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http://www.jstor.orgTHE VALUE OF ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION: 
AN ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS 
LOUIS  KAPLOW* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
C_ONCERNS  for the accuracy of adjudication permeate analyses of proce- 
dural rules and aspects of substantive law. Yet the value of more accurate 
adjudication is  largely  taken for  granted.  When this  is  done,  however, 
there is no basis for choosing  among rules (or for judges  to make discre- 
tionary judgments  when  applying them),  for it typically  is the case  that 
greater accuracy comes  at a cost.  Even if precise quantification of various 
benefits of accuracy  is impossible,  decision-making  will be enhanced by 
understanding why accuracy  may be desirable. 
This article presents  an economic  analysis  of the value of accuracy in 
adjudication.  It focuses  primarily on three considerations:  the effect  of 
inaccuracy  on  implementation  of  substantive  legal  norms  (individuals' 
incentives  to comply  with the law and proper assignment of future rights 
and obligations),  the administrative  costs  of inaccuracy  and attempts to 
reduce it, and costs  arising from the imposition  of sanctions. 
Accuracy  is  a  central  concern  with  regard to  a wide  range of  legal 
rules.  One might go  so far as to  say that a large portion of the rules of 
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civil,  criminal,  and administrative  procedure  and rules  of  evidence  in- 
volve an effort to strike a balance between  accuracy and legal costs.  The 
regulation of lawyers in litigation and some other settings is appropriately 
viewed,  for present purposes,  as an aspect of procedural rules concerned 
with  achieving  accurate  outcomes  while  not  incurring excessive  costs. 
Implicit judgments concerning the value of accuracy are central in assess- 
ing major legal reforms (such  as  substituting an inquisitorial system  for 
an adversarial system),  evaluating more modest changes (limiting discov- 
ery or the use of expert witnesses),  determining how adjudicators should 
exercise  discretion  (pretrial orders concerning the conduct  of litigation), 
and designing and using alternative dispute resolution (often specified by 
contract). 
Many  aspects  of  substantive  law  also  are concerned  with  accuracy. 
Most obvious  are special burdens of proof in particular areas of law (such 
as burden shifting in employment discrimination cases or res ipsa loquitur 
in tort law) and rules concerning what evidence  meets even conventional 
proof burdens (such  as whether  a dealer's  complaint to a manufacturer 
is  sufficient  evidence  of  an antitrust conspiracy  to  reach  a jury).  Also 
important are components  of substantive  law that determine which cate- 
gories  of  behavior  are to  be  distinguished.  For  example,  when  assault 
with intent to commit  murder is made a crime separate from simple as- 
sault, the legal system distinguishes two types of behavior, with the result 
that sanctions  are more precisely  tailored to individuals' conduct.  When 
various  categories  of  consequential  damages  are  allowed,  defendants' 
payments may reflect plaintiffs' actual harm more closely; but consequen- 
tial damages sometimes  are disallowed  because  they would be too costly 
to establish or may be so prone to error that defendants' payments would 
less  accurately reflect differences  in actual harm. 
This article is primarily concerned  with the question of why accuracy 
is valuable. It is assumed throughout that more accuracy can be obtained 
only at a higher cost.1 No attempt is made to determine which legal rules 
are more accurate,  by how  much,  and at what cost.  Such inquiries are 
best  made  case  by  case.  Rather,  the  analysis  seeks  to  illuminate  the 
following  sort of inquiry: if a contemplated  legal reform would increase 
accuracy  in some  specified  manner and increase  cost  by  a determined 
amount, is the reform desirable? 
' Some changes in the legal system might make it simultaneously  more accurate  and 
cheaper, but it is usually obvious that such changes are desirable  (from the economic 
perspective  employed  here) and thus analytically  uninteresting  to consider  them. ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION  309 
Other closely related questions are considered as well. In particular, 
this article addresses how the cost of improving  accuracy depends on 
other aspects of the legal system (such as the extent to which a law is 
enforced)  and how problems  of accuracy affect the appropriate  design of 
other  elements of the system (such as whether  sanctions  should  be higher 
or lower when inaccuracy  is a more serious problem).  The analysis also 
examines  expenditures  on legal advice, in particular  whether  private  par- 
ties' incentives to seek advice when contemplating  how to behave or 
when litigating  are socially appropriate.  (For example, do parties  tend to 
spend too much or too little to pursue their interests in adjudication?) 
Largely separate discussions will be offered for three important  legal 
contexts-the  determination  of damages, of liability, and of future  rights 
and obligations-because  the analysis differs substantially  for each. Part 
II examines a scenario in which different  acts cause different  levels of 
harm.  While  the average  level of damage  is known, or can be ascertained 
at low cost, the particular  level of damages  in a given case can be deter- 
mined only after more substantial  expenditures  are made. The question 
is whether it is worth the cost to measure  damages  more accurately. 
Accurate damage determination  may improve individuals'  incentives 
to behave properly.2  If I contemplate  committing  an act that is unusually 
harmful,  I will be more careful or more likely to refrain  from the act if I 
will be held responsible  for the true, higher  level of harm,  rather  than  for 
the lower, average level of harm for the class of acts. (Similarly,  if my 
act is less harmful  than is usual, holding  me liable for an accordingly  low 
amount  will prevent  excessive deterrence  of my activity or avoid creating 
excessive incentives to be cautious.) In contrast, if at the time I act I am 
unaware  whether my act will cause an atypically high or low level of 
harm, knowledge that an adjudicator  will determine  harm precisely ex 
post will not cause me to adjust my behavior accordingly. (If my act 
creates a risk of injuring  a pedestrian  and I have no way of knowing  how 
serious  a particular  injury  will be, making  the damages  I must  pay depend 
precisely on the details of the actual injury  cannot affect how carefully  I 
act.) Thus, greater accuracy is valuable only to the extent it involves 
dimensions about which individuals  are informed  at the time they act. 
Relatedly, Part II explores how greater accuracy in adjudication  influ- 
ences individuals' incentives to become better informed  before acting. 
Finally, Part II considers whether parties' incentives to present infor- 
2 This part also examines briefly how accuracy affects the compensatory  function of 
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mation concerning damages in adjudication are socially excessive  or inad- 
equate.  Part III addresses  accuracy in determining liability. The context  exam- 
ined is one in which there may be errors: individuals who truly committed 
acts causing  harm-referred  to  as the  "guilty"  for convenience3-may 
mistakenly be  exonerated  (false  negatives),  and those  who  actually  did 
not commit  harmful acts-the  "innocent"-may  mistakenly  be  sanc- 
tioned (false  positives).  Such  errors reduce  the  law's  deterrent  effect. 
The existence  of false  negatives  means  that those  who  commit harmful 
acts are less  likely  to  be  sanctioned,  while  false  positives  increase  ex- 
pected sanctions for innocent behavior.  Both effects  reduce the disincen- 
tive to commit harmful acts. 
Thus, one benefit of accuracy  is that it is a means of increasing deter- 
rence. The  analysis  considers  what  combination  of  expenditures  to  in- 
crease accuracy  and other methods-raising  enforcement  effort and in- 
creasing sanctions-enhances  deterrence  in the least  costly  manner. In 
addition, the  analysis  demonstrates  that  greater  reliance  on  accuracy 
allows  a given level of deterrence to be achieved while imposing sanctions 
less  often, which is beneficial whenever  sanctions themselves  are socially 
costly (as with imprisonment).  The analysis  also  considers  the relation- 
ship  between  accuracy,  the  level  of  sanctions,  and concerns  for  sanc- 
tioning  the innocent.  The  main result  is that,  when  error is greater, an 
enforcement  policy  that relies on higher rather than lower sanctions  may  be  appropriate.4 Other topics  addressed  in Part III are how  the burden 
of  proof  should  be  incorporated  into the article's  analysis  and whether 
individuals'  incentives  to present information in adjudication are socially 
appropriate. 
In  Part IV,  the  analysis  shifts  to  situations  in which  the  purpose  of 
adjudication  is to determine  either future behavior (such as in licensing 
procedures)  or eligibility for future public benefit payments.  Because  the 
analysis  of Parts II and III is concerned with incentives for ex ante behav- 
ior,  it is largely inapplicable in this setting. (When future rights and obliga- 
tions  are determined as a consequence  of prior behavior, both the analy-  sis  of Part  IV and that of the prior parts will be relevant.)  Determining 
3  The  analysis  applies  to the civil context as well. 
4  The  reason, briefly,  is that, in achieving  a given level of deterrence,  higher  sanctions  permit  enforcement  effort to be reduced, with the result that sanctions are mistakenly  imposed  less often;  moreover,  when enforcement  effort  is reduced,  raising  accuracy  (further  reducing  mistakes)  becomes cheaper  because the required  additional  expenditures  need be 
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the  value  of  accuracy  with  regard to  future  events  consists  largely  of 
identifying  the  social  benefits  associated  with  different  outcomes.  For 
example,  with  entitlements  to  social  security  disability  payments,  one 
would  be  concerned  with  the  benefit  of  supporting the  truly disabled, 
the implicit cost  of public expenditures,  and the extent  to which  giving 
payments to those  not truly disabled produces  benefits that fall short of 
the cost of public funds. While this formulation does not appear to deviate 
substantially from conventional  understandings, it is suggested that argu- 
ments about accuracy  in this context  often confuse  changes in accuracy 
with  implicit  changes  in  the  burden  of  proof.  This  part also  indicates 
how incentives  for individuals to pursue their claims tend to be socially 
excessive. 
Part V  examines  concerns  that fall outside  a conventional  economic 
analysis,  particularly those  related  to  the fairness  of  adjudication.  The 
discussion  suggests  that  some  such  concerns,  notably  the  problem  of 
mistakenly  sanctioning  the  innocent  (whether  imprisoning the  innocent 
or requiring individuals  not truly liable to make payments  to plaintiffs), 
are already reflected to a substantial extent  in the economic  analysis.  It 
is explained  that,  if one's  concern  about mistakenly  imposed  sanctions 
were greater than the economic  analysis credits, the implications for legal 
rules are not always what they appear to be. In addition, Part V addresses 
the extent  to which  process  values  have  significance independent  of ef- 
fects on results (as through improving accuracy by providing more infor- 
mation  to  decision-makers).  The  discussion  in this  part is  incomplete, 
in part by  design,  as  the  focus  of  this  article  is  on  economic  effects, 
and  in  part  by  necessity,  as  frequently  invoked  concerns  about  fair- 
ness  are  rarely  sufficiently  specified  to  allow  them  to  be  applied  and 
assessed. 
II.  ACCURACY  IN THE  ASSESSMENT  OF  DAMAGES 
This part considers  efforts to increase  accuracy in specifying  damages 
to be awarded in adjudication. The analysis  in Section A emphasizes  the 
relationship between  the degree of accuracy that is anticipated in ex post 
adjudication and how  individuals  choose  to  behave  ex  ante,  in light of 
the  sanctions  they  expect  to  be  applied  to  their conduct.  It takes  into 
account  how  the accuracy  of adjudication influences  individuals'  incen- 
tives to become  better informed before they act. In Section B, the analy- 
sis is applied to various legal settings.  Section C extends the discussion  to 
address parties' incentives  to present information in adjudication (thereby 
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A.  Accuracy  and Ex Ante Information5 
1.  How  the Value of Accuracy  Depends  on Individuals' Information 
at the Time They Act 
Consider a scenario in which individuals' contemplate committing acts 
deemed  to be harmful. (Such  acts  may include,  for example,  torts that 
involve  only a risk of causing harm, breaches  of contracts,  or violations 
of intellectual property rights of others.)  Acts in a given class are known 
to cause  a particular level  of  harm, on  average;  some  acts  cause  more 
harm than average and others  less.  (For example,  victims'  injuries may 
differ  in  severity,  and  given  injuries  may  impose  different  costs,  de- 
pending on characteristics  of the victim.)6 
To simplify the discussion,  assume that when they cause harm injurers 
are  always  liable  for  damages  and  the  only  question  is  the  extent  of 
damages.7 The adjudicator8 has two choices:  award damages equal to the 
5 Most of the analysis  in this section is demonstrated  in a formal  model  in Louis Kaplow 
& Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages (Working  Paper No. 4287, 
National  Bureau  of Economic  Research  1993)  (hereinafter  Accuracy  and  Damages).  Related 
issues are analyzed formally  in Louis Kaplow, The Optimal  Complexity  of Legal Rules 
(Discussion  Paper No. 97, Harvard  Law School, Program  in Law and Economics 1991). 
Some of the points in this section have been touched  on in investigations  of legal advice in 
litigation.  See Stephen  McG. Bundy & Einer Richard  Elhauge,  Do Lawyers Improve  the 
Adversary  System?  A General  Theory  of Litigation  Advice and Its Regulation,  79 Calif.  L. 
Rev. 313, 381-82 (1991);  Louis Kaplow  & Steven Shavell,  Legal  Advice  about  Acts Already 
Committed,  10 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 149, 158-59 (1990);  Louis Kaplow  & Steven Shavell, 
Legal  Advice about  Information  to Present  in Litigation:  Its Effects and Social  Desirability, 
102  Harv. L. Rev. 567, 588-90, 597-98 (1989)(hereinafter  Legal Advice). 
6 Considering  victim's incentives, which must be ignored  in this preliminary  investiga- 
tion, would  make  optimal  rules  more  complicated  (as when  one allows  a defense  of contribu- 
tory negligence)  or imperfect  (strict  liability,  even with a contributory  negligence  defense, 
leaves victims with excessive incentives  with regard  to their  activity  level). See, for exam- 
ple, Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980). Once 
rules are imperfect  to begin with, the value of accurately  applying  them will differ. One 
suspects the value may fall. In the simple case in which the rule is strict liability  with no 
defense, awards  based on actual  rather  than  average  harm  would  reduce  victims'  incentives 
to minimize  their  expected  harm;  if this effect were more  important  than  any  beneficial  effect 
of accuracy  on injurers'  behavior, greater  accuracy  would be undesirable.  (A decoupling 
approach,  in which injurers  paid damages  reflecting  actual  harm  but victims  received  com- 
pensation  equal to average  harm  may avoid this problem.) 
7 Among  the issues ruled  out is that concerning  incentives  to sue and  frivolous  litigation. 
It may be that accuracy would discourage  frivolous suits, although  greater  accuracy  in- 
creases litigation  costs, which in some contexts might  encourage  frivolous  suits. See, for 
example, Lucian Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract  a Settlement  Offer, 17 J. Legal Stud. 
437 (1988);  Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous  Lawsuits  on the Settlement  of Litigation, 
10 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 3 (1990);  David Rosenberg  & Steven Shavell, A Model  in Which 
Suits Are Brought  for Their Nuisance Value, 5 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 3 (1985). See also 
note 184 infra  (effect of accuracy  on incentive  to file claims  for public  benefits). 
8 For the present  analysis, this may be a judge, a jury, an arbitrator,  or whoever. ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION  313 
average  harm  for the class, or make an inquiry  into harm  in the particular 
case, in which event damages will depend on the actual level of the 
harm.9  This inquiry  entails some cost.1?  (For the moment,  it is immaterial 
whether  the inquiry  is undertaken  directly by the adjudicator,  by a gov- 
ernment  agency, or by the parties.)11 
This subsection examines the value of accuracy with regard  to influ- 
encing actors' behavior for various assumptions about the information 
individuals  have at the time they act. The influence  of accuracy  on incen- 
tives to become informed  ex ante and the value of accuracy with regard 
to compensating  victims will be considered in later subsections. 
a. When  Individuals  Cannot  Anticipate  the Actual  Level of Harm.  As- 
sume that individuals,  at the time they decide how to act, know only the 
average level of harm for the type of act they will commit but not the 
actual harm  their act will cause.12  Then it is apparent  that greater  preci- 
9 Thus, it is assumed  that "inaccurate"  decisions are unbiased,  rather  than involving  a 
systematic  and therefore  predictable  over- or underestimate  of the harm  caused by a type 
of activity.  Instances  in which  less accurate  assessments  of damages  may  involve systematic 
error  are considered  in Subsections  Alc,  A4, and B3. (If the problem  is simply  that, say, 
damage  awards  are 10 percent too low in a class of cases, one might  cheaply correct the 
problem  by using  a damage  multiplier  rather  than  by spending  more  in each case to improve 
estimates.) 
Relatedly, the assumption  is that it is easier (see note 10 infra) for the adjudicator  to 
learn  average  harm  than the actual  harm.  In this case, there are three  possibilities-actors 
ex ante know only average harm (considered  in Subsection a), both average and actual 
harm  (Subsection  b), and only actual but not average  harm  (which  is an interpretation  of 
the analysis in Subsection  4). When instead the actual harm  is easiest for the adjudicator 
to observe,  it usually  will be clear that  damages  should  simply  equal  actual  harm,  regardless 
of whether  actors ex ante know actual harm  or only average  harm  (the latter  being noted 
in Subsection  B3). (A caveat may arise when defendants  are risk-averse,  as discussed in 
Subsection  A3, or on account of effects on settlement,  as indicated  in note 97 infra.) 
10  The simple story examined  here can be understood  in a manner  that captures  a range 
of more realistic situations.  One might  imagine  that, after an initial  inquiry,  a tribunal  has 
some information  on the actual harm  in a particular  case but that uncertainty  nonetheless 
remains.  At that point, it has an estimate  of the actual  harm,  which  can be taken  to be the 
"average"  for purposes  of the analysis  in the text. (Thus,  the "average"  need not be across 
some broad  class of acts about which the adjudicator  may know little but, rather,  can be 
understood  as simply the best estimate before undertaking  additional  investigation.)  The 
tribunal  could, however, engage  in further  inquiry-at some cost-to  refine  its estimate  for 
the particular  case. This refined  estimate, even though  itself imperfect,  can be taken  to be 
the "actual" harm  for present  purposes. See Subsection  c infra. 
l1 The only effect is that  the optimal  damage  award  depends  on who pays for the inquiry. 
In this simple  case, if the defendant  pays for the inquiry,  the optimal  damage  award  if an 
inquiry  has been undertaken  simply equals the actual  harm.  If the government  undertakes 
the inquiry,  the optimal  damage  payment  must  be increased  by the cost of the inquiry.  See, 
for example, A. Mitchell  Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Enforcement  Costs and the Optimal 
Magnitude  and Probability  of Fines, 35 J. Law. & Econ. 133  (1992). 
12  It sometimes will be the case that individuals  would initially  know the actual harm 
they might  cause but not the average  that an adjudicator  might  estimate,  perhaps  because 314  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
sion ex post, in adjudication, is a waste of resources because  information 
learned later cannot improve the earlier decision. 
For concreteness,  suppose  that  the  contemplated  act,  using  a toxic 
substance,  may cause  harm of 5,  10, or 15, each with equal probability, 
if a storage tank leaks.  The average harm is 10. If liability always equals 
10, the decision  whether  to use the  substance  and about how careful to 
be in preventing leaks  will reflect that, if a leak occurs,  liability will be 
10. If, instead, damages would equal 5, 10, or 15, depending on the actual 
harm that results, the analysis is the same, for it is assumed that individu- 
als do not know  the actual harm ex  ante.  Since  they will be held liable 
for damages of 5,  10, or 15 with equal probability, their expected  liability 
is  10, which  will induce  the  same behavior  as if the average harm were 
used as the basis for damages.13 (This assumes  that individuals care only 
about expected  liability and not its variance-that  is, that individuals are 
risk-neutral. Risk aversion  is considered  in Subsection  3.)14 
Thus,  greater  accuracy  has  no  effect  on  behavior,  while  it entails  a 
positive  resource  cost.  As  a result,  accuracy  is of no value and greater 
accuracy is undesirable. 
b.  When Individuals  Do  Anticipate  the Actual  Level  of  Harm.  As- 
sume that individuals,  at the time they  act,  do know the actual level  of 
harm their particular acts  will  cause.15 If  damage payments  reflect the 
level  of  harm caused,  behavior  will  be  improved.  For  example,  if the 
benefit from using the toxic  substance  is 8,  it will be used  if the actual 
harm and  thus  the  damage  award  will  be  5,  but  not  if  the  harm and 
they are unsure  of what evidence the adjudicator  initially  will have in making  its estimate 
(see notes 9 & 10 supra). The scenario examined  in Subsection  4 can be interpreted  as 
including  this case. See also Subsection  B3 infra  (possibility  that adjudicator  must inquire 
into actual  harm  because it does not know an individual's  average  harm). 
13  The argument  in the text involves an oversimplification.  If expenditures  will be made 
ex post, then they affect behavior  ex ante either because the actor will anticipate  having 
to make the expenditures  or because they will be reflected  in an optimal  damage  award. 
See note 11 supra. Thus, behavior would differ. (More acts would be deterred;  greater 
precautions  would  be undertaken.)  But the primary  conclusion  that  accuracy  is undesirable 
is unaffected,  for whatever  behavior  is produced  with accuracy  could have been produced 
without  accuracy  by simply  raising  the damage  award  from 10 to 10 plus the cost of accu- 
racy. That would produce precisely the same behavior  as with accuracy  but would not 
involve the expenditure  of resources. 
14  See also note 32 infra. 
15  Accuracy  also will tend to be valuable  when individuals  do not know the actual  level 
of harm  but take some action-not  observed  by the adjudicator-which affects the magni- 
tude of actual  harm  in a known manner.  (Thus, actors ex ante may know more about  the 
harm  that will arise than the adjudicator.)  Then damages  equal to average  harm  will give 
actors insufficient  incentive to reduce expected harm. See Kathryn  E. Spier, Settlement 
Bargaining  and the Design of Damage  Awards, J. L. Econ. & Org. (in press); Subsection 
B3 infra  (providing  analysis similar  to what would be applicable  in such a case). 315  ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION 
damage award will be  10 or 15. In contrast,  if the damage award will be 
10, to reflect the  average  harm, the  substance  would  not be used  even 
when the actual harm is only  5. Thus,  accuracy  avoids  excessive  deter- 
rence. Similarly, if the benefit from using the substance were 12, it would 
be used even  when the actual harm would be  15 if damages were based 
on the average harm of  10, but not if damages  equaled the actual harm 
of 15. Accuracy  thereby provides efficient deterrence that otherwise  may 
be lacking.16 
The  question  remains  whether  this  improvement  in behavior  on  ac- 
count  of  accuracy  is  sufficiently  desirable  to justify  the  cost  of greater 
accuracy.  If most leaks caused harm of 10 and accuracy were expensive, 
the cost of establishing whether there were exceptions  in each case would 
exceed  any benefit in improving behavior.  Similarly, accuracy would be 
undesirable if decisions  concerning  use  of the substance  would be unaf- 
fected  in any event.  (This would  occur either if most users had benefits 
less than 5, in which case  they would not act regardless of whether dam- 
ages were estimated  accurately,  or if most users had benefits exceeding 
15, in which  case  they  would  act in any event.)17 In contrast,  accuracy 
will be valuable when  it is cheap and the effect  on use of the substance 
would involve  substantial benefits. 
c.  The Optimal Degree  of Accuracy.  When individuals are informed 
about the level  of harm that their acts might cause,  the optimal level  of 
accuracy will be a matter of degree.  It would no doubt be undesirable to 
treat auto and aircraft collisions  as  a single  group because  the average 
level  of  harm in  each  category  differs  greatly;  moreover,  the  cost  of 
distinguishing  these  categories  is  extremely  low.  Similarly,  one  would 
wish  to  distinguish  cases  in  which  cars  hit  pedestrians  from  those  in 
which  cars  crush  strands  of  grass  on  someone's  lawn.  It may be  very 
costly,  however,  to determine whether a victim's  loss  in future earnings 
will be 30 percent  or 40 percent  of his previous  potential,  while  such a 
difference may have little effect  on precautions. 
In addition,  the more refined the  damage inquiry, the less  likely  it is 
16  The text oversimplifies  because behavior  with accuracy  would also reflect  the cost of 
the accuracy,  as discussed in note 13. Accounting  for this would not fundamentally  change 
the analysis.  (For example,  if accuracy  costs 1, the expected  total costs for individuals  who 
commit acts causing harm  of 5, 10, and 15 would be 6,  11, and 16, respectively, and the 
example  in the text would illustrate  the same potential  effects of accuracy.) 
17 If they would not act, of course, the litigation costs would not be borne in such 
instances. If one considered  instead a scenario  in which individuals  would act regardless 
and the only question were how much care they would take, the analogous  argument  is 
that,  if care  would  be little  influenced  by the differences  in actual  harm,  it would  be wasteful 
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that any difference in outcome  will be anticipated at the time individuals 
decide how to act.  One who drives into a pedestrian in a crosswalk may  cause harm of thousands  or millions of dollars.  But the degree of harm 
will not  be  known  to  the  driver in advance.  Thus,  a practice  of  using 
averages-say,  for  types  of  accidents  or types  of  injuries-may  have 
little effect  on behavior  even  when  the  range of potential  difference  in 
actual harm is vast.18 
2.  The Degree  of Ex Post Accuracy  and Individuals' Incentives 
to Acquire  Information Ex Ante 
a. How Accuracy  Ex Post  Induces  Individuals to Acquire Information 
Ex  Ante.  The analysis  in Subsection  1 assumes  that individuals,  at the 
time they  decide  how  to  act,  either  are or are not  informed about  an 
aspect  of the harm they might cause.  Often, however,  the extent to which 
individuals are informed will  be  a matter of  choice.  For example,  one 
who  contemplates  using dynamite may not know very precisely how dan- 
gerous it is  but may be  able  to  consult  experts  who  are more familiar 
with  the  extent  of  the  danger from various  uses.  The more individuals 
are  willing to spend,  the more information they can acquire.'9 
The  central point of this subsection  is that the extent to which individu- 
als  will choose  to become  more informed ex  ante,  when  contemplating  how  to act, will depend on the degree of accuracy they expect in adjudica- 
tion,  ex post.  An individual will  see  no value in making an expenditure 
to  learn whether her act will cause harm of 5, 10, or  15  if she knows that 
a  court will award 10 in any event.20 Only if she anticipates that the court 
will  learn the level of harm more precisely,  and make damages reflect the 
actual  harm, will she have an incentive  to learn the actual level  of harm 
ex  ante. 
18  Relatedly, if the driver  knew in advance that substantial  harm  would be caused, she  would  have been more careful.  And if she knew that reckless driving  in  her  lifetime  would  in  fact produce  trivial  harm-that is, if she knew in advance  that she would be extremely 
lucky-she  would have been less careful. The point is that such differences  in outcomes  are  often unknown  in advance, in which case they do not affect behavior. 
19  One can think  of the two cases in Subsection 1 as representing  extremes  with regard  to  ex ante information  costs. The case in which individuals  were assumed  to be informed  is  similar  to one in which information  is extremely  cheap, while the one in which they are  not  informed  might be one in which information  is prohibitively  expensive. (In many in-  stances,  of course, predicting  future  events with  high  precision  may  be virtually  impossible; 
one  can think of the information  cost as infinite, in which case individuals  would never 
acquire  the information  in any event.)  20  If  the actor and potential victim are in a contractual  relationship,  there may be an  incentive  with regard  to negotiation  of price and adjusting  behavior. See note 41 infra 
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Whether  individuals  ultimately  acquire  the information  is another  mat- 
ter. Individuals  will acquire information  when the benefits of being in- 
formed  exceed the costs of the information.  The benefit  of being informed 
is that one can better adjust  one's behavior  in light of actual legal conse- 
quences. For example, if there is a probability  that one will learn that 
actual harm, and thus expected liability, is very high, and one would 
choose not to act in that instance, then the benefit of information  would 
be the difference between the net value of not acting and that of acting 
in such an instance, weighted  by the probability  one expects to learn  that 
actual  harm  is very high.21  Similarly,  one might  learn that harm  is lower 
than anticipated  and in that instance commit an act that one otherwise 
would have refrained  from doing. 
To illustrate,  suppose that the use of a toxic substance  will cause harm 
of 5, 10, or 15, each with equal probability,  and that the user does not 
know the actual  harm  that would be caused. If the benefit  from using the 
substance  is 12, it would be used in the absence of information  because 
the expected liability is 10. If one acquired  information  on actual harm, 
the substance would not be used in the event that harm was 15.22  This 
produces  a gain of 3-liability  of 15 is avoided while the benefit of 12 is 
forgone. Because the probability of this outcome is  1/3, the expected 
value of information  is 1.23 Thus, information  would be acquired  if and 
only if the cost of the information  were less than 1. 
Information  ex ante is valuable  only if what is learned  will be reflected 
in awards  ex post. Similarly,  as noted in Subsection 1, accuracy  ex post 
is valuable only if individuals also have accurate information  ex ante; 
that statement  can now be interpreted  to include both the case in which 
individuals  already  have the necessary information  and that  in which they 
will be induced to discover it. And individuals  will be induced to learn 
information  ex ante only if their benefits  from adjusting  behavior  exceed 
the cost of the information. 
21 The value of not acting can be taken to equal zero as a reference  point. The value of 
acting  would be the benefit of the act minus the expected sanction;  in this instance, the 
value is negative. (If the difference  were positive, it would be desirable  to act even if one 
learned  that harm  was very high. Then the individual  would have had no reason  to acquire 
the information.) 
22  When  the user learns that actual harm  is 5 or 10, the substance  will be used, for the 
benefit  is 12, but  this is the same  result  as when information  is not acquired.  Thus, acquiring 
information  affects behavior  only in the case in which actual  harm  is 15. 
23  An analogous  example  can be constructed  for the case in which one is induced  to act 
by favorable  information.  If the benefit from using the substance  were 8, one would not 
use it without  first obtaining  information  about  actual  harm,  because the expected liability 
is 10. If the information  indicates  that actual  harm  is only 5, the substance  would  be used, 
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b. The Social  Value of Accuracy  Ex Post.  Having established  when 
accuracy is valuable,  it remains necessary  to consider whether the value 
is worth  its  cost.  In  Subsection  lb,  when  individuals  simply  were  as- 
sumed to be informed, accuracy ex post was desirable when the benefit of 
the improvement in behavior was greater than the cost of more accurate 
adjudication ex  post.  In the present  context,  the benefit with regard to 
behavior must exceed  the  sum of the cost  of accuracy  ex  post  and the 
cost of individuals' becoming  informed ex ante.24 
c. Whether Individuals' Incentives  to Acquire Information Ex Ante Are 
Excessive or Inadequate.25  It is noted  in Subsection  a that individuals 
acquire information when  the anticipated benefits to themselves  exceed 
its cost.  This subsection  explores  whether,  ex ante, individuals will tend 
to acquire more or less  information than is  socially  appropriate (taking  as given  that adjudication  will  involve  the  expenditure  of  resources  to 
reach  accurate results ex post). 
First, consider  a benchmark  case.  Assume  that liability is  strict,  the 
only uncertainty  concerns  damages,  and  individuals  properly  estimate 
the  value  of information to  themselves.26 Then,  if the information con- 
cerns how  a court  will  properly  assess  harm,  individuals'  incentive  to 
acquire  information will be socially  appropriate. 
The  reason incentives  are proper in this simple context relates to famil- 
iar  properties of a rule of  strict liability.27 When individuals acquire in- 
formation  about  the  true  level  of  harm,  and  expected  damages  equal 
expected true harm, they  will be  induced  to behave  appropriately. Re- 
latedly,  the private benefit from their change  in behavior will equal the 
social  benefit.  (The private  benefit  will  consist  of  gains  or losses  from 
modifying  one's  activity,  which are assumed to be social gains or losses 
as  well.  Changes  in  expected  liability  payments  will  equal  changes  in 
expected  harm, which is a correct measure of the external social cost  of 
one's  activity.)  Finally,  individuals' private cost  of information involves 
real  expenditures  of resources  (usually, time or expenditures to purchase 
experts'  services),  which  will  thus  be  a proper  measure  of  the  social 
cost  of  information.  Therefore,  when  individuals  compare their private 
24  In  contexts in which harm  is probabilistic-as is typical  with accidents-note  that ex  ante  costs will be borne more frequently  than ex post costs. 
25  This topic is the subject of Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Private  versus Socially  Optimal  Provision  of Ex Ante Legal Advice, 8  J.  L. Econ. & Org. 306 (1992). 
26  More  precisely,  the assumption  is that  their  probability  distribution  of what  they might  learn  is  correct-rather  than, say, biased toward expecting that what they learn will be  systematically  more positive than is actually  the case. 
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benefits and costs,  their calculus  will precisely  reflect social benefits and 
costs,  and their incentive  to become  informed will be correct. 
Before discussing  contexts  in which this conclusion  may not hold, it is 
useful to explore  the implications  of social  and private incentives  to ac- 
quire information being properly aligned. On one hand, alignment implies 
that there is no case  for taxing  or subsidizing  individuals'  purchases  of 
such  information28-which  often  may  consist  of  legal  services.  On the 
other  hand,  alignment  of  ex  ante  incentives  leaves  open  the  question 
whether the degree  of  accuracy  ex  post  is appropriate. The analysis  of 
private incentives  to acquire ex  ante information takes as  given the as- 
sumption that damage awards will be accurate with regard to the type of 
information they  might acquire.  It remains the case  that such accuracy 
will be desirable only when the benefits from improved behavior exceed 
the  ex  ante  costs  of  information  acquisition  plus  the  ex  post  costs  of 
greater accuracy.  That private incentives  are correct establishes  only that 
the  benefits  from  improved  behavior  exceed  the  ex  ante  information 
costs.  Whether the difference between  these benefits and costs  (summed 
across the relevant population  of individuals)-which  is the net ex  ante 
benefit-exceeds  the ex post cost  of greater accuracy  is another matter. 
Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  private  incentives  to  acquire  infor- 
mation ex  ante,  even  given  the  level  of  accuracy  in adjudication,  need 
not  be  socially  appropriate.  In  the  context  explored  in  Subsection  4 
below,  in which  ex  ante  information  concerns  errors adjudicators will 
make ex post,  private incentives  tend to be excessive.  Similarly, when a 
negligence-type  rule is employed,  incentives  may be excessive.29 
For present purposes,  the possibility  that private incentives  to acquire 
information may be socially excessive,  or inadequate, complicates  a prac- 
tical inquiry into the value of accuracy but not the fundamental elements. 
It is still the case that one must weigh the benefits with regard to behavior 
against the costs  of ex ante and ex post information. The only difference 
is that assessing  the benefits with regard to behavior and the costs  of ex 
28  This is not to deny that there may be a role for government  intervention.  If there are 
public  good aspects to such information,  it may be efficient  for the government  to collect 
and publish  it-for  example, by producing  or subsidizing  the private  creation  of databases 
with accident statistics. Aside from such acts, however, individuals'  incentives to learn 
about  what is in such databases  and how the information  may be applied  to their  behavior 
would  be appropriate.  See also Subsection  B2c infra. 
29  See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 25. A "negligence-type"  rule is meant  to include 
any rule  in which  one is not liable  for any damages  if one's behavior  falls within  a protected 
zone, but one is liable if one's behavior  is outside the protected  zone. This would include, 
for example,  the negligence  rule in tort law, contract  rules  finding  breach  only when behav- 
ior crosses some threshold,  and public regulations  that impose penalties  only for violating 
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ante information may be  more complicated  when  ex  ante incentives  to 
acquire information are inappropriate. 
3.  Compensatory  Objectives  and Risk Aversion 
When parties are risk-averse-that  is, when uncertain losses  are more 
detrimental than a certain loss  with the same expected  value-the  level 
of actual damage awards will affect their welfare directly,  in addition to 
affecting their behavior.30 To illustrate this,  recall the example  in which 
actual harm may be 5,  10, or 15, each with equal probability. 
Consider first the effect with regard to injurers (defendants), who have 
been the focus  of the analysis  thus far. In the  scenario  examined  here, 
inaccuracy corresponds  to  making  defendants  pay  the  average  harm 
caused by their type  of act (10), while accuracy involves  each defendant 
paying the  actual harm caused  by  her particular act  (5,  10, or  15). By 
construction, the  expected  payment  (the mean) is the  same in both in- 
stances (10). But the variance differs: there is no variance if the average 
harm  is paid by all injurers, while there is positive  variance if each injurer 
pays  the actual harm she causes  (the standard deviation is approximately 
4.1).31  As a result,  greater accuracy  in adjudication increases  the risk to 
which  defendants are exposed.  On this account,  accuracy is less desirable 
than  otherwise.32 Thus, when individuals are uninformed ex ante, so that 
there  is no behavioral benefit, accuracy would be undesirable even if the 
greater  accuracy  were free!33 
For  plaintiffs,  the effect  would  tend to be the opposite.  Assume  that 
plaintiffs' damages  compensate  for  pecuniary  losses  (or nonpecuniary 
losses, such as physical  injuries, that are fully restored by expenditures 
of  money).  Then, if they are risk-averse,  the optimal amount of compen- 
30  The possibility  that one may care about accurate  compensation  independent  of con-  cerns  for imposing  risk is considered  in Subsection  VA1. 
31  More  generally,  there is positive variance  and  thus risk  in both  instances  if an injurer's  act  causes harm  only with a probability,  for then when no harm  arises, the payment  is zero. 
Nonetheless,  the variance  is greater  when, in instances  where  harm  occurs, individuals  pay  for  actual  harm  rather  than the average  harm  for such instances. 
32  A complete analysis would be more complicated  because, when defendants  are risk- 
averse,  optimal  damages  would no longer equal actual harm.  Rather,  they would involve  some  compromise  between  optimally  controlling  behavior  ex ante  and  minimizing  the impo-  sition  of risk. (Relatedly,  the effect of damages  on behavior  differs when individuals  are 
risk-averse.)  The statements in the text would, nonetheless, remain valid even if such 
complications  were taken into account. 
33  If individuals  become informed  before they act, the risk of a more accurate  system is 
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sation  equals the actual  loss.34  Hence, if damages  equal average  harm  for 
classes of plaintiffs  rather  than actual harm, some plaintiffs  (those with 
harm  of 15)  will be undercompensated  and others (with actual  harm  of 5) 
will be overcompensated  (as both types receive damages of 10). There- 
fore, plaintiffs  will bear risk when results are inaccurate, but not when 
they are accurate. 
Thus, taking  risk aversion into account could make accuracy more or 
less desirable  than otherwise, depending  on whether  plaintiffs'  or defen- 
dants' risk aversion were more significant.  Of course, all these conclu- 
sions are mitigated  to the extent parties are insured.35 
4.  Variation:  Reduction of Error  That Is Costly to Predict36 
The analysis in this section has considered the situation in which an 
inaccurate  adjudication  is one that involves awarding  damages equal to 
the average harm  for a class of activity, while accurate adjudication  in- 
volves damages equal to actual harm. Consider  now a different  type of 
inaccuracy.  Suppose that, if the adjudicator  is inaccurate  with regard  to 
a particular  act, it awards too high a level of damages  in some instances 
and too low a level of damages  in others but that, on average, its awards 
are correct. To be concrete, consider the case in which true harm  is 100, 
34  If injuries  are nonpecuniary,  optimal compensation  need not equal actual loss. For 
example, if individuals  incur substantial  pain and suffering,  but this does not alter their 
marginal  utility  of wealth, the optimal  compensatory  payment  on account  of risk aversion 
is zero. See, for example, Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 228-35, 
245-54 (1987).  As between payments  that will equal some class average  and payments  that 
will reflect  one's actual  pain and suffering,  risk-averse  individuals  would  prefer  the former. 
In this instance, therefore, both risk-averse  plaintiffs  and risk-averse  defendants  would 
prefer the less accurate system, with damages  equal to average harm  rather  than actual 
harm. 
35  To the extent insurance  coverage  is nearly  complete,  the behavioral  benefits  of liability 
rules  will tend to be less, making  the very presence  of a system of adjudication  that makes 
injurers  pay damages  less likely to be desirable;  relatedly,  an expensive  and  precise system 
will be less attractive  than a cheaper,  imprecise  one. Accuracy  may still be valuable  to the 
extent that insurance  companies  can identify injurers  in advance as those likely to cause 
more or less harm  than average. (That is, the question  becomes whether  insurers,  rather 
than whether  actors, know actual harm  ex ante.) For then premiums  will be adjusted  for 
such individuals,  which may affect behavior.  (For example, those whose acts cause more 
injury  and thus who must pay high insurance  premiums  may forgo the activity. Or busi- 
nesses will reflect  these costs in prices, leading  to a more  efficient  allocation  of resources.) 
See also Bharat  Sarath,  Uncertain  Litigation  and  Liability  Insurance,  22 RAND  J. Econ. 218 
(1991)  (suggesting  that liability  insurance  may be undesirable  if there  is error  in determining 
liability). 
36  This scenario  is modeled  in Kaplow  & Shavell, supra  note 25, at 312-16, although  that 
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but  10 percent  of the time damages are mistakenly  determined to be 75 
and  10 percent of the time they are 125. Expenditures making the adjudi- 
cation  accurate eliminate  such errors.37 
When  an individual cannot anticipate the error a court will make in her 
particular  case,  accuracy  is of no value.  The reason is that, in such in- 
stances,  she will act based on the expected  award (100), which is assumed 
in  this instance  to equal the actual harm. (The difference with the prior 
analysis  is that here behavior  is ideal when  individuals are uninformed 
about  the precise  outcome  of the adjudication.) 
When  an individual  does  anticipate  the  error a court will  make,  she 
may  behave  incorrectly.  For  example,  if she  anticipates  that the  court 
will  err on the side of awarding damages  that are too low  (75), she will 
take  too little precaution or may be induced to undertake an activity the 
benefits  of which exceed  the expected  liability payment but are less than 
the  true expected  harm (for example,  an activity with a benefit of 90). If 
the  court were to make the expenditure necessary  to eliminate the error, 
however, then  the expected  liability payment  would  equal the true ex- 
pected harm (100),  so  behavior  would  be appropriate. Thus,  as before, 
accuracy  is valuable in the case in which individuals have information ex 
ante.  (The difference is that here individuals' information concerns  court 
error  in the  case  in which  adjudication  is  inaccurate,  rather than true 
harm  in the case  in which adjudication is accurate.) 
Finally, suppose  that individuals do not know the error an inaccurate 
court  will make but can predict it if they make an expenditure on informa- 
tion.38  In this case,  in contrast to that in Subsection  2c, such information 
is  undesirable (and thus, a fortiori, less  socially  valuable than its positive 
cost). After all,  uninformed  individuals  behave  properly (because  their 
expected liability  equals  actual  harm), while  informed individuals  may 
behave improperly (when they learn that actual liability differs from ac- 
tual  harm).39  Thus, in principle, one might wish to discourage the acquisi- 
tion of such information.  Alternatively,  this problem would be a reason 
to increase accuracy:  when  adjudicators are accurate,  there is no longer 
any error to learn. Individuals are therefore induced to behave better, and 
they no longer have an incentive  to make wasteful ex ante investments  to 
37  The analysis would be qualitatively  the same if the expenditures  reduced  either the 
probability  or magnitude  of such errors  rather  than eliminating  them entirely. 
38  For example,  they may hire  a lawyer  who can predict  typical  jury biases or who knows 
that  rules concerning  consequential  damages  omit certain  components  of harm. 
39  Another possible dimension of improper  behavior may involve ex ante or ex post 
activity  designed  to mislead  the adjudicator.  Greater  accuracy  may discourage  such costly 
efforts, or it might lead individuals  to substitute  more costly techniques  that will remain 
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predict errors (that no longer will be made). Thus, greater  expenditures 
on accuracy  ex post are  justified  when the cost is exceeded by the benefit 
from  improved  behavior  plus the reduction  in ex ante information  acquisi- 
tion costs.40 
In summary, as before, accuracy tends to be valuable to the extent 
individuals  are informed ex ante. The primary  difference concerns the 
incentive to become informed.  In the original  scenario  addressed  in Sub- 
sections 1-3, more accuracy ex post induces greater  information  acquisi- 
tion ex ante; here, more accuracy reduces the incentive to acquire  infor- 
mation ex ante. In both instances, greater accuracy tends to improve 
behavior  if individuals  are informed  ex ante but has no effect on behavior 
if they are uninformed  (and will not be induced to become informed) 
ex ante. 
B.  Applications 
This section applies the analysis in Section A to various  legal settings. 
Some of the applications  are generic, consisting  of comments  on the type 
of setting or legal question to which the analysis applies. Others are 
specific and are offered because of their independent  significance  as well 
as their value in illustrating  the analysis more concretely. 
1.  Generality  with Regard  to Areas of Law and Types of Rules 
The scenarios outlined and analyzed in Section A are most directly 
interpreted  as involving accident law and a rule of strict liability.  But the 
analysis is more general in a number  of dimensions. First, much of law, 
particularly  public regulation,  is like tort law in that it attaches sanctions 
to activities that may cause harm to third parties. This includes most 
substantive  rules outside of the contractual  context. 
Second, in contractual  settings, the scenario is directly applicable  to 
questions of breach. Whether  rights are determined  by background  law 
or terms supplied by the parties, the question remains how accurately 
an adjudicator  should determine harm.4'  (The concrete question might 
40  Note that in this instance a more accurate  legal system may reduce total legal costs. 
This would be the case if the reduction in ex ante expenditures  on legal advice itself 
exceeded the greater  legal costs from more accurate  ex post adjudication. 
41  One particular  application  involves the problem  of foreseeability  of unusually  high 
damages,  as in the famous case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 
(1854).  It is familiar  that, if the promisor  is not informed  about  when the harm  from  breach 
is severe, there is no benefit with regard  to the promisor's  behavior  in making  damages 
high  in such cases. See, for example, Richard  A. Posner, Economic  Analysis  of Law ? 4.9 
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involve,  for  example,  the  measurement  of  expectation  damages.)  Also 
note that parties often provide for alternative dispute resolution  in their 
contracts.  This  merely  transfers the question  of the appropriate degree 
of accuracy to another forum. Parties might specify the level of accuracy 
with which they would like an arbitrator to resolve  disputes or they may 
choose  a particular provider of dispute resolution  services  that is known 
to provide a desired level of accuracy (at a cost that reflects how accurate 
an outcome  is usually produced).42 Or, they may specify liquidated dam- 
ages,  making an inquiry into actual harm unnecessary. 
Third, the scenario was presented in a manner suggesting that adjudica- 
tion concerned  the level  of damages rather than, say, whether an activity 
is of a type or was  conducted  in a manner that subjects one to liability. 
But the scenario can readily be interpreted differently.  Suppose,  for ex- 
ample,  that acts  in a given  class  are of two  actual types,  one  harmless 
and another causing a certain degree of harm (denoted  H).  An accurate 
adjudication would apply a rule of no liability to the harmless type of act 
and liability (with damages of H) to the harmful type of act. An inaccurate 
adjudication-one  that failed to distinguish the two types of acts-might 
award damages of less  than H to all acts (where the amount of damages 
equaled  the  average  harm-H  times  the proportion of acts  in the class 
that are of the harmful type).  But this is functionally equivalent to saying 
that there is liability for all acts  and,  if the  court is accurate,  damages 
equal true harm, which is zero for the harmless type of act. As a result, 
interpreting the scenario as involving uncertainty over two possible levels 
of harm (rather than a potentially  unlimited range of possibilities),  when 
one  possible  level  is  zero,  indicates  that  the  analysis  is  applicable  to 
accuracy in categorizing  activity. 
An important qualification is that the analysis  assumed in all contexts 
that the  legal  rule took  the  form of  strict liability-that  is,  the  injurer 
pays the victim's  harm even  if the injurer behaved  reasonably.  Under a 
negligence-type  rule,  the  analysis  may  be  more  complicated,  as  small 
differences in behavior might be responsible for great differences in liabil- 
ity payments.43 The results,  nonetheless,  are qualitatively similar. If indi- 
Liability  for Breach  of Contract:  The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,  7 J. L. Econ. & Org. 
284 (1991). 
42  Those designing  alternative  dispute  resolution  mechanisms,  such as for the American 
Arbitration  Association  or in state statutes  providing,  say, mandatory  arbitration  for com- 
plaints that a new car is a lemon, confront the same questions facing architects  of the 
conventional  legal system (with the possible difference  that constitutional  constraints  may 
be absent). 
43  See note 29 for elaboration  on what is meant  by negligence-type  rules. The effects of 
a negligence  rule  on behavior  in the presence  of uncertainty  is explored  in Richard  Craswell ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION  325 
viduals  are uninformed  ex ante, there is no value in an adjudicator  having 
more precise information  ex post.44  If individuals  are informed  ex ante, 
the anticipation  of greater accuracy ex post will improve  behavior.45  Fi- 
nally, individuals' incentive to acquire information  ex ante will be af- 
fected by the degree of accuracy that will be employed ex post.46 
2.  Formulating  Legal Commands: 
Rules versus Standards  and Complexity47 
Two recurring  questions concerning how legal commands should be 
formulated  involve the appropriate  degree of complexity  or detail  (should 
acts and outcomes be distinguished  finely or grouped  more broadly)  and 
whether commands should take the form of rules or standards  (should 
the content be determined  and announced  in advance, in a rule, or left 
to an adjudicator,  in a standard).  As I have argued  elsewhere, it is useful 
to distinguish  these two aspects of formulation  and consider them sepa- 
rately. The reason is that two dimensions are involved that often can be 
varied  independently.  To illustrate, one could have a simple rule (a pen- 
alty of $10 for any parking  violation), a complex rule (a detailed  schedule 
& John E. Calfee, Deterrence  and Uncertain  Legal Standards,  2 J. L. Econ. & Org. 279 
(1986); Jason S. Johnston, Bayesian Fact-finding  and Efficiency: Toward an Economic 
Theory  of Liability  under  Uncertainty,  61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 137  (1987);  Shavell, supra note 
34, at 79-83, 93-99. As Kahan notes, however, the doctrine  of causation  may eliminate 
the characteristic  of a negligence  rule that results in substantial  differences  in liability  for 
small  differences  in behavior,  in which  case the analysis  is closer to that  applicable  to strict 
liability.  See Marcel  Kahan, Causation  and Incentives  to Take Care  under  the Negligence 
Rule, 28 J. Legal Stud. 427 (1989). The effect of these differences  with regard  to ex ante 
incentives to acquire information  is examined in Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 25, at 
311-12, 316. 
44  While this argument  is more complex because of the manner  in which a negligence 
rule affects behavior  in the presence of uncertainty,  it still holds. See Kaplow  & Shavell, 
Accuracy  and Damages,  supra note 5, at 18 n.21. 
45  With a negligence rule, there are scenarios in which straightforward  use of greater 
accuracy  could  make  behavior  worse. See Craswell  & Calfee,  supra  note  43, at 287  (showing 
that  reducing  the variance  in estimates  under  a negligence  rule  can result  in worse  behavior). 
But it will generally be true that if one used the more accurate information  optimally 
(including  the possibility  of adjusting  the rule, as by changing  the criterion  for due care), 
one could improve  the control of behavior. (It is trivial  to ensure that matters  do not get 
worse; if they did, the information  could be made legally irrelevant.  Usually, however, 
there would be a way to use the better information  to improve  behavior.) 
46  Distortions  in the incentive  to acquire  information  ex ante under  a negligence  rule are 
analyzed  in Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 25, at 309-12, 314-16. 
47  The analysis  in this subsection  largely  derives  from Louis Kaplow,  Rules versus Stan- 
dards:  An Economic  Analysis, 1992  Duke L. J. 557. A formal  analysis  of complexity  appears 
in Kaplow, supra note 5. Some of the points concerning  rules versus standards  appear  in 
Anthony Ogus, Information,  Error  Costs and Regulation, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 411 
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of parking penalties  that depend  on location,  time of day,  day of week, 
and driving conditions),  a simple standard (the adjudicator sets  the pen- 
alty,  taking into  account  only  that there was  a parking violation),  or a 
complex  standard (the  adjudicator considers  location,  time of day,  and 
so on in setting the penalty).  This subsection  briefly considers  the rela- 
tionship between  these  aspects  of  formulation  and the  problem  of  ac- 
curacy. 
a. Complexity.  The question of the appropriate degree of accuracy in 
adjudication and that of the appropriate degree of complexity  or detail in 
legal commands are closely  related.  Consider the scenario introduced in 
Subsection A1.  The question  posed  was  whether it is worthwhile  under 
a rule of strict liability for an adjudicator to inquire into the precise level 
of harm rather than holding defendants  liable for the average  harm for 
the relevant class  of acts.  Compare this question to one of how detailed 
a rule for harmful behavior  should be.  A  simple rule specifies  that acts 
in the described  class  of behavior  shall give  rise to liability of a stated 
amount and sets  this  amount  equal to  the  average  harm of  acts  in the 
class. A complex  rule specifies  a damage award for each type  of actual 
case that  may  arise,  with  the  award equal  to  actual  harm.  Under  the 
simple  rule, evidence  concerning  the actual harmfulness of an act would 
be irrelevant.  Under  the  complex  rule,  one  could  not  determine  what 
damage amount was  applicable  unless  one  first assessed  the particular 
act that  occurred.  In essence,  the  simple  rule  is  a  command  that the 
adjudicator  not  invest  in  more  accurate  information,  and the  complex 
rule  is a command that the adjudicator invest  in more accurate informa- 
tion.  Thus, the specificity of substantive rules is one of the ways in which 
a  legal system  indicates  how accurate its adjudication is meant to  be.48 
The  difference  between  simple and complex  standards involves  much 
the  same choice.  A simple standard, recall, is one that does  not involve 
the  adjudicator making a precise  ex  post  inquiry but, rather, making its 
decision  as to the appropriate level of damages in a more general fashion. 
In  contrast,  a complex  standard is  one  in which  the  adjudicator takes 
into  account more factors-which  requires more precise information-in 
determining  what  damages  must be  paid.  (The difference  is that,  when 
standards  are used  rather than rules,  the determination of what penalty 
corresponds  to  what  set  of  facts  is  made  by  the  adjudicator,  ex  post, 
rather  than the promulgator of the rule, ex ante.) 
Furthermore,  when adjudicators operate under standards, as they often 
48  Of  course, a substantive  law could be even more detailed:  it could specify what evi-  dence  counts as proof of an element  or, similarly,  indicate  what damages  shall  be awarded  for  various  combinations  of evidence that may be presented.  See note 49 infra. ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION  327 
do at least implicitly,  they must decide what level of specificity  is appro- 
priate. If a law merely commands that those who park improperly  shall 
pay accordingly,  the adjudicator,  in interpreting  the law, must determine 
how many dimensions  in how much detail are to be considered;  the more 
complex the inquiry, the more refined the necessary evidence will be. 
Thus, a decision on how complex the standard  should be is a decision 
about how accurately  the adjudicator  should assess behavior.49 
b. Rules versus Standards.  Compare  a complex-that  is, a detailed, 
precise, accurate-standard to a complex rule  with the same content (one 
that provides for the same level of damages for each particular  act that 
may arise).50  How, if at all, would their effects on behavior differ? If 
individuals  were, in either case, unaware of the detail of the law, they 
would act in the same manner  under  both formulations,  in a manner  that 
reflected  the expected liability for a class of acts rather  than the actual 
harmfulness  of their particular  act. Similarly,  if they were aware of the 
precise consequences that would follow from their  activity in either  case, 
they would act the same way, in a manner  that reflected the particular 
harm  of their act. 
But it is plausible to suppose that individuals'  information  will differ 
under the two formulations.  In particular,  individuals  may find it easier 
(cheaper)  to become informed  under rules. Because the specification  of 
particular  consequences is stated in advance, legal consequences are less 
costly to determine  than under a standard,  where by definition  the state- 
ment of damages  for various acts is left to an adjudicator,  ex post. Thus, 
even when the content does not differ, individuals  may often be more 
informed  about the particulars  in rules than in standards  at the time they 
act and thereby conform their behavior more closely to the law's com- 
mands.51 
Moreover, it may sometimes be true that even if one compared  a less 
49  One might  say that, once an element is deemed  to be relevant  in a particular  manner, 
there  remains  the question  of how accurately  to ascertain  that element. But the distinction 
is largely  semantic. In principle,  one can state a functional  relationship  directly  from evi- 
dence to outcomes: findings  on elements are a function  of evidence, and outcomes are a 
function  of findings  on elements;  thus outcomes  are a composite  of these two functions  and 
can be determined  from the evidence. The deemed relationship  between evidence and 
findings  can be viewed as part of the system of legal commands  just as is the relationship 
between findings  and outcomes. When evidentiary  presumptions  and proof burdens  are 
stated formally,  this is obvious, but the logical relationship  remains  the same even if the 
relationships  are implicit. 
50  The validity of this sort of comparison  is discussed in Kaplow, supra note 47, at 
586-96. 
51  The suggestion  that some standards  may be more accessible to individuals  than rules 
is criticized  in id. at 596-99. 328  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
complex  rule to  a  more  complex  standard (perhaps one  that could  be 
more detailed because  hindsight is better than foresight), the former, less 
complex command may result in behavior that is more precisely in accord 
with  underlying  legal  norms.  The  reason  is  that the  standard's  added 
detail may be unknown,  and too difficult to predict, ex ante (for the very 
reason  that  hindsight  has  yet  to  be  obtained).  Thus,  the  conventional 
view  that there is an advantage  in allowing  more room for adjudicators 
to examine  context-specific  factors,  rather than specifying  legal conse- 
quences  in advance  under a simpler scheme,  exhibits  an error in logic. 
This view  implicitly assumes  that the more precise  ex post result will be 
reflected in ex ante behavior; but this will not occur if the ultimate content 
of the legal command cannot cheaply  be predicted in advance  (which is 
often a major premise of those presenting this justification for standards). 
Moreover, failing to announce (formulate into rules) even simpler aspects 
of an appropriate outcome  may make it more difficult for individuals to 
take them into account  in their behavior,  leading to worse  results.  This 
analysis is simply an application of the main principle of Subsection  A1: 
accuracy  ex  post,  in adjudication,  is valuable with regard to improving 
behavior only  to the extent  individuals  have the relevant knowledge  ex 
ante, when they decide  how to act. 
There is, however,  an exception  to this maxim. Recall from Subsection 
A4  that,  if errors are made  in formulating the  law  and individuals  can 
predict errors in the outcome  of adjudication, their behavior will be worse 
than if they cannot. Assume that rules, when promulgated, and standards, 
when applied, contain errors. Errors under rules are easier for individuals 
to learn and thus more likely to affect behavior in an undesirable manner. 
In contrast, precisely because  individuals are more poorly guided by stan- 
dards, they  are less  likely  to  be influenced  (adversely)  by errors in the 
application of standards.52 
c.  Predictability  of Legal  Outcomes.  The arguments in Subsection  b 
are based on the preceding analysis indicating that predictability is desir- 
able when  greater  accuracy  is  involved  and undesirable  when  error is 
involved.  These  ideas  have  implications  aside  from  questions  literally 
involving the law's formulation. If one wants the law to be a more precise 
guide to behavior,  individuals need the relevant knowledge.  One way to 
disseminate it is through rules, which  state the consequences  that attach 
to  various  behavior.  Another  way  to  disseminate  information to  guide 
52  Even this exception  has a caveat: if errors  under  standards  are likely, individuals  have 
an incentive  ex ante to expend resources  to predict  them. To the extent individuals  under- 
take such expenditures,  behavior  will be little  better  under  standards,  while more  (wasteful) 
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behavior  is through  the outcomes of adjudication.  Obviously, one benefit 
of more accurate outcomes is that individuals in the future will have 
better  guidance  concerning  their behavior.53 
But adjudication  tends to be a costly and ineffective way to collect and 
disseminate  information.  Often more will be spent adjudicating  a single 
case than would be required  to fund a substantial  empirical  study of a 
mass of cases. Moreover, if a case settles, typically  few individuals  learn 
of the information  produced through the litigation. Even if there is a 
verdict, it is extremely difficult  to interpret  a black-box pronouncement 
by a  jury, without statements  of reasons, weight given to factors, or basic 
evidentiary  findings.54 
Thus, while adjudication  does, at substantial  cost, provide  some useful 
information,  governments should consider alternatives  that involve di- 
rectly gathering  and disseminating  information.55  For example, if one is 
concerned about the waste-disposal behavior of dry-cleaning  establish- 
ments  or auto repair  shops, study of appropriate  methods  of disposal and 
costs of inappropriate  methods, followed by distribution  of the results, 
may be an important  accompaniment  to substantive law regulating  the 
activity. (Of course, such investigation  would simultaneously  provide  the 
information  needed to give appropriate  content to the legal commands.) 
Even if one chose to enforce compliance  using  a conventional  tort  regime, 
there would exist the advantage that, when adjudicators  set damages 
equal to actual harm, individuals  would be more likely to know actual 
harm  at the time they decide how to act. (In addition, adjudicators  may 
find that they could assess harm more accurately and more cheaply if 
such an investigation  had been undertaken.) 
In contrast, the legal system may function  more effectively if its errors 
and idiosyncrasies are less predictable. Randomly  assigning  judges and 
making  it difficult  to learn how juries actually reach decisions interfere 
with prediction.56  Limiting  appellate  review of fact-finding,  usually  justi- 
53  This subsection  considers  only the effect of predictability  on ex ante behavior,  not on 
settlement. 
54  See James  F. Blumstein,  Randall  R. Bovbjerg,  & Frank  A. Sloan,  Beyond  Tort  Reform: 
Developing  Better Tools for Assessing Damages for Personal  Injury,  8 Yale J. Reg. 171 
(1991)  (exploring  the problem  and advocating  solutions);  Randall  R. Bovbjerg,  Frank  A. 
Sloan,  & James  F. Blumstein,  Valuing  Life and Limb  in Tort:  Scheduling  "Pain  and Suffer- 
ing," 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 908 (1989). 
55 See  note 28 supra. 
56  Prediction  of jury behavior  is impeded  by using general  verdicts rather  than detailed 
special questions and by limiting  lawyers' abilities  to interview  jurors afterward.  See, for 
example,  Tanner  v. United States, 483 U.S.  107 (1987)  (Federal  Rule of Evidence 606(b), 
which prohibits  juror testimony about deliberations  to impeach  a verdict, applied  to testi- 
mony about  jurors' alcohol and drug use during  trial). In addition,  jury outcomes are not 330  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
fled on unrelated grounds,  also  has the effect  of limiting the knowledge 
base  of  legal  experts  and  individuals  who  contemplate  activity  in the 
future.  Of course,  all  such  limits  also  disguise  what  may be  important 
information reflecting the  (at least  roughly) accurate  findings of  adjudi- 
cation.57 
3.  Inquiries about Ex Ante  Knowledge  versus  Ex Post Consequences 
There are two important differences  between  inquiring into an actor's 
ex  ante knowledge  and inquiring into what is known ex  post,  including 
the  actual  consequences  of  her  acts.  First,  different  inquiries  may  be 
appropriate as a matter of principle.  For example,  ex ante knowledge- 
what  individuals  actually  knew  or  should  have  known-may  be  most 
relevant for incentives58 while  ex  post  consequences  may be most rele- 
vant for determining appropriate compensation  of risk-averse plaintiffs.59 
Second,  different inquiries may involve  different costs.  In some cases, 
ex post consequences  will be obvious,  but ex ante knowledge  (actual or 
what an actor should have  known)  may be extremely  difficult to deter- 
mine. In others,  ex  ante knowledge  may be  straightforward while  there 
is substantial dispute concerning what actually happened. (When an indi- 
vidual commits an act that is readily classified and has a known distribu- 
tion of consequences,  ex  ante knowledge  may be apparent; yet whether 
a particular harm was  caused  by an act or how  extensive  the harm was 
to a particular victim may be quite difficult to ascertain.) 
Such considerations  have an important bearing on accuracy in adjudi- 
cation. For example,  it is often the case that individuals can know at most 
the probability distribution of consequences  of their acts.  (The effect  of 
a form of  air pollution  may be  reasonably  well  known  statistically,  al- 
though it is impossible  to predict whether  particular molecules  that are 
emitted will ever enter anyone's  lungs and what damage they will cause 
that otherwise  would not have occurred.) At the same time, greater accu- 
officially  reported,  making  it difficult  to match  outcomes  to case characteristics.  Of course, 
commercial  services and  grapevines  communicate  such information,  although  rather  imper- 
fectly. (Each decision is noisy and involves many factors; generalizing  across a broad 
sample  of such decisions will thus be difficult,  particularly  with informal  networks  in which 
communications  are incomplete  and perhaps  purposely  biased to reflect  positively on the 
lawyer  telling  the story.) 
57  Intentionally  designing  the legal system to make it more difficult  for individuals  to 
understand  how it operates  raises questions  of legitimacy  and  accountability  that  go beyond 
the scope of this article, although  some such issues are noted in Section VC. 
58  See Steven Shavell, Liability  and the Incentive  to Obtain  Information  about  Risk, 21 
J. Legal Stud. 259 (1992). 
59 See  Subsection  A3 supra. ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION  331 
racy ex post may be extremely  expensive.  (Determining whether a plain- 
tiff was actually exposed  to a defendant's  emissions  and, if so, the extent 
to which his illness can be attributed to such exposure  may be very costly 
and unavoidably  uncertain.) 
In such instances,  not only would  accuracy  be costly,  but it would be 
of  no  value.  Evidence  of  the  harm the  defendant  caused  the  plaintiff 
would be only a fragment of the data concerning the defendant's expected 
harm. Of course,  if the defendant will be held to account  accurately for 
all harm caused,  the defendant's expected  liability will equal the expected 
harm, as  well  as  it can  be  ascertained  ex  ante.  But basing  liability  on 
averages (or substituting fines or taxes on emissions,  with payments equal 
to expected  harm, for tort liability) would induce the same behavior. 
Accurate information about ex post consequences  is useful in two types 
of settings.  One, the focus  of Section A, is when an individual knows (or 
might be induced to learn) ex ante the actual harm her act will cause.  If 
precise  prediction  is possible  for particular acts,  behavior will be better 
if damages reflect actual harm rather than average harm for a class. 
Accurate  information  about  ex  post  consequences  is  also  valuable 
when an adjudicator has poor information on average harm (in particular, 
worse  information than the actor).  Suppose,  for example,  that there are 
two  groups  of  actors:  the  first type  causes,  on  average,  a low  level  of 
harm (5), and the  second  type  causes,  on average,  a high level  of harm 
(15).60  One option would be to provide liability equal to average harm for 
both types taken together (10). But then the first type will be overdeterred 
and the  second  underdeterred.  Another  option  is  to  consider  average 
harm, determining  averages  for each  type  (so  liability is higher for the 
second  type-15  rather than the  two  groups'  average  of  10). Suppose, 
however,  that this is impossible  (or too costly).  A third option is to award 
damages equal to  actual harm. This  option  might be best,  even  though 
individuals  of  both  types  could  not  predict  actual harm. The  reason  is 
that, under this rule, the first type of individual-who  causes,  on average, 
a low level  of harm (5)-has  a low  expected  liability (5) and the second 
a high expected  liability (15). It is, of course,  possible  that in a particular 
case  the  low-harm-causing  type  would  pay  a high award,  reflecting  an 
atypically high level  of harm, and the high-harm-causing type would pay 
a low  award,  but on  average  this  would  not  be  true.  Even  though the 
harm in the  particular case  is  only  a  single  data point  on  individuals' 
60  A similar  argument  would apply if actors faced the same options but one dimension 
of their  actions affected  the expected level of harm.  (For example,  greater  care may reduce 
the expected harm  caused by the activity, as modeled  in Spier, supra  note 15.) 332  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
types,  it  is  an  unbiased  estimate,  so  using  it  would  lead,  ex  ante,  to 
appropriate behavior.61 
The  conclusion  of  Section  A  must,  therefore,  be  qualified: there  are 
instances  in which  accurate  assessments  that cannot be anticipated will 
be  useful.  Note,  however,  that the  qualification is  modest.  For,  while 
individuals cannot predict the actual accurate assessments,  they are as- 
sumed to be able to predict the distribution of such assessments.  More- 
over,  in this instance the argument depended on the fact that, with accu- 
rate assessments,  different  types  of  individuals  would  know  that their 
expected  damage payments  would,  accordingly,  differ. If individuals did 
not know whether they  were  the type that causes  higher or lower harm 
on average,  there would be no value derived from the court determining 
actual damages  ex  post  rather than relying on  the average for all such 
individuals. 
4.  Scheduling  Sanctions 
a. Personal Injuries.  A conscious  decision  to reduce accuracy by set- 
ting damages  equal  to  average  harm rather than particular harm is  re- 
flected in proposals to provide a damage schedule for personal injuries.62 
Workers' compensation  schemes  use such an approach to some extent.63 
But scheduling of damages is not generally employed in the tort context. 
It is useful  to compare  other,  similar settings  in which  schedules  are 
used.  First-party  insurance  is  a  good  example.  Policies  often  provide 
particular payments  for loss  of limb,  rather than indicating that,  in the 
event  of injury, an inquiry will be made to determine actual losses.  Pre- 
sumably,  if  more  precise  compensation  were  thought  to  be  worth  the 
61 Damages equal to actual harm will not be the best estimate one could make of an 
injurer's  expected harm. To illustrate,  if low types cause an average  harm  of 5 and high 
types an average  of 15, and actual harm  in a given case were 20, 20 could hardly  be the 
best estimate  of the defendant's  expected harm.  An adjudicator  could set damages  equal 
to the best estimate  of the defendant's  expected harm  (using  Bayes' rule)  rather  than  setting 
damages  equal to actual harm.  Expected liability  would be the same whichever  method  is 
used. As suggested  by the analysis in Subsection  A3, this alternative  would be preferable 
if defendants  were risk-averse  (because there would be less variance  in damage  awards) 
but inferior  if plaintiffs  were risk-averse  (because compensation  would be less accurate). 
62  See, for example, 2 American  Law Institute, Enterprise  Responsibility  for Personal 
Injury  217-27 (1991); Bovbjerg, Sloan, & Blumstein, supra note 54. Another proposal 
involves allowing statistical  claims profiles  to be introduced  as evidence or to determine 
awards  without  resort  to a trial.  See Kenneth  S. Abraham  & Glen  O. Robinson,  Aggregative 
Valuation  of Mass Tort Claims,  53 L. & Contemp.  Probs. 137  (1990). 
63  See Donald  T. DeCarlo  & Martin  Minkowitz,  Workers  Compensation  Insurance  and 
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cost of particularized inquiries, policy provisions  would differ.64  Another 
instance  is  disability  insurance,  where  policies  typically  provide  for  a 
fixed percentage  of one's  prior wage for covered  disabilities.65 
In  other  first-party insurance  contexts,  such  as  homeowners'  insur- 
ance,  there is a mix of  scheduling  and inexpensive  forms of alternative 
dispute resolution.  Scheduling  arises  implicitly from advance  appraisals 
of particular objects,  so it is particularized.66  In other instances,  or when 
property is damaged without  losing  all its value,  a common  provision  is 
for binding arbitration.67 First-party  auto  insurance  for injury by  unin- 
sured motorists  operates  similarly.68 
Thus,  in a wide  range of  contexts,  particularly including contractual 
settings,  one observes  damage scheduling or the use of very inexpensive 
dispute resolution.  It is unclear whether these practices should be seen as 
demonstrating the superiority of employing less accuracy in conventional 
adjudication. On one  hand, the questions  posed  often are the same.  On 
the other hand, ex  ante provision  by contractual arrangement offers ad- 
vantages  not  available  when  contracts  are silent  (rather than providing 
for liquidated damages)  or in contexts  such as accidents  in which there 
is no prior contractual arrangement.69  In addition, the use of alternative 
64  Health  insurance  policies, of course, typically  reimburse  medical  expenses, which are 
particularized.  (Policies also typically omit entirely  pain and suffering,  most probably  be- 
cause it is inefficient  for individuals  to insure against such nonpecuniary  losses, see note 
34 supra; costs of accurate assessment could be avoided by scheduling.)  Life insurance 
involves  scheduling  of sorts, in that  an insurance  policy will provide  for a specified  payment. 
But in such instances, as well as with provisions  providing  a specified  amount  for loss of 
limb, the amount  is contracted  for in advance  by the insured  party, so it is likely to reflect 
some particulars  of that individual's  circumstances.  (Nonetheless, there will remain  varia- 
tions that are not taken into account.) 
65  As discussed  previously  (see note 64 supra),  to some extent  this reflects  that  individuals 
choose the level in advance by contract, to suit their particular  situation.  But disability 
coverage tends to be rather  standardized  (often purchased  in a group  plan through  one's 
employer  that provides the same coverage for all employees who participate),  suggesting 
that  the benefits  of more  precisely  tailored  compensation  are not viewed as worth  the costs. 
66  Nonetheless, the value is usually  determined  in an inexpensive  manner  in contrast  to 
disputes over valuation in the context of litigation. This could reflect that precision of 
compensation  is not that valuable. Alternatively,  it may be that, with ex ante valuations, 
there is only a small probability  that they will ever govern the amount  that must be paid, 
and premiums  adjust  to reflect  expected payments,  whereas  ex post each dollar  difference 
in the valuation  will translate  directly  into a difference  in payment. 
67  See, for example, Thomas W. Mallin  & Michael  E. Bragg, eds., Annotations  to the 
Homeowners  Policy 145-46 (2d ed. 1990). 
68  See, for example, 3 Irvin E. Schermer,  Automobile  Liability Insurance  33-8 to -10 
(2d ed., revised 1993). 
69  Even with accidents, insurance  companies  might  behave  in a manner  leading  to differ- 
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dispute resolution  may  not  reflect  a differing view  about  the  value  of 
accuracy but,  rather, a belief  that different procedures  can produce  as 
good or better accuracy  at lower cost.70 
b. Fines.  Fines,  as for parking violations,  can be formulated in vari- 
ous ways,  with  different  levels  of  specificity  for  different  settings  and 
with  the amount stated ex ante or left open to be determined ex post.  (In 
the  language of Subsection  2, they can be more  or  less complex,  and they 
may take the form of  rules  or standards.)  Fines  often  take the form of 
simple rules  (it is  the  simplicity  that is  most  relevant  for present  pur- 
poses).  Thus,  there  may  be  a  $10  fine  for  a  parking meter  violation, 
regardless of  whether  one  was  illegally  parked for  ten  minutes  or ten 
hours, or  there  may  be  a  $15  fine  for  double-parking,  regardless  of 
whether there was  no traffic or one  caused  gridlock for an hour. There 
are some gradations: blocking an intersection  and parking in a taxi space 
may  be treated differently.71 While further gradation of fines would proba- 
bly be useful  (as the above  examples  suggest),72 no one would advocate 
any careful inquiry into harm done  in particular instances.  A number of 
factors contribute to  such a result: the stakes  are low,  the cost  of accu- 
an insurance  company could state in its policies that, whenever a dispute involved an 
opposing  party with the same clause in its policy, a particular  form of alternative  dispute 
resolution  would be employed, or both sides would operate  in a certain  manner  in court 
litigation.  Or insurance  companies might cooperate informally.  (When both parties to a 
dispute  have the same insurer,  there generally  is no litigation;  while determining  liability 
may  not be very important  in such instances, damages  would still matter,  as they would 
affect the payment from the insurance company to the victim, who has first-party  in- 
surance.) 
70  The schemes may use expertise more effectively and avoid duplicative  gathering  of 
information  and misleading  presentation  to inexperienced  fact-finders.  Relatedly,  the desire 
of insurance  companies  to maintain  a good reputation  may lead them to provide  effective 
dispute  resolution. 
Debates  on alternative  dispute resolution  often address  accuracy  (perhaps  indirectly,  in 
calling  it second-class  justice). See, for example, Edward  Brunet,  Questioning  the Quality 
of Alternate  Dispute  Resolution,  62 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (1987).  Such debates  usually  offer little 
analysis or proof concerning actual differences in accuracy. More relevant for present 
purposes  is that  they do not indicate  why or how much  accuracy  is valuable  in the particular 
context. 
71  Many  parking  tickets list dozens of offenses, although  there  may  be only a few different 
fine levels. Thus, rather  than to determine  the penalty, the purpose  of the categories  is 
largely  to provide  information  as to the offense-perhaps  so the offender  will know what 
the police officer  believes was done illegally. 
72  Further  gradation  would not be appropriate  if enforcement  probabilities  already  reflect 
differences  in expected harm, so that the expected sanction  equals expected harm  even if 
sanctions  imposed  are not proportional  to expected harm.  (Police may use their discretion 
in a manner  such that tickets are more often given for more serious behavior.  But during 
times when traffic  is busy, police may be more heavily  engaged  in directing  traffic  and  thus 
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rately measuring  harm may  be  high,  and  individuals  at  the  time  they 
park  illegally would know only approximately how much disruption they 
would cause.73 
In  other regulatory settings,  such as the violation of pollution or safety 
standards, fines  also  tend  not  to  be  particularized.  In these  instances, 
another  factor may contribute to the desirability of such fines: harm may 
be probabilistic and not have occurred.74 Alternatively,  it may be that it 
is extremely  difficult to trace particular injuries to particular violations.75 
Thus, average expected  harm may be far cheaper to ascertain than actual 
harm.  Moreover,  there is little difficulty with regard to diminished incen- 
tives because  the injurer also  is unable to determine actual harm at the 
time she decides  how to act.76 
c. Criminal Sentencing.  In the past decade,  the federal government 
has adopted  criminal  sentencing  guidelines,  involving  a highly detailed 
sanction schedule.77 For present  purposes,  two  features  of these  guide- 
lines are  notable.  First,  they  often  involve  substantial  differentiation 
among offenses  causing different levels  of harm-providing  different sen- 
tences, for example,  for different degrees  of offenses  against the person 
and for different amounts  of money  involved  in crimes  such as theft or 
fraud.78 In most  instances,  one  suspects  that individuals  contemplating 
such crimes would know at least approximately how severe the resulting 
harm would be.  (For example,  a thief usually knows  whether a crime is 
likely to involve  a few  thousand  dollars or a few million.) Thus,  making 
73  To illustrate,  determining  actual  harm  might  require  knowing  who was inconvenienced 
and  what mission  was delayed as a result. This inquiry  would  be extremely  expensive, and 
a violator  could not readily anticipate  the outcome. In contrast,  if one double-parks  near 
an intersection  during  rush hour, one can anticipate  causing significant  disruption,  and it 
would  be simple  for a police officer  to ascertain,  at least approximately,  the significance  of 
the  disruption. 
74  One might  ask why there is a fine when there is no harm,  rather  than  liability  for harm 
done if and when harm arises. In addition  to the argument  that follows in the text, an 
important  reason  is that  injurers  may  be  judgment-proof  for the large  harm  they might  cause 
(but  not for the lower fines  for violations  detected  in advance).  See Steven  Shavell,  Liability 
for Harm  versus Regulation  of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 (1984). 
75  See  id. 
76  This is one of the cases noted in Subsection  3. 
77  See United States Sentencing  Commission,  Guidelines  Manual  (1992).  The motivation 
for the guidelines  involved in significant  part concerns for a more open process and for 
uniformity  (see id. at 2), suggesting  values of promoting  fairness and avoiding  potential 
abuses of power (see Subsection VC3 infra)  in addition  to instrumental  objectives of the 
criminal  law, such as effectively  combating  crime.  Reducing  the cost of adjudication  was not 
a primary  issue, as the previous  discretionary  system did not devote significant  resources  to 
determine  an appropriate  sentence. 
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sanctions  depend  on  harm is  desirable  with  regard to  its  effect  on be- 
havior. 
Second,  the guidelines  do  not usually  require expensive  adjudication 
of the  degree  of  harm. For example,  in determining the  amount of  the 
loss for theft and related offenses,  the commentary indicates that "[t]he 
loss  need  not be  determined  with  precision,  and may be  inferred from 
any reasonably  reliable information available,  including the scope  of the 
operation."79 And facts are not determined at a trial but, rather, using less 
formal sentencing  procedures.80 Thus,  the  system  operates  in a manner 
suggesting  that  approximate  accuracy  is  a reasonable  objective,  while 
great precision  is not worth the additional costs  involved.  An important 
exception,  however,  is that some  of the differentiation provided by the 
guidelines  involves  different  sentences  for  formally  different  crimes 
rather than for  different  degrees  of  harm from  a given  type  of  crime. 
Establishing the crime category requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
at trial or a plea bargain made with the knowledge  that the prosecution 
would otherwise  have had to meet such a standard.81 
5.  Market-Share Liability 
When  it  is  difficult  to  determine  which  of  many  potential  injurers 
caused a particular plaintiff's  injury, market-share liability has been pro- 
posed and adopted in some instances.82 For example,  if four manufactur- 
ers each sold an identical drug that caused delayed illness in some users, 
each manufacturer might be held responsible  for the fraction of damages 
corresponding to its percentage of sales in the relevant period. Arguments 
in favor of such an approach usually combine the difficulty of determining 
79  Id. ? 2B1.1, commentary,  application  note 3. 
80 See id. ? 6A1. In particular,  when a matter  is disputed, section 6A1.3 provides  for 
information  to be submitted  in addition  to the presentence  report, but the commentary 
indicates a preference  for written submissions  of counsel and affidavits  when possible. 
(The commentary  further  indicates  that sentencing  judges are not restricted  to admissible 
information  and that a preponderance  of evidence standard  is appropriate,  which presum- 
ably reduces the prosecution's  need to offer expensive proof unless the defendant  is able 
to present  credible  contrary  information  on the disputed  factor.) 
81 This, of course, raises the question  why proof that one has committed  a more serious 
crime  is subject  to high standards  guaranteed  by the Constitution  while proof  of the degree 
of a given offense-which  may have as great an effect on the sanction-is  not subject  to 
such requirements. 
82  See, for example, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,  26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 
Cal. Rptr. 132,  cert. denied,  449 U.S. 912 (1980);  David  Rosenberg,  The Causal  Connection 
in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public  Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 
849 (1984).  A related  approach  involves the use of statistical  sampling  of cases to determine 
damages. See Robert G. Bone, Statistical  Adjudication:  Rights, Justice, and Utility in a 
World  of Process Scarcity, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 561 (1993). ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION  337 
causation,  the need to provide incentives for potential  injurers  to behave 
properly,  and the desire to compensate victims. 
Observe that in the context just described, a market-share  approach 
may be preferable  even if causation  from  particular  manufacturers  to 
particular injuries could be  established. First, establishing causation 
would cost more. Second, establishing  causation  would not alter the ex- 
pected liability of each manufacturer,  so there is no behavioral  gain to 
be had from accuracy. Third, it would not affect victim compensation  in 
the case posed. Moreover, in some important  variations,  victim compen- 
sation would be worse from an insurance perspective if individualized 
causation  were established. Suppose, for example, that  one manufacturer 
with 25 percent of the market  was bankrupt.  Then, under market-share 
liability,  each victim would receive 75 percent compensation.  If, instead, 
causation  were accurately  traced, 75 percent would receive full compen- 
sation  and 25 percent  would receive nothing.  Victims  as a class are worse 
off because their situation  is riskier,  while manufacturers  are  unaffected.83 
Thus, even if causation can be established accurately, it may cost more 
and produce a less desirable  outcome. 
There is one obvious and important  caveat. The above analysis as- 
sumes that it is known that the products or processes that may have 
caused the injury  are fungible.84  If this is not known, tracing  causation 
to particular  victims would be a way of determining  how much  harm  each 
manufacturer  actually caused. This argument  parallels that in Subsec- 
tion 3 concerning  the benefit of determining  actual harm  when expected 
harm caused by an individual  or group is not known. Note, however, 
that tracing harm in perhaps thousands of particular  cases may not be 
the best way to gather the relevant information.  A statistical study may 
be of similar  accuracy and far less costly.85  Even if it is less accurate, it 
83  Accurately  tracing  causation  would introduce  additional  sources of uncertainty.  For 
example,  if 50 percent  of illness was due to natural  causes, a market-share  approach  (prop- 
erly  conceived)  would  provide  50 percent  compensation  to everyone  rather  than 100  percent 
compensation  to half  of those who were ill. Also, accurate  tracing  in any setting  will impose 
some risk  on defendants.  One's expected  liability  has less variance  when  one is held  respon- 
sible for one's market  share than for the injury  one actually  caused (which may be more 
or less, even though  it is, on an expected-value  basis, precisely  equal to one's share). 
84  It is also assumed  that the injuries  are caused by the manufacturers  rather  than other 
sources, which suggests similar  qualifications. 
85  It could not be more accurate  than determining  the actual  cause of harm  in each and 
every case. Many  errors,  however, will be made  investigating  each case, particularly  given 
the methods  of proof employed in adjudication.  (In particular,  victims have incentives to 
mislead  the fact-finder  about  causation  since their  compensation  depends  on it. If, instead, 
they were asked to participate  in a statistical  study that would determine  manufacturers' 
liability, but they were provided a level of compensation  that was independent  of the 
outcome  of the study, the information  obtained  might  be better.)  Particularly  when illness 338  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
may  be  sufficiently  cheaper  to justify  its  use  in place  of  conventional 
tracing of particular injuries. 
C.  Parties'  Incentives  to Present  Information in Adjudication 
The discussion  in Sections  A and B largely assumes  that the legal sys- 
tem-those  who promulgate rules or judges  who apply them-is  able to 
choose  the degree of accuracy in adjudication. In adversary adjudication, 
however,  this choice  is made largely through a scheme  of indirect con- 
trols. Legislators and judges do not determine which witnesses  will testify 
at trial. Rather, they establish  a system  in which private litigants present 
whatever information they believe  will further their cause.  The quantity 
and type of information a fact-finder ultimately considers is thus a product 
of procedural and substantive  law and the parties' choices.  This section 
considers  whether  parties'  incentives  to present  information tend to be 
socially appropriate, excessive,  or inadequate.86 
This question  has an important bearing on the design of the legal sys- 
tem.  If parties'  incentives  tend  to  be  socially  appropriate, there would 
be no need to worry greatly about too  much or too little accuracy.  One 
could leave  it to the litigants,  who would  produce the correct level.87 If 
has multiple  causes, statistical  evidence may be the only reliable  evidence available  in any 
event. Relatedly,  in statistical  studies with large samples, a fairly high error  rate in each 
observation  may be unimportant  as long as errors  in measurement  are unbiased  because 
errors  will tend to cancel. Adjudication  of an individuals'  right to recover is not usually 
conducted  under  the assumption  that error  is permissible  because  it evens out across cases. 
See  Section  C infra. 
86  As noted in the Introduction,  questions  of whether  a given system produces  accuracy 
at the least cost-for  example, whether an adversary  system is an efficient producer  of 
information-are beyond the scope of this inquiry.  Also, the reader  should  keep in mind 
that the present analysis concerns incentives to present factual information  rather  than 
incentives to develop and present arguments  about the appropriate  content of the law. 
While many elements of the analysis here are applicable  in the latter  context, there is the 
additional  consideration  that determination  of the law in a particular  case is a public  good 
to the extent the case serves as a precedent, a factor suggesting  that private incentives 
would be insufficient.  See also Subsection  B2c supra. 
87  This is a familiar  invisible-hand  argument.  Note that a general  belief in the efficient 
functioning  of markets  does not provide  any basis for inferring  good results  in adjudication 
(unless  the form of adjudication  was itself chosen in the market,  as when it is specified  by 
contract).  The reason  is that virtually  every act of a litigant,  by design,  hurts  the opponent; 
externalities  are thus a central characteristic  of behavior  in litigation.  This fundamental 
difference  between litigation  and other goods and services is often overlooked. See, for 
example, Jerry L.  Mashaw, Bureaucratic  Justice: Managing  Social Security Disability 
Claims  80-81 (1983) (arguing  that litigation,  unlike dispute resolution  concerning  benefit 
determinations,  is largely analogous  to other markets,  such as that for cars, with respect 
to individuals'  incentives to incur  litigation  costs); Jonathan  R. Macey, Rule of Law: Not 
All Pro Bono Work  Helps the Poor, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1992,  at A7 ("When  clients must 
pay for legal services, lawyers  will be hired  only when the benefits  of the lawyers'  activities 
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parties' incentives might be incorrect, then one must take this into ac- 
count  in designing  adjudication.  Alternatively,  one may view the question 
of the appropriate  degree of accuracy  as involving, at the implementation 
phase, the design of a set of procedures so that self-interested  parties 
will be induced to produce the right amount of accuracy (at the least 
cost). 
1.  Analysis of Parties' Incentives88 
Return  to the scenario from Section A, in which a damage  award  may 
be based on the average harm for acts in the class or the actual harm 
caused by a particular  act. It was assumed that the legal system chose 
whether  or not more accurate information  would be used. Now assume 
instead that the adjudicator  begins with information  about the average 
harm;  damages  will equal average  harm  unless one of the parties  presents 
reliable  evidence of actual harm,  in which case damages  will equal actual 
harm.89 
When will a plaintiff  or defendant  offer evidence of actual harm?  For 
concreteness, assume that average harm is  150. Furthermore,  assume 
that, after the accident, each of the parties learns of the actual harm  and 
can prove it in adjudication  at a cost of 20. Then, whenever actual harm 
is less than 130, the defendant  will spend 20 to prove actual  harm;  when- 
ever actual harm  exceeds 170, the plaintiff  will spend 20 to prove harm; 
and whenever actual harm is between 130 and 170, neither party will 
prove harm, so damages will be 150. (The reasoning  is straightforward: 
if actual harm  were 125, the defendant  would rather  pay 125  in damages 
plus 20 in litigation  costs than pay 150 in damages. If actual harm  were 
175, the plaintiff  would rather  collect this amount, spending  20 to prove 
it-for  a net of 155-than  collect damages  of 150. If actual harm  is near 
150, neither  party gains enough by proving  that actual harm  differs  from 
150  to justify the cost of 20.) 
The remainder  of the analysis in this subsection  explains  why the incen- 
tives just described  are not generally  socially appropriate.  The discussion 
first considers the case in which individuals are uninformed  of actual 
harm  ex ante, then the case in which they are informed,  and finally  con- 
cludes with remarks  on some of the simplifying  assumptions  employed 
in the analysis. 
88  For  a formal  analysis  of most of the argument  in this subsection,  see Kaplow  & Shavell, 
Accuracy  and Damages,  supra note 5, at 11-17. 
89  This description  is simpler  than actual  adjudication  in that it ignores  the possibility  of 
conflicting,  misleading,  or unreliable  evidence. In some sense, it is an optimistic  scenario 
for the presentation  of information.  It assumes that each party is able, with certainty,  to 
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a. Whether Incentives  to Present  Information Are Excessive  When In- 
dividuals Cannot Anticipate  the Actual  Level  of Harm.  When injurers 
do not know at the time they act what the actual harm will be,  expendi- 
tures ex post by plaintiffs and defendants to prove the actual harm are a 
pure waste.  The analysis  in Subsection  Ala  explained that greater accu- 
racy is of no value because  it cannot improve injurers' behavior ex ante.90 
Yet,  in adjudication,  ex  post,  both  injurers and victims  will  sometimes 
find it in their interest to make expenditures  establishing actual harm, if 
such evidence  is admissible. 
Two  sorts  of policies  might address  this problem.  One could  adopt a 
rule that ignored proof of actual harm.91  Alternatively,  some  sort of tax 
on presenting information could be implemented.92 Such a tax would raise 
parties'  private costs  of presenting  information without  consuming  real 
resources.93 
b. Whether Incentives  to Present Information Are Excessive  When In- 
dividuals  Do  Anticipate  the  Actual  Level  of  Harm.94  When  injurers 
know the actual harm they  will cause  at the time they act,  the prospect 
of greater accuracy  ex post  as a result of parties' incentives  in litigation 
will improve behavior. The question is whether the value of the improve- 
ment is  sufficient  to justify  the  ex  post  cost.  In addition,  there  is  the 
possibility  that there  may  be  valuable  but unrealized  improvements  in 
behavior because  parties,  ex post,  would  not have a sufficient incentive 
to present information leading to accurate results. 
The analysis,  which is substantially more complicated than for the pre- 
90 There  might  be a benefit  of accuracy  with regard  to guiding  future  actors' behavior  if 
the outcome of an accurate  adjudication  is effectively disseminated.  See Subsection  B2c 
supra  (indicating  that often this is unlikely). 
91  In Subsection  b, where it is assumed that individuals  know actual harm  ex ante and 
thus information  has some value but private incentives may be excessive, the analogue 
would  be to ignore  proof  of actual harm  when it differs  only modestly  from  average  harm. 
Ruling  that evidence is inadmissible  because it is largely  redundant  of other evidence has 
this feature. A party may wish to present evidence at a cost of 10 that will affect the 
outcome  by an expected amount  of 11. Even if the party's  evidence is entirely  reliable  and 
will not lead to further  expenditures  by the other side, such evidence may have a cost in 
excess of its social value. 
92  One could imagine  options such as taxing legal services in litigation  or charging  fees 
for court  time. 
93  One can contrast  legal rules that make it more difficult  to present  information.  If the 
information  is  nonetheless presented, more real resources will have been consumed, 
whereas  a tax transfers  money without  wasting  resources. 
94  The effects examined  in this subsection  are of the sort identified  with regard  to incen- 
tives to file suit in Steven Shavell, The Social versus the Private  Incentive  to Bring  Suit in 
a Costly Legal System, 11 J. Legal Stud. 333 (1982). ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION  341 
ceding case, is sketched in the margin.95  The basic points are as follows. 
Initially, it can be demonstrated  that the social benefit from improving 
behavior is generally less than the difference between actual harm and 
average  harm.  In contrast, the private  benefit  from proving  harm  in adju- 
dication equals the difference between actual and average harm, as ex- 
plained previously. This suggests that, even when individuals  are per- 
fectly informed  of actual harm at the time they act, litigants' incentives 
to present information  about harm in adjudication  are never inadequate 
and are sometimes socially excessive. Indeed, this is the case for defen- 
dants. 
95  Suppose  that actual  harm  is 170  rather  than  the average  value, 150.  If damages  will be 
170 rather  than 150, how will this affect behavior? For individuals  whose benefit from 
committing  the act exceeds 170, there will be no effect: they will act regardless.  (This 
example assumes that harm is certain. If harm has a probability  of, say, .1, one could 
consider  individuals  with a benefit  of 17 rather  than 170, 15 rather  than 150,  and so on, and 
the analysis  would  be the same;  the maximum  benefit  of information  would  be the difference 
between actual and average  harm, weighted  by the probability  of harm.)  The expenditure 
of 20 ex post will be a waste with respect  to them. For those whose benefit  from  committing 
the act is less than 150, there will be no effect: they will not act in either  instance. (There 
is no waste, however, because there will never be an occasion ex post to spend the 20 to 
prove that harm is  170 rather than 150.) For one with a benefit of 160, the act will be 
committed  if damages  are 150 but not if they are 170. The social gain from deterring  this 
act is 10 (the difference  between the harm  of 170 and the benefit  of 160). For one whose 
benefit  is 151, the social gain from deterrence  will be 19. For one with a benefit  of 150.01, 
the gain will be  19.99. Thus, 20-the  difference between the actual harm and average 
harm-is  the maximum  possible benefit  from accuracy.  In virtually  all cases (all but those 
where  the private  benefit  exactly equals 150 and the individual,  indifferent  between acting 
and not acting when damages  are 150, chooses to act), the benefit  is less than 20, and in 
many  (when the benefit  exceeds 170), the benefit  is zero. 
Return  now to the incentive to present information.  It was explained  that when actual 
harm  is between 130  and 170, neither  party  would spend 20 to present  information.  This is 
desirable  with respect to defendants,  for information  costs 20, while 20 is the maximum 
possible benefit with regard  to behavior when harm is in this range. For plaintiffs,  this 
result  is desirable  if the act would be committed  in any event (for then there is no benefit 
from demonstrating  that actual harm exceeds average harm). But if the act would have 
been deterred-for example, if actual harm  is 160  and the actor's benefit  is 155-it  would 
be desirable  for harm  to be demonstrated,  for the prospect  of such demonstration  provides 
deterrence,  in which case the ex post information  cost of 20 is never borne. 
Consider  now the situation  in which actual harm  is just below 130  or just above 170. In 
this case, parties  would present information,  at a cost of 20. This result usually  would be 
undesirable  for demonstration  by defendants. The reason is that the maximum  possible 
benefit  of the information  is close to 20, suggesting  that the average  benefit  of information 
(which  usually  is less than 20 and may well be zero) is less than 20. Since the information 
costs 20 to present, the incentive often is excessive. For plaintiffs,  the above reasoning 
applies:  the result  is undesirable  if behavior  is unaffected  but desirable  if there  is deterrence 
because then the 20 need never be spent. 
Finally, consider  situations  in which harm  is much  less than 130  or much  more  than 170. 
Then it is possible that the benefit  of establishing  actual  harm  will, on average,  exceed 20 
for both plaintiffs  and defendants. See also Kaplow & Shavell, Accuracy and Damages, 
supra note 5, at 14-17 (formally  analyzing  the case where the behavioral  benefit  involves 
the actor's level of care). The preceding  analysis  assumes that parties  bear  their  own legal 342  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL  STUDIES 
When plaintiffs have an incentive to demonstrate harm, however,  there 
is  a further consideration:  the  prospect  that  they  will  demonstrate  an 
above average harm will sometimes  deter harmful acts, in which case the 
cost of demonstrating harm ex post will not be borne. In such instances, 
the improvement in behavior is obtained for free, so the ex post incentive 
is  not  excessive  and  may  be  inadequate.  Thus,  when  actors  are fully 
informed ex  ante about the actual harm caused  by their acts,  plaintiffs' 
incentives ex post may be excessive  or inadequate, depending on whether 
the particular act would in fact be deterred by the expectation  that actual 
harm would be established  in adjudication. 
c.  Comments on Simplifying Assumptions.  The.preceding  discussion 
indicates that defendants' incentives  to present information are systemati- 
cally excessive,  while plaintiffs'  are excessive  when actors do not know 
actual harm when  they  act and indeterminate when actors are informed 
when  they  act.  The  analysis  oversimplifies  in  many  respects.  First,  it 
ignores  risk  aversion.  As  noted  in  Subsection  A3,  when  plaintiffs  are 
risk-averse,  accuracy  may be  more valuable  than otherwise  and, when 
defendants  are  risk-averse,  accuracy  may  be  less  valuable.  Thus,  for 
example,  if  plaintiff risk  aversion  were  a  significant problem  (because 
plaintiffs were very risk-averse  and could not obtain insurance), accuracy 
would be more valuable,  so what appeared to be an excessive  incentive 
to present information in adjudication may not be so excessive.96 
Another  simplification is that the possibility  of  settlement  is ignored. 
When settlement is possible,  accuracy may be less costly.  In the extreme 
case in which settlement was certain before any legal costs were incurred 
and settlement reflected actual harm rather than average harm, accuracy 
would  be  free.  Thus,  if  accuracy  has  any  positive  value,  it would  be 
desirable. More realistically,  settlement often occurs after substantial ex- 
penditures,  the magnitude of which is related to the level  of accuracy.97 
costs.  If plaintiffs' costs  were  borne by defendants,  as would be efficient in this scenario 
with regard to  effects  on injurers' ex  ante behavior,  plaintiffs'  incentives  to demonstrate 
harm would unambiguously be excessive. 
96 When individuals are uninformed of actual harm ex ante, the ex post incentive  is still 
socially excessive.  Because  there is no benefit with regard to improving behavior, the only 
possible benefit would be enhanced accuracy in compensation.  But since parties are willing 
to  spend  up  to  a  dollar for  each  dollar  change  in  the  outcome,  expenditures  would  be 
excessive  even  if plaintiffs were  risk-averse.  (Even  a risk-averse  individual would not be 
willing to  spend  up to  a dollar to  improve  the  precision  of  his  insurance  coverage  by  a 
dollar.) See  Subsection  IVA2 infra. 
97 For an analysis  of how legal complexity  (similar to greater accuracy;  see  Subsection 
B2a supra) affects  the likelihood  of settlement  when there is asymmetric information con- 
cerning actual harm,  see  Spier,  supra  note  15. Also  note  that accuracy,  by  making trial 
more expensive,  may  make  settlement  more  likely,  which  could  reduce  litigation  costs. 
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For  example,  if particular aspects  of  the  plaintiff's  circumstances  are 
relevant  in  establishing  damages,  then  investigation,  taking of  deposi- 
tions,  and consultation  of experts  may have occurred before  settlement 
is reached.  It is even  possible  that costs  in proving actual harm could be 
greater than suggested  in the above  example  because,  even  if costs  are 
lower  in each  case,  they  may be  incurred more often  when  bargaining 
over  settlement  amounts is taken into account.98 
In conclusion,  whether private parties' incentives  to provide informa- 
tion in adjudication are socially  appropriate is a complex  question.  When 
injurers are uninformed about actual harm ex ante, the ex post incentive 
is clearly excessive;  when  injurers are perfectly  informed,  the incentive 
may well  be  excessive,  although  not  always,  in the  simple case,  while 
settlement and other values of accuracy further complicate the calculus.99 
This  subsection  also  employed  other  simplifying  assumptions,  such  as 
that parties who  spend resources  to prove  actual harm do so only when 
what  they  are proving  is  the  truth and that they  will  be  successful  in 
proving the truth. Overall, it seems quite clear that there is no strong basis 
for assuming that parties'  incentives  generally tend to be appropriate.1?? 
there  simply  assumed  that  greater  accuracy  involves some added  cost. As long  as settlement 
does not always occur (and the frequency  is not greatly  affected  by accuracy)  or involves 
some added cost when adjudication  is more accurate,  the analysis  would be qualitatively 
the same. (As noted  in the Introduction,  if accuracy  reduced  costs overall,  one could  usually 
conclude  that it was desirable  without  bothering  to analyze its benefits.) 
98  For example,  if a plaintiff  has injuries  that are above average,  this may not be known 
to the defendant,  who then would not be willing  to settle for a high amount.  Thus, there 
must be enough gathering  and exchange of information  for the defendant  to believe that 
the plaintiff's  likely  recovery  is high  in order  for the plaintiff  to obtain  a generous  settlement. 
With such asymmetric  information,  there may tend to be an unraveling  phenomenon  to 
some extent. See Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal  Scope, in this 
issue; Steven Shavell, Sharing  of Information  prior  to Settlement  or Litigation,  20 RAND 
J. Econ. 183  (1989).  Plaintiffs  with above average  harm  will prove this to defendants.  This 
leads defendants  to revise downward  their estimate of the average  harm  of plaintiffs  who 
remain  silent. Then, of this group, those with greater  harm  will have an incentive  to prove 
their actual damages, and so on. Thus, it is possible that the cost of establishing  harm 
would  be incurred  in most cases, even cases involving  actual  harm  close to or below  average 
harm:  costs may not be incurred  at trial, but costs would be incurred  before trial, in the 
process of bargaining  over settlement  amounts. 
9"  If parties  were uninformed  ex ante, but could make expenditures  to learn more, the 
analysis  would  involve aspects of both  cases, as well as additional  complications  concerning 
ex ante decisions to acquire  information. 
100  See note 87 supra (no reason to suppose that the invisible hand produces  efficient 
expenditures  on litigation  because litigation  involves imposing  costs on opposing  parties). 
Note that the social value of accuracy will vary greatly by context, while the ex post 
incentives to present information  tend to be similar  and largely  independent  of the social 
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2.  Applications 
Growing concern with the cost of litigation has led to reform proposals 
designed  to  reduce  costs.l?l  Some  reforms  are  designed  to  reduce  the 
presentation  of  information,  such  as limits on the amount of discovery 
or the  numbers  of  expert  witnesses.102 In  addition, judges  often  exert 
informal, but powerful,  pressure  on  parties  to  act  in ways  that reduce 
costs  of disputes.103  The analysis  here provides a framework for evaluat- 
ing such proposals  and actions. 
To  the  extent  that incentives  to  present  information in litigation are 
more often  excessive  than inadequate,  the analysis  also  casts  doubt on 
the wisdom of rules that require parties to present more information than 
they would present on their own.  Some evidence  rules-those  excluding 
hearsay,104  requiring "best  evidence,"105 demanding that foundations  or 
chain of custody be established106-force  parties to present more accurate 
but more expensive  information than they would choose.  Production bur- 
dens  of  proof  operate  similarly.  There  may  be justifications  for  many 
such  rules  because  they  may  reduce  costs  if they  dispose  of  cases  or 
eliminate  channels  of  proof.107  There  also  may be  concerns  about jury 
error.108  Nonetheless,  it is interesting that some components  of the legal 
101  While there is much noise about the problem  of excessive litigation  costs, there is 
little analysis indicating  how we know that the costs are excessive, rather  than simply 
higher  than we would "like." (Presumably,  we would like them to be zero.) In particular, 
the social purposes of litigation usually remain unstated. It is not possible to analyze 
whether  expenditures  are excessive when there is no benchmark  for evaluation. 
102  See, for example,  Judicial  Conference,  Standing  Committee  on Rules of Practice  and 
Procedure,  Proposed Amendments  to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  and Forms, 
Rule 16(c)(15)  (April 1993:  effective December 1993)  (authorizing  pretrial  orders limiting 
time allowed  for presentation  at trial);  id. Rule 30(a)(2)(A)  (limiting  number  of depositions 
that may be taken without  leave of court);  id. Rule 33(a)  (limiting  interrogatories  available 
without  leave of court);  Wall St. J., June 30, 1992, at B7 (reform  of discovery and limits 
on expert witnesses adopted  in Arizona). 
103  At the same time, they regularly  fail to rule on motions in a timely fashion, leading 
parties  to spend on discovery vast sums that turn out to be wasted even from a private 
point  of view. 
104  Fed.  R. Evid.  802. 
105  Fed.  R. Evid.  1002. 
106  An example is the business records exception to the hearsay rule, Fed. R. Evid. 
803(6), although  it should be noted that the requirements  are much more lenient than at 
common  law. See Advisory Comm. Notes, Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). 
107  Production  burdens  allow more frequent summary  disposition  of cases. A hearsay 
rule  may reduce  costs if, for example,  the declarant  is unavailable  (assuming  that the party 
is not thereby  induced  to offer additional,  more costly evidence instead). 
108  This concern may explain the hearsay rules-particularly outside the criminal  con- 
text-although plausible  views of jury error  provide  a weak foundation,  and one inconsis- 
tent with  the many  areas  in which  jurors  are trusted.  See Note, The Theoretical  Foundation 
of the Hearsay  Rules, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1786  (1980). ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION  345 
system operate to push parties  to present more information,  while others 
only occasionally ignore relevant  information,'09  even though  it is plausi- 
ble in many contexts that private parties' incentives to present informa- 
tion are excessive rather  than inadequate. 
III.  ACCURACY  IN THE  DETERMINATION  OF  LIABILITY 
In this part, attention shifts from accuracy in assessing damages to 
accuracy  in determining  liability. As noted in the Introduction,  errors  in 
adjudication  with regard to liability are of two types: failing to impose 
liability  on those who violate legal commands  (false negatives), and im- 
posing liability  on those who did not violate legal commands  (false posi- 
tives). For convenience, those who violate the law are referred  to as the 
"guilty" and those who do not as the "innocent," and the language  of 
"sanctions" and "penalties" will be employed, even though  most of the 
analysis is applicable  to civil and criminal  disputes (as well as violations 
of rules internal  to organizations).11?  Mistakes  in determining  liability  can 
arise in many ways. There may be uncertainty  concerning  the identity  of 
the person who  committed an act,  whether an act was  committed, 
whether  an act in fact caused the victim's injury,  or whether  an act was 
justified  in some manner  recognized by the law. 
The analysis in Section A emphasizes the relationship  between efforts 
to enhance accuracy and other aspects of enforcement,  notably  the gen- 
eral level of enforcement  effort (audit  or investigation  rates, intensity of 
police patrols, rate of private suits) and the level of sanctions. Thus, the 
analysis will emphasize trade-offs among various enforcement instru- 
ments. In addition, the discussion will focus on the costs of imposing 
sanctions, which received only brief attention in Part II.111  Section B 
addresses  the relationship  between setting  the burden  of proof  and choos- 
109  Notable instances involve excluding  evidence on account of prejudicial  effects (see 
Fed. R. Evid. 403) or because of purposes unrelated  to accuracy or cost (as with the 
constitutional  exclusionary  rules; see note 138  infra),  rather  than  out of a concern  for cost. 
110  Subsection  C1 explains  how even portions  of the analysis  that seem uniquely  applica- 
ble to the criminal  context have important  implications  in the civil context or that  of private 
dispute  resolution. 
111  In particular,  Subsection  IIA3 discussed risk aversion. Imposing  risk is an important 
social cost of sanctions, distinguished  from the aspect of monetary  sanctions  that merely 
involves transferring  funds between individuals  or from individuals  to the government. 
Part II devoted less attention to sanction costs in part because they are less directly 
affected  by policies concerning  accuracy  in the context of assessing  damages.  Setting  sanc- 
tions equal to average harm  for a class rather  than equal to actual harm  for each act in a 
class involves, as a first approximation,  imposing  the same amount  of sanctions  in total. 
(The approximation  is not precise because behavior  may differ  under  the two approaches, 
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ing a  level  of  accuracy.  Applications  of  the  analysis  are presented  in 
Section  C. Section  D examines  issues  involving the extent to which indi- 
viduals are informed about the law and their incentives  to present infor- 
mation in adjudication. 
A.  Accuracy,  Enforcement  Effort, and Sanctions112 
Consider a scenario in which individuals decide whether to commit an 
act that causes  a known  level  of harm. (Such  an act might be a crime, 
tort, breach of contract, violation of a disclosure obligation, or whatever.) 
It is  assumed  that individuals  commit  acts  when  their benefit from  so 
doing exceeds  the expected  sanction  cost.113 
The legal system  provides  a sanction for such acts.  (The sanction may 
be  a fine,  imprisonment,  or  damages  paid to  the  victim.)  For  present 
purposes,  the level  of the sanction is not taken as given but is viewed  as 
involving a choice in designing the system.114  Raising the sanction reduces 
optimal  to set expected sanctions  equal to expected harm,  which would  further  complicate 
the analysis. See, for example, A. Mitchell  Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal  Use 
of Fines and Imprisonment,  24 J. Pub. Econ. 89 (1984).)  Thus, that sanctions  are costly 
need not be relevant  to the choice. Risk aversion  is an exception  because risk depends  not 
only on the aggregate  amount  of sanctions  imposed  but, for defendants,  on their variance 
and, for plaintiffs,  on the extent to which they reflect actual harm.  (In contrast, costs of 
imprisonment,  as a first approximation,  depend  on the total amount  of imprisonment:  two 
five-year  terms  and one ten-year  term  result  in about  the same costs of maintaining  prisons 
and involve the same total deprivation  of liberty.  Restated  formally,  costs of nonmonetary 
criminal  sanctions  may be approximately  linear.) 
112  Most  of the analysis  in this section is demonstrated  in a formal  model  in Louis Kaplow 
& Steven Shavell,  Accuracy  in the Determination  of Liability,  37 J. Law & Econ. (in press, 
April 1994).  The most relevant  prior  economic literature  concerns  incentives  in principal- 
agent  relationships;  some of that  literature  discusses the value  of information  in monitoring. 
See Sanford  J. Grossman  & Oliver  D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent  Problem, 
51 Econometrica  7, 35-38 (1983);  Bengt Holmstrom,  Moral  Hazard  and Observability,  10 
Bell J. Econ. 74, 81-88 (1979);  Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing  and Incentives  in the Principal 
and Agent Relationship,  10 Bell J. Econ. 55, 64-65 (1979). 
113  Both elements of this statement may be interpreted  broadly. Their benefit may be 
defined  net of any aversion  toward  violating  the law for its own sake (that  is, without  regard 
to the risk of sanctions).  The expected sanction  cost in some instances  will refer  not to the 
cost of some expected sanction  (the mean)  but rather  to whatever  cost one associates  with 
the possibility  of sanctions  (thus  allowing  for the possibility  of risk  aversion).  The  discussion 
will proceed  on the assumption  that individuals'  benefits  vary, so that, for any given legal 
regime,  some individuals  will be deterred  and others will act. Also, the language  is that of 
acting  or not acting, but the decision may be taken  to include  how one acts (so that acting 
may  be acting  without  taking  precautions  and not acting  may be not acting  as dangerously, 
by taking  precautions);  relatedly,  "innocent" individuals  may be individuals  who acted in 
a less harmful  manner  rather  than in a harmless  manner. 
114  In the civil context, the level of damages is affected by various rules determining 
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the number of individuals  who  will  commit  the act (assuming other as- 
pects  of the system  remain unchanged).  This section  considers  the case 
in which  sanctions  are socially  costless  (as with fines or civil  damages, 
that are mere transfers if individuals are not risk-averse) and the case  in 
which  sanctions  are socially  costly  (as with imprisonment,  or monetary 
sanctions when individuals are risk-averse). 
The legal  system  also  involves  a level  of enforcement.  Thus,  for tax 
compliance,  there is an audit rate; for reported crimes,  an investigation 
rate; for traffic violations,  a density of police  on patrol; for civil disputes, 
a set  of  rules affecting  the  likelihood  that a victim  will  sue.  Increasing 
enforcement  effort  deters  more  individuals.  Such  increased  effort  is 
costly.115 
Finally, designing the legal system entails choosing a level of accuracy. 
The  greater  the  level  of  accuracy,  the  fewer  innocent  individuals  are 
sanctioned and the more guilty are sanctioned.  One can view enforcement 
effort  as  determining  the  number  of  individuals  who  are detected  and 
sanctioned, while accuracy indicates the fraction of those sanctioned who 
are guilty.116  For example,  one can choose  the number of audits and the 
care with  which  each  is  conducted.  Or one  may  determine  how  many 
thefts  to  attempt  to  solve  and how  carefully  to  adjudicate the  guilt of 
each suspect.  Greater accuracy  is assumed  to be costly. 
This section  will analyze  three ways  in which accuracy in the determi- 
nation of liability may be valuable.  First, greater accuracy is a means of 
achieving  deterrence,~17 in addition to  raising sanctions  or enforcement 
whether  damages  simply equal harm  or may differ (as with damage  multipliers,  statutory 
minimum  damages,  punitive  damages).  In private  arrangements,  sanctions  may  be specified 
by contract  (liquidated  damages),  determined  by an arbitrator,  or left to the default  rules 
provided  by the formal  legal system. 
115  A qualification  is that raising  enforcement  rates  in some contexts may reduce  enforce- 
ment expenditures  on account of the increase in deterrence.  For example, if a sufficiently 
high  percentage  of cases were pursued  vigorously,  few individuals  would  continue  to com- 
mit such acts. (In contrast, posting more officers along a highway  may reduce speeding, 
but that  reduction  will not in turn  reduce  the number  of officers  who must  be posted.) Most 
of the discussion to follow, however, will consider different  combinations  of techniques 
that achieve a given level of deterrence. 
116  Accuracy and enforcement  effort are not inherently  separable.  For example, hiring 
better  detectives  may result  in more suspects being  detected, with a higher  fraction  of those 
detected  being truly  guilty. Nonetheless, it is useful in thinking  about  the problem  to view 
each aspect separately. 
117  "Deterrence"  will often be used as a synonym  for controlling  behavior.  Although  the 
term is more familiar  in the criminal  context, where for most crimes it would be ideal to 
deter all harmful  acts (if this could be done at no cost), the term can be applied  to typical 
cases in the civil context. For example, increasing  deterrence  for an activity subject  to tort 
law (that is often desirable  when conducted properly,  but not always, at least when con- 348  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
effort. Second,  when deterrence  is achieved  through enhanced accuracy 
rather than by using alternatives,  sanctions are imposed less often, which 
is a benefit to the extent that sanctions are socially costly.  Third, increas- 
ing  accuracy  may  increase  the  precision  with  which  behavior  is  con- 
trolled. 
1.  Accuracy  and Deterrence 
Accuracy  is relevant in controlling behavior because  increasing accu- 
racy,  like  increasing  the  level  of  sanctions  or enforcement  effort,  is  a 
method of increasing deterrence.1l8 The reasoning involves  two  compo- 
nents.1l9 First, greater accuracy-holding  sanctions  and enforcement  ef- 
fort  constant-increases  the  likelihood  that  the  guilty  are  sanctioned 
rather  than  mistakenly  exonerated.  Thus,  individuals  contemplating 
whether  to  act  expect  the  likelihood  of  sanctions  to  be  higher if they 
commit the harmful act.  (The likelihood  is the product of the probability 
that they will be detected  and the probability that they will be sanctioned 
given detection.  Increasing enforcement  effort raises the first factor and 
increasing accuracy  raises the  second  factor.)  Second,  greater accuracy 
reduces the likelihood that the truly innocent are sanctioned.  This makes 
a decision  not to  commit  the  act  look  more  attractive.  Both  factors- 
making harmful acts  less  attractive  and harmless  behavior more attrac- 
tive-increase  deterrence.120 
It might be objected  that many  sources  of enhanced  accuracy  do not 
ducted improperly)  simply means increasing  the expected liability associated with that 
activity. 
118  Prior  literature  has emphasized  how the presence  of legal error  may affect deterrence 
and, in some instances, how adjusting  sanctions  may be an appropriate  response. See, for 
example, Isaac Ehrlich,  The Optimum  Enforcement  of Laws and the Concept  of Justice: 
A Positive  Analysis,  2 Int'l  Rev. L. & Econ. 3, 16-18 (1982);  I. P. L. Png,  Optimal  Subsidies 
and Damages  in the Presence of Judicial  Error, 6 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 101 (1986);  A. 
Mitchell  Polinsky  & Steven Shavell, Legal Error,  Litigation,  and  the Incentive  to Obey  the 
Law, 5 J. L. Econ. & Org.  99 (1989);  Richard  A. Posner,  An Economic  Approach  to Legal 
Procedure  and Judicial  Administration,  2 J. Legal Stud. 399, 402-10 (1973).  Such literature 
has not, however, considered  the level of accuracy  as an instrument  of enforcement  policy 
and, thus, has not considered  the value of accuracy  in determining  liability. 
119  Accuracy  may also influence  individuals'  efforts  to evade sanctions.  Such efforts  may 
be reduced  if greater  accuracy  renders  them ineffective  or increased  by inducing  shifts to 
more  costly techniques  that tend to be successful in spite of more accurate  procedures. 
120  If the likelihood  of mistakenly  sanctioning  the innocent  is small,  as one often suspects 
is the case, this second factor would be much less important  than the first. Sometimes, 
however, it may be important.  Many areas of the law are ambiguous  or difficult  to apply 
without  a significant  risk of error  (such as some tax rules). Then, individuals  might  reason 
that committing  an act is beneficial  in significant  part  because they are fairly likely to be 
sanctioned  even if they do not commit  the act. Moreover,  which situation  prevails  depends 
on how the burden  of proof is set. See Subsection  B2a infra. ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION  349 
reduce both the likelihood of mistakenly exonerating  the guilty and of 
mistakenly  sanctioning the innocent. In fact, some-such  as providing 
free defense counsel to indigent  criminal  defendants-may  increase one 
type of error (mistaken acquittals) while reducing the other (mistaken 
convictions). As Section B will emphasize, however, such an argument 
involves changing  both accuracy and (implicitly)  the burden  of proof. If 
the de facto burden of proof is held constant (in a manner to be ex- 
plained),  increased  accuracy  will by definition  result  in reductions  in both 
types of error. 
Having  described  how accuracy, enforcement  effort, and sanctions  af- 
fect deterrence, it is now possible to explore what combination  of these 
three aspects of enforcement  policy should be selected.l2:  The simplest 
answer, reflecting  the economic perspective of this article, is to choose 
the combination  that minimizes costs. The remainder  of this subsection 
examines  factors relevant in determining  the appropriate  combination. 
a. Sanctions and Enforcement  Effort.  First, consider sanctions and 
their relationship  with enforcement effort. If sanctions are costless (as 
when they involve mere monetary transfers and individuals are risk- 
neutral),  there is a benefit in employing them to the maximum  feasible 
extent. If the sanction  were less than its maximum  feasible level, it could 
be raised, thereby increasing deterrence at no cost.  Then, one could 
reduce  enforcement  effort by just the amount  that restores deterrence  to 
its prior  level. The combination  of these two changes has the result that 
the control of behavior remains unaffected but enforcement costs are 
reduced.122  Therefore, as long as the sanction is less than its highest 
possible level, the enforcement  policy is not optimal. 
121  The emphasis  in this part is on achieving  a specified  level of deterrence  in the most 
appropriate  manner.  There is, of course, the separate  question  of how much deterrence  is 
optimal.  (It is separate  because, whatever level is optimal, it is best to achieve it in the 
most  efficient  manner.)  When  enforcement  is costly, the answer  is complicated.  The simple 
maxim  that expected sanctions  should  equal  expected harm,  so that acts will be committed 
if and  only if their  benefits  exceed their  costs, does not hold  when  there  is a cost of obtaining 
that result. See, for example, Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 111. Moreover,  the cost of 
achieving  an additional  increment  to deterrence  will depend  on how it is achieved-that is, 
by what combination  of increased  sanctions, enforcement  effort, and accuracy.  Thus, the 
question  of optimal  deterrence  is hardly  independent  from  the present  analysis  but, rather, 
will depend  in part  on its outcome. 
122  This argument  derives from  the reasoning  in Gary  S. Becker, Crime  and Punishment: 
An Economic  Approach,  76 J. Pol. Econ. 169  (1968).  Ehrlich  presents  a model  in which he 
argues  that higher  enforcement  with a lower sanction  may be optimal.  See Ehrlich,  supra 
note 118, at 16-18. But he simply assumes that raising  enforcement  effort does not result 
in an increase  in erroneous  convictions.  (In addition,  his objective  function  and  assumptions 
about  behavior  are ad hoc-for  example, expected sanctions  do not determine  behavior  in 
any direct  way--and there are some errors  in his derivations-terms omitted  from  deriva- 
tives and a failure  to optimize  one of the choice variables.) 350  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
The problem of inaccuracy does not fundamentally alter this argument. 
Increasing  sanctions  will  have  less  effect  on  deterrence  when  there  is 
error because  some portion of the increase will fall on the innocent rather 
than the guilty. But the logic suggesting that it is better to raise sanctions 
and reduce enforcement  effort to save costs  still holds. 
The  literature  on  the  economics  of  law  enforcement  has  developed 
numerous qualifications  to this  result,  most  of which  have  similar rele- 
vance  when  one  allows  for the possibility  of error and expenditures  to 
reduce it.123  Of particular importance is the effect  of costly  sanctions  on 
the analysis,  considered  in Subsection  2. 
Finally,  note that, for a given level  of accuracy,  raising sanctions  and 
reducing  enforcement  effort  need  not  involve  any  change  in the  total 
extent  to  which  errors are made  in imposing  sanctions.  Thus,  for  the 
innocent,  mistakenly  imposed  sanctions  will be larger, but they  will be 
imposed less often. These effects  tend to be offsetting.  (When individuals 
are risk-neutral, they are precisely  offsetting.)124 
b.  Accuracy  and  Enforcement  Effort.  Second,  consider  the  appro- 
priate mix  of  enforcement  effort  and  accuracy.  One  suspects  that  at- 
tempts to increase  each are subject to diminishing returns. For enforce- 
ment  effort,  returns  tend  to  diminish  because  the  best  enforcement 
opportunities  are pursued first.125  Similar logic  holds for accuracy.  One 
might adopt breathalyzers  before blood tests  if the former achieve  most 
123  These include  differences  in individuals'  wealth  (and  thus  in the highest  fine  or damage 
award  they can pay), see A. Mitchell  Polinsky  & Steven Shavell,  A Note on Optimal  Fines 
When Wealth Varies among Individuals,  81 Am. Econ. Rev. 618 (1991);  risk aversion, 
discussed  in Subsection  2, see A. Mitchell  Polinsky  & Steven  Shavell,  The Optimal  Tradeoff 
between  the Probability  and Magnitude  of Fines, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 880  (1979)  (hereinafter 
Risk Aversion);  limits on the ability  to adjust  enforcement  effort  because effort  may affect 
the probability  of detection  for different  types of acts, see Steven Shavell, Specific  versus 
General  Enforcement  of Law, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 1088  (1991);  and  individuals'  misperceptions 
of the probability  of apprehension,  see Lucian Arye Bebchuk  & Louis Kaplow, Optimal 
Sanctions  When  Individuals  Are Imperfectly  Informed  about  the Probability  of Apprehen- 
sion, 21 J. Legal Stud. 365 (1992). 
124  When individuals  are risk-averse,  the total imposition  of sanctions  on the innocent 
would fall when sanctions are raised and enforcement  effort reduced  in an amount  that 
keeps deterrence  constant  because each increment  to the sanction  has an increasing  mar- 
ginal  effect on deterrence.  But the utility  cost of the higher  sanction  to the innocent,  which 
seems more relevant,  would tend to be constant. 
125  For investigation  of theft, some cases will, by chance, be easier to investigate  than 
others  (for  example,  witnesses vary  in their  ability  to give a precise  description).  The easiest 
cases can be pursued  first; if a higher rate of detection is required,  progressively  more 
difficult  cases must be investigated.  The same is true with audits if they are not random 
but, rather,  target  first  the most likely violators.  With  truly  random  audits  (including  inspec- 
tions and the like), there may be no diminishing  returns  (except to the extent one must  pay 
progressively  higher  wages to hire enough auditors, which is unlikely  to be a significant 
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of  the possible  improvement  over  simple  observation  (smelling breath, 
having the driver attempt to walk in a straight line) at far lower cost.  If 
more experts  improve  accuracy  in adjudication,  one  suspects  that the 
twentieth expert does  not contribute as much as the tenth.126 
When two  options  are subject  to  diminishing returns, it is often  best 
to employ an intermediate combination.  (If one is used substantially and 
the other not, the former will exhibit little return at the margin while the 
latter will have a high marginal return, so reducing the first and increasing 
the  second  will  be  more  effective.)  Similarly,  if more  deterrence  were 
required, it would  seem  best  to  accomplish  this  by increasing both en- 
forcement effort and accuracy. 
There  is,  however,  an  important  caveat  to  this  logic.  The  marginal 
costs  of  enforcement  effort  and  accuracy  are  closely  interrelated:  the 
higher the level  of one,  the more costly  is the other at the margin. For 
example,  if the criminal courts  are made more accurate at a cost  of  100 
per case,  it will be more costly  to increase enforcement effort than previ- 
ously:  each  added  individual  who  is  detected  will  now  be  processed 
through a system  that costs  100 more.  Or, if the audit rate is high, the 
total cost  of increasing  the accuracy  of audits will be higher than if the 
audit rate is  low  because  the  increased  cost  of  each  audit is  incurred 
more often. 
This interaction of costs  has two implications.  First, it is possible  that 
a high enforcement  effort/low  accuracy  strategy or a high accuracy/low 
effort  strategy  may  be  appropriate.  For  many  categories  of  theft,  we 
employ  a rather accurate  system  (which  is quite costly  per case,  given 
the  stakes)  and use  a low  level  of  enforcement  effort  (police  seriously 
attempt to capture only a small fraction of thieves). 
Second,  as  will  be  relevant  to  the  discussion  in the  next  subsection 
and in Part V, accuracy may be valued for reasons in addition to its effect 
with regard to controlling behavior.  Then, a higher level of accuracy will 
be  appropriate.  Given  that  this  is  the  case,  enforcement  effort  will  be 
more costly  at the margin, so  the appropriate level  of enforcement  will 
be lower. This, in turn, implies that it will be optimal to rely on sanctions 
to a greater extent,  if this is possible.  Recall that raising sanctions allows 
one to reduce enforcement  effort in achieving a given level of deterrence. 
When we wish accuracy to be high, this reduction in enforcement effort is 
even more valuable. (And, as noted above,  raising sanctions and reducing 
126  The second may add more than the first  in an adversary  system, if each side hires an 
expert. But if court appointed  experts were used as permitted  under  Fed. R. Evid. 706, it 
is possible that one expert would be more accurate  than two (where one is appointed  by 
each party). 352  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
enforcement  effort  in a manner that keeps  deterrence  unchanged  does 
not increase the total amount of mistakenly imposed  sanctions.) 
Another way to see this difference is to compare two extreme systems, 
the first with a very high level  of enforcement  effort (high detection  rate) 
and a low  sanction,  and the  second  with  a very  high sanction  and low 
detection  rate.  In the first system,  accuracy  would  be extremely  costly 
because  there would  be  so  many  cases  to  process,  so  accuracy  would 
tend to be low.  In the second,  because  there are so few cases,  accuracy 
could  be  made  comparatively  high  at  modest  cost-much  higher at a 
given total cost  than would  be possible  with the first system.  Thus,  the 
more valuable  accuracy  is  deemed  to be,  the  more one  should favor  a 
high sanction,  low enforcement  effort policy. 
2.  Accuracy  and Sanction  Costs 
Most of the analysis in Subsection  1 assumed that sanctions were cost- 
less,  as with monetary sanctions  applied to risk-neutral individuals. Con- 
sider  how  the  analysis  is  affected  by  introducing  costly  sanctions- 
nonmonetary sanctions,  like imprisonment,  or monetary sanctions when 
individuals are risk-averse. 
a. Sanctions  and Enforcement  Effort.  It was  noted that, when  sanc- 
tions  are costless,  there  is a benefit of raising sanctions  while  reducing 
enforcement  effort because  a given  level  of deterrence  can be achieved 
at a lower enforcement  cost.  Whether sanction costs  affect the argument 
depends  on the source  of sanction  costs.  With imprisonment, for exam- 
ple, sanctions are no longer free.  But if sanctions are raised and enforce- 
ment effort reduced to keep behavior unaffected,  the total imposition of 
sanctions  would  also  tend to be unaffected.  (For example,  a 50 percent 
probability of imposing  a sanction  of  10 and a 25 percent probability of 
imposing a sanction of 20 both involve  an expected  sanction of 5.) Thus, 
raising sanctions  and reducing enforcement  effort in a manner that keeps 
behavior unchanged may also keep total sanction costs  unchanged while 
still reducing enforcement  costs  (because fewer police  and court officials 
are needed  if  only  25  percent  of  violators  rather than  50  percent  are 
apprehended and processed). 
When  sanction  costs  arise  because  risk-averse  individuals  are  sub- 
jected to monetary sanctions,  raising sanctions and reducing enforcement 
effort will raise sanction  costs.  (In the preceding example,  the expected 
sanction is the same,  but the variance is greater when the probability is 
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employ lower sanctions  and use greater enforcement  effort when individ- 
uals are risk-averse.127 
The presence of inaccuracy does not fundamentally alter this argument. 
When errors are made,  the costly  sanctions  are less  often borne by the 
guilty  and  are  sometimes  borne  by  the  innocent.  When  sanctions  are 
raised,  some  of this increase  will fall on the innocent rather than on the 
guilty.  But,  when  enforcement  effort  is  reduced,  the  overall  detection 
rate is lower,  so fewer  innocent  individuals will be subject to the risk of 
mistakenly imposed  sanctions.  As a first approximation, these effects  are 
offsetting.128 
b. Accuracy  and Enforcement Effort.  In Subsection  1, the discussion 
emphasized  that accuracy  and enforcement  effort  (in addition to  sanc- 
tions) are substitutes  in achieving  deterrence,  and therefore they should 
be combined in a manner that achieves  a given level  of deterrence at the 
least cost.  When sanctions are costly,  however,  this is no longer the case. 
Rather, a higher level  of accuracy  (and thus lower enforcement  effort) is 
appropriate. 
The benefit of substituting accuracy for enforcement  effort can be seen 
by comparing how each increases  deterrence.  Increased enforcement  ef- 
fort enhances  deterrence  by  increasing  the  detection  rate.  As  a result, 
more guilty individuals  and more innocent  individuals will be subject to 
sanctions.  Increasing  accuracy  enhances  deterrence  by  increasing  the 
number of  guilty  who  are  sanctioned  while  decreasing  the  number of 
innocent who are sanctioned. 
Moreover,  if one  raises  accuracy  and reduces  enforcement  effort  so 
that deterrence  is kept  unchanged,  the total imposition  of  sanctions  on 
both the innocent and the guilty falls. For the innocent,  this is straightfor- 
ward: reducing enforcement  effort reduces the number who are detected, 
and raising accuracy decreases  the fraction of detected innocent individu- 
als who bear sanctions.  For the guilty, there are conflicting effects: reduc- 
ing enforcement  effort reduces the number detected,  but raising accuracy 
increases  the fraction of those  detected  who bear sanctions.  But it must 
be  that  the  former  effect  dominates  the  latter.  This  follows  from  the 
assumption that deterrence  is unchanged.  For deterrence to be constant, 
it must be that the difference in expected  sanctions for those who commit 
127  This argument  first appears  in Polinsky  & Shavell, Risk Aversion, supra  note 123. 
128  For nonmonetary  sanctions such as imprisonment,  where risk neutrality  may be a 
good first approximation  and sanction costs tend to be linear (see note 111 supra), the 
effects offset precisely. With risk aversion, there are numerous  additional  subtle effects 
operating  in opposing  directions.  See Kaplow & Shavell, supra  note 112. 354  THE  JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
the  act and those  who  do not remains the same.  Since the latter falls,  it 
must  be that the former falls as well.129 
Raising accuracy  and  reducing  enforcement  effort  a  corresponding 
amount  thus reduces the total imposition of sanctions,  which is desirable 
when sanctions  are socially  costly.  Therefore,  accuracy should be higher 
and  enforcement  effort lower  than the level  that minimizes enforcement 
costs.130  The  most  obvious  implication  is  that this provides  a rationale 
for providing relatively  more accurate  adjudication in the criminal con- 
text, where  sanctions  often  involve  high  social  costs,  than in the  civil 
context, where  sanctions  in themselves  may involve  little social  cost.131 
(As will be noted in Section  B, the benefit of greater accuracy  should be 
distinguished from any benefits associated  with the height of the burden 
of proof.) 
3.  Accuracy  and Precision  in Controlling Behavior 
This section  has  addressed  the  benefits  of  accuracy  with  regard to 
deterrence and reductions  in the imposition  of socially  costly  sanctions, 
but not Part II's  concern  with precision  in controlling behavior.  In this 
regard, it should  be  observed  that the  relationship  between  deterrence 
and precision  in controlling behavior is closer  than may appear. In Sub- 
129  That is, for any given increase in accuracy, the fall in enforcement  effort that keeps 
deterrence  unchanged  is necessarily large enough to reduce expected sanctions for the 
guilty.  For if they did not decrease, deterrence  would in fact rise because of the fall in 
expected  sanctions  for the innocent. See Subsection 1 supra. 
130  In familiar  terms, if one is trading  off the extent of reliance on two components, 
adding  a benefit on one side of the balance will tip the balance  further  in that direction. 
More  formally,  the levels of accuracy  and enforcement  effort that minimize  enforcement 
costs  are those at which each is equally  costly at the margin  in producing  a given increment 
of deterrence.  Therefore,  if accuracy is raised slightly and enforcement  effort reduced  in 
an amount  that keeps deterrence  unchanged,  there will be no change  in enforcement  cost 
(this is literally true for an infinitesimal  adjustment  and approximately  true for a small 
adjustment).  But this adjustment  will produce a positive benefit with regard  to sanction 
costs. 
131  In the criminal  context, nonmonetary  sanctions (notably, imprisonment)  are com- 
monly  employed. (In fact, some procedures  depend explicitly on the sanction. See Scott 
v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (counsel must be provided  only if imprisonment  actually 
occurs).)  In civil cases, sanctions  are  typically  monetary.  Even if individuals  are  risk-averse, 
the typical sanction  cost will be less than in the criminal  context per unit of the sanction. 
With  imprisonment,  the private  cost of the sanction,  which  affects  deterrence,  is determined 
by the loss of liberty  and other factors that also constitute  social costs-if  costs to guilty 
individuals  are deemed to be social costs. To this, one must add the substantial  costs of 
running  prisons. Thus, the social cost exceeds the private cost. With risk aversion and 
monetary  sanctions, the risk-bearing  cost is necessarily less than the private  cost of the 
sanction  (which equals the expected transfer  plus the risk-bearing  cost). Thus, the social 
cost is less than the private cost. Therefore,  for a given private  sanction  cost, the social 
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section IIB1, it is explained that Part II's model concerning damages 
could be applied to the case of categorizing  acts. For example, if some 
acts were harmful, causing harm of H, and others were harmless, one 
could interpret  this as involving a single set of harmful  acts, where harm 
varied (for some, zero; for others, H). In the language  of this section, 
acts causing no harm  could be thought  of as innocent. Part II addresses 
whether it is worthwhile to distinguish acts according to their level of 
harm.  In contrast, the analysis here assumes that there is some value in 
distinguishing  acts, and asks how accurate  the legal system should be in 
making  such distinctions.132 
In addition,  one could supplement  the scenario  explored  in this section 
in a manner  that would make accuracy  valuable  in achieving  more  precise 
control of behavior. Suppose, for example, that there are two types of 
innocent acts. The first corresponds to that described previously, for 
which  there is a risk of sanctions. The second, equally  harmless,  innocent 
act does not subject one to the risk of sanctions. (Perhaps  the first type 
of act must be carried out publicly, in proximity to where harmful  acts 
are regularly  committed, while the second type is done privately.) 
Consider  now the prospect of increasing  deterrence  of the harmful  act 
by raising sanctions or enforcement effort. Either approach would in- 
volve increasing  the expected sanction on the first type of innocent act, 
but without affecting  the second type of innocent act. This would induce 
individuals  to favor the second type of act over the first, even when their 
benefits  from the first act were greater. This effect (sometimes referred 
to as "chilling" innocent behavior)133  would be undesirable. 
If, instead, deterrence  were enhanced by increasing  accuracy, the ex- 
pected sanction for the first type of innocent act would fall. This would 
reduce  the extent to which individuals  are inefficiently  induced  to choose 
the second act over the first. Thus, achieving more precise control of 
behavior  can be a benefit of accuracy, in addition  to enhancing  the level 
of deterrence  for harmful  acts as a whole.134 
132  The case from Part  II in which damages  equaled  average  harm  would, in this section, 
correspond  to one in which both the innocent and guilty were equally  likely to be appre- 
hended  and in which the rate of correct sanctioning  of the guilty  just equaled  the rate of 
false convictions  of the innocent. Part  II implicitly  assumed  that the only alternatives  were 
complete  accuracy  in making  the distinction  and  not making  any distinction.  In this section, 
imperfect  distinction  is allowed. One can control  behavior  just as well in such cases as long 
as expected sanctions  are high  enough.  But if there  are limits  to or costs of raising  sanctions 
and enforcement  effort, expenditures  to enhance  accuracy  are desirable. 
133  See, for example, Frederick  Schauer,  Fear, Risk and the First Amendment:  Unravel- 
ing the "Chilling  Effect," 58 B.U.L. Rev. 685, 694-701 (1978). 
134  It may be possible, however, to achieve this benefit in an alternative  manner.  Png 
notes that the first  type of innocent  act could be subsidized.  See Png, supra  note 118. This 356  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
B.  Burden of Proof 
1.  Relationship  between  Burden of Proof and Accuracy 
The previous analysis assumed that designing the legal system to regu- 
late a type of activity involved  choosing the level of the sanction, enforce- 
ment effort,  and accuracy.  This formulation implicitly takes the burden 
of proof as given.  But the proof burden can be chosen  as well.  This need 
not,  however,  affect  the  preceding  discussion,  which  indicates  how  to 
choose  the sanction,  enforcement  effort, and accuracy for any burden of 
proof that may be  specified.135 Hence,  determining the burden of proof 
could be left as a separate inquiry. It is the case,  however,  that setting 
the burden of proof and choosing  the level  of accuracy often are related. 
Initially, it is useful to define a shift in the burden of proof in isolation- 
that is, taking as given all other aspects  of the system,  including its accu- 
racy.  When  a  decision-maker  hears  all  the  evidence,  there  inevitably 
remains some uncertainty about what actually happened. A higher proof 
burden is taken here to mean that the decision-maker must have a higher 
level of confidence  that the party is responsible  for committing the illegal 
act  in  order  to  impose  a  sanction.  Thus,  raising  the  burden  of  proof 
increases  the rate of mistaken  acquittals and decreases  the rate of mis- 
taken convictions. 
In contrast, increasing accuracy was said to reduce the rate of mistaken 
acquittals and convictions.  This arises when better information is avail- 
able to the decision-maker  or a more capable decision-maker is used. For 
a given  burden of  proof,  better  information or better analysis  of given 
information reduces  mistakes  of both types.  (Assume  that the burden of 
proof  is  held  constant  by  setting  the  required level  of  confidence  at a 
point such that the same percentage of convictions  and acquittals results. 
Then the rates of both types  of error necessarily  fall or rise together as 
information improves  or worsens.) 
The relationship can be explored  further with an example.  Consider a 
policy of subsidizing defendants'  legal counsel.  Assume  for present pur- 
might  be accomplished  either by providing  some reward  to those found innocent (in an 
amount that, ex ante, just offset the possibility of being mistakenly  sanctioned)  or by 
subsidizing  the activity directly. 
135  It has been argued  that the questions may not be independent,  in that juries may 
choose to require  more proof if sanctions  are higher. See, for example, James Andreoni, 
Reasonable  Doubt and the Optimal  Magnitude  of Fines: Should  the Penalty  Fit the Crime? 
22 RAND J. Econ. 385 (1991)  (offering  a model in which the cost of false convictions  rises 
with the sanction  but the benefit of correct  convictions-as  by increasing  deterrence-is 
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poses that the policy increases the accuracy of the proceedings.136  Typi- 
cally, it is assumed that such a policy also enhances both innocent and 
guilty  defendants'  chances of success. In the terminology  employed  here, 
this policy involves both an increase in accuracy and an (implicit)  in- 
crease in the burden of proof. (Thus, the burden  of proof is interpreted 
de facto rather  than  with regard  to its legal formulation:  if the probabilities 
of conviction for the innocent and the guilty are lower for whatever  rea- 
son, the proof burden  is said to be higher.) 
Consider  some alternative  policies. Suppose  there  is a subsidy  of defen- 
dants' legal counsel and a simultaneous  downward  shift in the express 
burden  of proof to an extent that the portion  of detected individuals  who 
are ultimately  convicted remains  the same.137  Then, the only effect would 
be on accuracy. 
The question thus becomes whether the additional  accuracy is worth 
the cost, the burden-of-proof  question being disposed of separately.  For 
example, what if increasing  resources available  to the prosecution  by the 
same amount  increased  accuracy more?  Then, one could accompany  this 
change by an increase in the express burden of proof, producing  more 
accuracy  at the same cost. Similarly,  if what one really desired in advo- 
cating a subsidy to defendants' legal counsel was making  the de facto 
burden  of proof higher, one might accomplish this directly or through 
other  indirect  means (such as by reducing  resources  available  to the pros- 
ecution). Thus, it is possible in principle  to view accuracy  and the burden 
of proof separately.'38  Any policies affecting both can be analyzed with 
regard  to each component  because if one aspect is desirable  and the other 
136  This is obviously a controversial  assumption.  The purpose  of the discussion in the 
text is to clarify what is meant by increased accuracy and to describe how one should 
analyze  the policy, whatever  one thinks  to be the truth  about  its effect on accuracy. 
137  In reality,  there  would  be no need for an explicit  shift  if the decision-maker  discounted 
the information  presented  to account  for the presence of defense counsel (or, equivalently 
for present  purposes,  discounted  the prosecution's  case when there  is no defense  counsel). 
A sophisticated  decision-maker  who understands  how the process works would be aware 
of the effect of counsel on the average  tilt of the information  presented  and thus could not 
help but consider  separately  the question  of the burden  of proof. 
138  Some rules may be related  to accuracy  and the burden  of proof in a special manner. 
Namely, constitutional  protections  (such as the exclusionary  rules of the Fourth  and Fifth 
Amendments)  may be designed  to prevent  abuse of power  by the government.  Many  appli- 
cations  of these protections  may decrease accuracy, and even if accuracy  is increased  (as 
by prohibiting  the admission  of confessions obtained  under  questionable,  but not entirely 
unreliable,  circumstances),  there may be other ways to increase  accuracy  at a lower cost. 
Yet the provisions  may exist to make it difficult  for the government  to go after political 
opponents  or unpopular  individuals.  It may be feared,  for example,  that high  proof  burdens 
and generally  adequate  procedures  would sometimes  be insufficient.  See Subsection  VC3 
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not, it would be possible  to benefit from the former and do without the 
latter.139 
2.  Setting the Burden of Proof140 
a.  Controlling Behavior.  The burden of proof  affects  the control  of 
behavior.  Obviously,  an infinite burden or a zero burden would tend to 
be disastrous,  as adjudication then would  not differentiate according to 
behavior.141  Ignoring any effect  on sanction costs,  the optimal burden of 
proof  would  be  that  which  maximizes  deterrence.  The  reason  is  that 
adjusting the  burden  of  proof  is  free,142 while  enforcement  effort  and 
139  What  is true  in principle  may sometimes  be impossible  in practice.  In the civil context, 
there  is probably  substantial  room to modify  the express burden  of proof  directly,  and this 
is sometimes  done. In the criminal  context, one might  argue  that  it is impossible  to increase 
further  the express burden  of proof (and express decreases  may be constitutionally  imper- 
missible)  because we already  have the highest  possible express burden  (short  of requiring 
absolute  certainty,  which  would  require  acquittal  in every case). This  appearance,  however, 
is probably  misleading.  First, indirect  means will fail in any event if decision-makers  are 
sophisticated.  See note 137 supra. Second, I am unaware  of any demonstration  that it is 
not possible to adjust  the burden  upward.  (After  all, the current  formulation  seems nearly 
absolute,  yet conviction  is routine  on evidence falling  well short of certainty;  this may be 
in part  because sophisticated  fact-finders  do discount  for aspects of the process or simply 
because  fact-finders  disregard  instructions.  One can imagine  empirical  research  that would 
illuminate  this question  further.)  Third,  there are many  ways of raising  proof  burdens.  For 
example, one can adjust  or add to elements of offenses. (One can heighten  the required 
intent  or make  aspects of proof  elements  of a crime-for  example,  the two-witness  require- 
ment  for treason.  See also Note, Winship  on Rough  Waters:  The Erosion  of the Reasonable 
Doubt Standard,  106 Harv. L. Rev. 1093  (1993).) For a possible exception, see note 138 
supra (rules that implicitly  raise the proof burden  to avoid abuse of government  power). 
Finally, note that changes in the burden of proof affect litigants' incentives to present 
information  and thus affect accuracy. 
140  Prior  economic analyses that have considered  the burden  of proof include  Johnston, 
supra note 43; Posner, supra note 118, at 408-15; Daniel L. Rubinfeld  & David E. M. 
Sappington,  Efficient  Awards  and Standards  of Proof  in Judicial  Proceedings,  18 RAND J. 
Econ. 308 (1987)  (studying  how the burden  of proof affects defendants'  litigation  expendi- 
tures). See also Frederick  Schauer  & Richard  Zeckhauser,  On the Degree of Confidence 
for Adverse  Decisions (unpublished  manuscript,  Harvard  Univ., Kennedy  School of Gov't, 
1992)  (discussing  proof burdens  outside the formal legal setting). Earlier  advocates of a 
cost-benefit  approach  to determining  burdens  of proof  include  Alan  D. Cullison,  Probability 
Analysis of Judicial  Fact-finding:  A Preliminary  Outline  of the Subjective  Approach,  1969 
U. Tol. L. Rev. 538, and John Kaplan,  Decision Theory and the Factfinding  Process, 20 
Stan. L. Rev. 1065  (1968). See also Laurence  H. Tribe, Trial  by Mathematics:  Precision 
and Ritual  in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329, 1378-93  (1971)  (critiquing  such an 
approach,  although  not advocating  a concrete alternative). 
141  A zero burden  does not really  exist in most contexts even if there  is a zero burden  in 
adjudication.  For example, if the police apply a threshold  in apprehension  (rather  than 
making  entirely  random  arrests),  the de facto burden  is not really  zero. This illustrates  how 
accuracy  involves the combined  effect of choices in investigation  (or auditing,  monitoring, 
etc.) and in adjudication.  See note 116  supra. 
142  For qualifications,  see note 139. 359  ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION 
accuracy are costly.  Therefore,  if it is  possible  to  raise  deterrence  by 
altering  the burden of proof,  one could make such a change in the proof 
burden while  simultaneously  reducing,  say,  enforcement  effort.  This 
would keep behavior unchanged while reducing enforcement  costs.143 
What  burden of proof would  maximize  deterrence?  Not  one that was 
very low.  To  see  this,  note  that reducing the burden of proof not only 
raises the likelihood  of sanctioning the guilty but also that of sanctioning 
the  innocent.  When the burden is low,  most of the guilty (for whom there 
is any significant evidence  of guilt) may be found guilty in any event,  in 
which case a further reduction would primarily increase the rate at which 
the innocent  are convicted.  As  explained  in Subsection  A1,  this would 
reduce deterrence.  Just what burden of proof results in maximum deter- 
rence is  difficult to  determine.  It might be  thought that a  "more  likely 
than  not"  standard, common  in the civil context,  maximizes  deterrence. 
The idea is that such a threshold  is precisely  the one  below  which it is 
more  likely that one is sanctioning innocent behavior. But the relationship 
between the proof burden and behavior is more complicated.144 
b. Sanction  Costs.  When  sanctions  are themselves  costly,  as  with 
imprisonment, a  common  intuition  is  that a  higher burden of  proof  is 
appropriate. This subsection  offers an argument suggesting that this intu- 
ition is correct. Increasing the burden of proof reduces sanctions on both 
the innocent  and the  guilty  and therefore  reduces  sanction  costs.  This 
might seem to be enough  of a demonstration:  the greater the social cost 
of sanctions,  the greater the benefit of increasing the burden of proof. 
There is,  however,  an important complication.  Increasing the burden 
143  Compare  Subsection  A la supra  (optimal  to raise sanctions  to maximum  feasible  extent 
if sanctions  are costless). 
'44  To illustrate,  a lower burden  could readily  improve  behavior.  Suppose,  for example, 
that when a harmful  act is committed,  the injurer  cannot be distinguished  from the two 
individuals  in closest proximity.  Then, the probability  that  one identified  the correct  injurer 
would always be one-third.  A proof burden  of "more likely than not" would exonerate 
everyone.  A lower  burden  would sanction  all injurers  as well as additional  individuals.  But 
this  may have little adverse effect on behavior.  First, if the sanction  is sufficiently  high, no 
one may commit  the act in such circumstances.  Second, as long as the acts are not terribly 
frequent,  innocent individuals  would not have their behavior  much affected by the slight 
possibility  that they would be the unlucky  parties  who happen  to be those nearest  to the 
injurer. 
Alternatively,  if an act is committed  by many and there is some difficulty  in identifying 
the injurers  accurately,  it may be that many  innocent  individuals  would find  themselves  in 
situations-proximate to others committing  the act-where  it would seem in adjudication 
more  likely than not that they, too committed  the act. Then, they would  face no increased 
risk of sanction  by committing  the harmful  act, an undesirable  state of affairs.  But it may 
be that requiring  a higher standard  of proof would usually exonerate such individuals, 
assuming  they did not act, while still resulting  in a sanction being applied  to most who 
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of proof also affects deterrence.  Suppose  that, in the range under consid- 
eration, an increase in the proof burden reduces deterrence.145  Then more 
individuals  commit  the  harmful  act.  But  individuals  who  commit  the 
harmful act  are more  likely  to  be  sanctioned  than individuals  who  do 
not.146  This effect  increases  the total imposition  of sanctions.  In total,  a 
lower fraction  of  the  innocent  and guilty  are  sanctioned,  but a higher 
fraction of  the  population  will  be  guilty  and thus  be  sanctioned  more 
often. 
Although the  effect  on  deterrence  complicates  the  argument  for  a 
higher burden of  proof,  the  argument is  not undermined entirely.  The 
analysis in Subsection  a indicated that, when  sanctions  are costless,  the 
most efficient burden of proof is that which maximizes deterrence.  If one 
increased the  proof burden slightly  above  that point,  the rate at which 
deterrence would  fall is generally  very  small.i47 In contrast,  raising the 
burden  would reduce sanction costs  at a positive  rate.148  Therefore, rais- 
ing  the burden of proof somewhat  above  the maximum deterrence point 
will tend to reduce  sanctions,  and therefore  sanction costs,  without  sig- 
nificantly affecting  deterrence.  One could  continue  to  raise the burden 
further,  but at some  point further increases  will reduce deterrence more 
significantly. That reduction  will be undesirable  both because  it offsets 
to some  extent  the  direct  effect  of  reducing  the  rate  of  imposition  of 
sanctions  and because  behavior is less effectively  controlled.149  The most 
145  If the increase  in burden  of proof  increases  deterrence,  it is probably  desirable  because  there  is both a deterrence  benefit  (but see the qualification  in note 149)  and a reduction  in  sanction  costs. One would stop increasing  the burden  further  only at some point after 
deterrence  began  to fall.  146  Otherwise,  there would be  no  deterrence  whatsoever. 
147  The logic is analogous  to that in note 130 supra. Intuitively,  the argument  is that, in  most  policy settings, little is lost as a result of being near the ideal policy rather  than 
precisely  at it. Thus, increasing  the proof  burden  from the level that maximizes  deterrence 
initially  has a negligible  effect on deterrence  but not on the imposition  of sanctions. For- 
mally,  the argument  is one from calculus:  a function  has a zero derivative  at its maximum,  meaning  that the rate of change (here, in deterrence)  is zero at the maximum  and close to 
zero  when near the maximum. 
148  The emphasis  is on rates, rather  than amounts.  This relates  to the point in note 147. 
149  This  latter  effect depends  on the assumption  that, at the optimum-taking into account  sanction  costs, enforcement  costs, and control  of behavior-there tends to be underdeter-  rence.  This is true when one considers  only enforcement  costs and behavior.  (The reason  is  that the benefit of deterrence  with regard  to behavior  alone is subject to diminishing  returns,  and zero marginal  returns  precisely  at the ideal level of deterrence,  while the cost  of  marginal  increases  in deterrence  remains  positive.) When  sanctions  involve social costs,  however,  it is possible in principle  for optimal sanctions to involve overdeterrence.  See  Louis  Kaplow, A Note on the Optimal  Use of Nonmonetary  Sanctions,  42  J.  Pub. Econ.  245  (1990);  Louis Kaplow, The Optimal  Probability  and Magnitude  of Fines for Acts That 
Definitely  Are Undesirable,  12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 3  (1992);  Polinsky  & Shavell, supra 
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efficient burden of proof will be that which just balances  these  opposing 
factors.150 
It is possible  to  say  something  more concrete  about the ideal burden 
of proof when sanctions  are socially  costly.  The preceding argument sug- 
gests  that, when  the burden of proof is set properly,  it will be at a level 
at which  deterrence  is falling.  Thus,  at the margin, a rise in the burden 
of  proof  (say,  the  last  increment  before  reaching  the  optimal level)  is 
more generous  to the guilty than to the innocent.  This is consistent  with 
the view  that the criminal justice  system  should err on the side of being 
generous to the guilty for the sake of avoiding the imposition of sanctions 
on the innocent,  although the correspondence  is hardly precise.15' 
Finally,  note  how  the  analysis  of  the burden of proof combines  with 
that of accuracy in the case of costly  sanctions.  Subsection A2b indicates 
that more costly  sanctions  warrant a greater level  of accuracy,  which in 
turn may best be accomplished  with a lower level  of enforcement  effort 
and higher sanctions  (because greater accuracy raises the cost of enforce- 
ment  effort).  This  subsection  suggests  that,  when  sanctions  are  more 
150  The analysis in the text shows that with costly sanctions  the burden  of proof should 
be higher  than with costless sanctions. A corollary  is that, the greater  the sanction  cost, 
the higher the proof burden should be. (For reasons discussed previously, at the most 
efficient  proof  burden  for a given sanction  cost, one would expect that a marginal  increase 
in the proof  burden  would reduce deterrence.  For that proof burden  to be optimal,  it must 
be that there is a reduction  in total sanction  costs just sufficient  to offset the adverse  effect 
with respect to controlling  behavior.  Then, if the social cost per unit of the sanction  were 
higher,  a marginal  increase in the burden  of proof would be desirable,  rather  than simply 
equating  marginal  costs and benefits.) 
151  The correspondence  is imperfect  for two reasons. First, the analysis  in the text, with- 
out empirical  evidence, does not indicate  the extent to which the guilty should  be favored 
(while  it is commonly  suggested  that the extent is quite substantial).  Second, the generosity 
toward  the guilty suggested  by the argument  in the text is in terms of expected sanctions. 
When deterrence  falls, it is because the fall in expected sanctions  for the guilty exceeds 
the fall in expected sanctions for the innocent. Most commentators,  however, probably 
have in mind  not the expected sanctions  for the innocent,  but the treatment  of the innocent 
who are arrested  and subject  to the formal  legal process. Observe  that a shift in the proof 
burden  that permits, say, one additional  guilty person and one additional  innocent  person 
go free is favorable  to the guilty on an expected value basis, as long as less than half of 
the relevant  population  commits  the act. (Because  there are fewer who commit  the act, the 
expected sanction each guilty person faces must fall by more to produce an expected 
reduction  in the number  of guilty sanctioned  of one, which equals the reduction  for the 
innocent,  of whom there are more.) Thus, the logic of the argument  in the text, suggesting 
that  generosity  toward  the guilty in terms  of expected sanctions  is efficient,  does not imply 
that the proof burden  necessarily  must be high enough  that, at the margin,  more guilty  go 
free than innocent. 
The lack of a precise fit may not be surprising  if the burden  of proof  in criminal  cases is 
justified in part by noneconomic concerns, such as those explored in Section VB. (To 
foreshadow  that analysis a bit, note that the "economic" concerns  here include  the social 
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costly,  proof burdens should be higher, to an extent  that reduces  deter- 
rence.  It may be appropriate to address some of the resulting shortfall in 
deterrence  by other means.  In light of the comments  on accuracy,  sanc- 
tions,  and enforcement  effort,  it may be best  to rely most on enhanced 
accuracy  and higher sanctions.152 Viewed  together,  when  sanction costs 
are  high, it seems that high proof burdens, high accuracy,  high sanctions, 
and  a low rate of enforcement  may be an appropriate mix. This combina- 
tion  characterizes  criminal law to a substantial extent,  in contrast to the 
civil  context.153 
C.  Applications 
1.  Civil Cases  and Private Dispute  Resolution 
As  suggested  at the outset  of this part, the analysis is applicable to all 
dispute  resolution contexts  even though the language speaks of the inno- 
cent  and guilty and the use  of  sanctions.  While some  examples  outside 
the  criminal context were noted in some instances,  it is useful to consider 
further  how the analysis  applies. 
Accuracy in determining liability and the burden of proof are features 
of  all legal settings involving the control of behavior. In place of criminal 
sanctions, damage awards are more common in civil and private contexts, 
but  the logic is unaffected.  Corresponding to the level of criminal enforce- 
ment effort  are aspects  of  the  civil  legal  system  that affect  incentives 
to sue.  With  crimes,  where  the  government  has  a  legal  monopoly  of 
enforcement, it is possible  to bring cases  that, ex post,  may not appear 
cost-justified (for example,  because  the costs  of trial or prison exceed  the 
harm)  in order to enhance  deterrence.  In contrast,  private litigants typi- 
cally have  no  such  incentive.154 Moreover,  the government  can refrain 
152  Because this strategy  decreases the rate of imposing  sanctions, in contrast  to using 
more  enforcement  effort, it lessens the need to raise the proof burden;  similarly,  a higher 
proof  burden,  by reducing  the imposition  of costly sanctions,  makes  accuracy  less valuable 
at  the margin. 
153  It is familiar  that in civil proceedings  sanctions  are less socially costly (see note 131 
supra),  less effort  is made  to be accurate,  proof  burdens  are lower, and sanctions  are often 
lower  (depending  on how one compares  damage  awards  and imprisonment).  With regard 
to enforcement  effort, note that in civil cases the injurer  can often be identified  and the 
victim  often has an incentive to sue, as long as the stakes are not low relative  to litigation 
costs. Thus, the probability  of suit in many settings is high. For the criminal  law, even 
when harm is substantial,  this is not true (aside from some exceptional  areas, such as 
murder). 
154  An exception arises when they contemplate  future  interactions  and can benefit  from 
a reputation  of suing even when the stakes are small, in order to deter violations  or to 
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from pursuing highly meritorious  cases  if it has  decided  that additional 
prosecutions  would not make a sufficient contribution to deterrence.155  In 
contrast,  private litigants will pursue cases  when the expected  recovery 
exceeds  the cost  of litigation,  even  if there would be no contribution to 
deterrence. 156 
While the government  does  not control each litigation decision  in civil 
suits, it does  structure the process  in a manner that affects incentives  to 
sue.  Litigation  costs  may  be  subsidized  or  shifted.  Alternatively,  fees 
may be charged and penalties  imposed  (as under Rule  11). Also,  in the 
private context,  there is a direct interaction between  sanctions (damages) 
and incentives  to  sue:  raising  sanctions  tends  to  encourage  litigation. 
Although adjusting sanctions  is less  common in the civil context  (in most 
areas of law, damages equal harm), there are exceptions  (treble damages, 
punitive  damages,  rules  limiting  consequential  damages,  requirements 
concerning proof of damages),  and more could be made.157  Also,  public 
enforcement  in the civil  context  is important, whether exclusive  or sup- 
plemented  by private rights of  action.158 Similarly,  with private dispute 
resolution  (or civil  litigation enforcing  contracts),  parties can adjust the 
system in various ways,  most obviously  by specifying liquidated damages 
(which affects  litigation costs,  incentives  to sue, and the deterrent effect 
of a given  suit). 
The major difference  between  public enforcement  in the criminal con- 
text and enforcement  in other contexts  thus involves  the nature of sanc- 
tions  and the  typical  degree  of  directness  in controlling  the  frequency 
of  enforcement.159 Even  here,  the  difference  could  be  reduced.  Some 
commentators  have  proposed  schemes  such as decoupling  the damages 
paid by defendants  from awards collected  by plaintiffs.160 
155  Of course, the government  may also consider other benefits, such as incapacitation 
(addressed  in Subsection  IVB2). 
156  The discussion  in Section IIC involved  this sort of problem.  See A. Mitchell  Polinsky, 
Private  versus Public Enforcement  of Fines, 9 J. Legal Stud. 105 (1980);  Shavell, supra 
note 94. 
157  Polinsky  and Shavell, supra note 118, consider  how setting  damage  awards  and pay- 
ments by losing plaintiffs  affects incentives to sue in a model in which there is error  in 
determining  liability. 
158  For example, enforcement  of much modern  regulation  involves public  prosecution  in 
a civil setting. 
159  As emphasized  in Section IIC, accuracy is chosen by private parties-in  the civil 
context and in the criminal  context (with respect to defendants).  Thus, accuracy  is deter- 
mined  indirectly,  through  procedural  rules, rules  of evidence, proof  burdens,  and  definitions 
of substantive  law. 
160  See A. Mitchell  Polinsky  & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling  Liability:  Optimal  Incentives 
for Care and Litigation,  22 RAND J. Econ. 562 (1991). See also A. Mitchell  Polinsky & 364  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
2.  Liability versus  Regulation 
In order to  control  behavior,  the  legal  system  varies  its  reliance  on 
liability (as with  tort) and regulation  (as with traffic or pollution  laws), 
sometimes  relying almost entirely on one or the other and at other times 
using both. Although the many factors relevant to the use of liability and 
regulation have been examined elsewhere,161 it is useful here to note how 
the present analysis bears on their use. 
Regulation is usually directed at behavior before harm arises.  Regula- 
tion may be applied to each actor's behavior (as when all restaurants are 
inspected),  or it may  rely  on  probabilistic  enforcement  (as with  traffic 
violations).  Sanctions  in many contexts  are rather modest,  reflecting in 
part that violations may not cause harm but only indicate a small probabil- 
ity that harm might have been  caused.162  With liability, in contrast,  it is 
typical to wait for harm to occur,  allowing the victim to sue to recover 
damages equal to the amount of harm caused.  In accident  cases,  the ex 
ante probability that harm will  occur  is  often  low,  and damage awards 
are high in comparison to fines for equivalent regulatory violations.  (For 
example,  the fine for  speeding  may be  $50, but if one  who  is  speeding 
hits another car, liability may range from thousands to millions of dollars, 
depending on how much damage results.) 
The prior analysis  might be taken to  suggest  that liability is  superior 
for two reasons.  First,  by using a high sanction  with a low  probability, 
Daniel  A. Rubinfeld,  Optimal  Awards  and  Penalties  When  Some Suits  Are Frivolous  (Work- 
ing Paper No. 93, Stanford  Law School, John M. Olin Program  in Law and Economics 
1992)  (increasing  damage  awards  while penalizing  losing plaintiffs  may reduce the rate of 
litigation  while maintaining  deterrence).  Such alternatives  may best be viewed as extending 
Becker's intuition,  see Becker, supra  note 122;  Subsection  Ala supra, to the civil context 
involving  private  enforcement.  See Louis Kaplow, Shifting  Plaintiffs'  Fees versus Increas- 
ing Damage  Awards, 24 RAND J. Econ. 625 (1993). 
161  See Shavell, supra note 74; Steven Shavell, The Optimal  Structure  of Law Enforce- 
ment, 36 J. Law & Econ. 255 (April 1993). 
162  There still remains  the question  of why fines are not higher,  with a lower probability 
of detection. See Subsection  Ala supra. For example, fines for common  traffic  violations 
may be about  $50, and one could imagine  fines being raised  to $100, allowing  enforcement 
effort  to be cut in half. The probability  may be kept as high  as it is (and  thus fines may be 
low) for many  reasons. First, the police who monitor  traffic  violations  are also in a position 
to respond  to emergencies  and to watch  for other illegal  acts. See Shavell, supra  note 123. 
(Still, substantial  police resources are devoted solely to traffic  violations, as when many 
officers  staff a speed trap.) Second, if the probability  were too low, misperceptions  about 
its magnitude  might become relatively more significant.  See Bebchuk & Kaplow, supra 
note 123.  Third,  if there  are too few monitors,  it will often  be the case that  potential  violators 
will be certain  (by direct observation)  that no police are nearby, so that they can violate 
the law with impunity. (Yet one suspects that this is often the case in any event, and 
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enforcement  resources are saved.163 Second, it might appear that tort 
liability  is superior  because of accuracy. When  the probability  is so much 
lower, one can invest more in each case to promote  accuracy. Although 
this is true all things being equal, the differences between liability and 
regulation  suggest that the latter may in fact be more accurate.  When  the 
police issue speeding tickets, they either measure the speed with radar 
or directly observe the car (and they are experienced at making such 
observations,  focusing on the relevant  question, and making  contempora- 
neous notes of what they see when they write a ticket). In contrast, in 
an auto accident case,  witnesses who are less  expert, have no radar 
equipment,  may not have been paying attention,  and often are interested 
parties  offer later testimony about the speed of a car.164  Because differ- 
ences inherent  in the way information  is gathered  have such a large  effect 
on accuracy, it is unlikely that subsequent  expenditures  could eliminate 
the disparity  in accuracy in these contexts. 
D.  Individuals'  Information  at the Time They  Act and Their 
Incentives to Present Information  in Adjudication 
1.  Individuals'  Knowledge Ex Ante and the Value 
of Accuracy Ex Post 
Much of the analysis in Part II emphasizes individuals'  knowledge of 
legal consequences at the time they decide how to act because accuracy 
ex post is valuable only if individuals will be induced to behave in a 
manner  that reflects the distinctions that will be made in adjudication. 
Thus, if an individual  is unaware  whether  her act will cause more or less 
163  One might save further  resources by, for example, raising damage  awards in auto 
accident  cases while simply eliminating  police monitoring.  The  judgment-proof  problem  is 
the most  important  of many  reasons  for not doing  so. See also note 162  supra.  Alternatively, 
one might eliminate  tort recoveries for auto accidents and correspondingly  increase the 
level of traffic  fines, maintaining  deterrence  while saving  the costs of the tort system (using 
first-party  insurance  for compensation).  This may have two problems.  First, when one is 
confident  that police are not monitoring  an area, there is no deterrence.  Second, because 
tort awards depend on harm caused, they will reflect the degree to which behavior is 
dangerous.  (But traffic  fines could be more finely graded, such as by raising  the fine for 
driving  over the center line, having fines vary more precisely as a function  of speed and 
traffic  density, and so on. Moreover,  as emphasized  in Part  II, much of the precision  with 
regard  to ex post damage  determinations  is not anticipated  ex ante. Thus, one running  a 
red light  at forty miles per hour  will have little idea of who if anyone will be hit, how badly 
potential  victims would be injured,  and the like. A fine based on statistical  data for such 
acts could provide  equivalent  incentives.) 
164  The testimony may be years later, but often there will have been interviews soon 
after the accident. Even so, an interview days or even hours later does not compare  to 
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harm than average,  damages  based  on actual harm rather than average 
harm will not affect her decision  how to act. 
Similar reasoning  is  applicable  to  accuracy  in  determining  liability. 
Thus, if an individual does  not know which of two acts she contemplates 
committing is harmful, greater accuracy in distinguishing the acts ex post 
will not affect her behavior. To illustrate, suppose that, with perfect accu- 
racy,  the  expected  sanction  for the first act would  be  100 and,  for the 
second,  0.  If one  does  not know which  act is subject to the sanction  of 
100 and which 0, the expected  sanction for each would be 50.165  Alterna- 
tively,  if there were  error, so that the expected  sanction for the first act 
was 80 (because 20 percent of the guilty are exonerated) and the expected 
sanction for the second  was 20 (because  some who commit the innocent 
act are mistakenly sanctioned),  the expected  sanction for each act would 
still be 50. Thus,  only if the actor knows  which act is harmful, and thus 
legally subject to sanctions,  will accuracy  ex post be relevant for behav- 
ior.166  If actors  initially  are  uninformed,  greater accuracy  ex  post  will 
increase  the  incentive  to  acquire  information  ex  ante,  before  deciding 
how to act. 
Although it is entirely natural to assume in the context in Part II involv- 
ing damages  that individuals  often  would  not know  ex  ante how  much 
harm their act would  cause  ex post,  it seems  more often to be the case 
with regard to liability that individuals know whether their acts are illegal. 
This seems  most likely  with regard to common  crimes.  For some  viola- 
tions  of  modern  statutes  (tax  laws,  occupational  safety  requirements), 
however,  it  seems  plausible  that  many  actors  would  have  substantial 
uncertainty  about which  acts  are deemed  harmful by the legal  system. 
The more it is the case  that individuals are uninformed ex ante, the less 
165  The example uses the assumption  that the actor believes that there is a 50 percent 
chance  that  each act is subject  to the sanction  of 100.  If individuals  believed  that  the chance 
that the first act was harmful  exceeded 50 percent, there would be some deterrent  effect 
of accuracy, although  less than when individuals  are certain. (If individuals  believed that 
the truly harmful  act was the harmful  one with a probability  under  50 percent, then more 
accuracy  would actually  make behavior  worse.) 
166  This is literally  true only if the assumption  is that all are uninformed.  Assume that 
some individuals  are informed  and some uninformed,  that the adjudicator  does not know 
who is who, and that there is error.  It may be that it would be desirable  to raise expected 
sanctions  on account of the informed  because expected sanctions  of 80 versus 20 involve 
a dilution  of deterrence,  so raising  sanctions  or enforcement,  perhaps  producing  expected 
sanctions  of 130 and 30, might  seem desirable.  But then expected sanctions  would distort 
behavior  if there were additional  options. See Subsection  A3 supra. For an analysis of 
uncertainty  with regard  to liability in a model in which error  is not involved, see Louis 
Kaplow, Optimal  Deterrence, Uninformed  Individuals,  and Acquiring  Information  about 
Whether  Acts Are Subject  to Sanctions,  6 J. L. Econ. & Org. 93 (1990). ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION  367 
valuable  accuracy  will be ex post.167  Given that the discussion of liability 
in Part III can be seen as an instance of uncertainty  about damages in 
Part  II,168  it should not be surprising  that the insights  of Part  II would be 
applicable  in this part. 
2.  Whether  Individuals'  Incentives to Present Information 
in Adjudication  Are Socially Appropriate 
a. Costless Sanctions.  Section IIC emphasized the divergence be- 
tween parties'  incentives to present information  about  damages  in adjudi- 
cation and the social value of information  in that setting. A similar  ques- 
tion can be  asked with regard to  information  about liability. As  the 
preceding  subsection suggests, the same analysis will be applicable.  To 
the extent individuals  are uninformed  ex ante about whether their acts 
are subject  to liability,  greater  accuracy  ex post will have no social value, 
but presenting  information  will be valuable  to parties  to the extent of its 
effect on the expected outcome of litigation. And if individuals  are in- 
formed  ex ante, incentives ex post may still be inappropriate  because the 
effect of accuracy ex post on behavior  ex ante does not tend to equal the 
private benefit to parties ex  post in presenting information  in adjudi- 
cation. 
b. Costly Sanctions.  The analysis in Section IIC of parties'  incentives 
to present information  in adjudication  viewed the effect of such informa- 
tion on the expected outcome as being of value only indirectly,  through 
its effect on behavior. When sanctions are socially costly, changes in the 
outcome also involve direct costs. The present discussion will consider 
expenditures  by innocent individuals  made to convince a tribunal  of their 
innocence.169 
When innocent individuals  provide better information,  decreasing  the 
167  When  some individuals  are  informed  ex ante  and  others  are  not, it is natural  to consider 
whether  different  sanctions  should  be applied  to these two groups.  See id. (suggesting  that 
there  is no reason  for differentiating  the two groups  unless there  are systematic  mispercep- 
tions by the uninformed  or sanctions are socially costly). If the distinction  is to be made, 
the related question of how accurate adjudication  should be in making  the distinction  is 
also presented. 
168  See  Subsection  A3 supra. 
169  As in Section IIC, attention  here is confined  to the presentation  of information  that 
improves  the accuracy of the result. The truly guilty can only improve  the outcome by 
convincing  the tribunal  of their guilt, which they have no incentive to do. In contrast, in 
Part  II, the truly  guilty may have caused less harm  than the court would think  were they 
to remain  silent. But, as Subsection  A3 indicated,  there  are  analogues  in the present  context. 
For example, the truly guilty may be guilty of a lesser offense than the tribunal  would 
otherwise  think.  But, using  what  the tribunal  initially  believes as a benchmark,  such individ- 
uals should  be viewed as "innocent" for present  purposes. 368  THE  JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
chance  of  a mistake,  there  is  both  an improvement  in deterrence  (the 
anticipation  that mistaken sanctions will be imposed on the innocent less 
often  makes innocent  acts relatively  more attractive) and a reduction in 
sanction  costs.  Although  the  analysis  in  Section  IIC  suggests  that the 
significance  of the former factor alone (the degree of improvement in ex 
ante  behavior)  may  be  less  than  the  change  in the  expected  sanction 
(which  determines  an individual's  incentive  to present the information), 
the  balance  would  be  otherwise  if  the  social  costs  of  sanctions  were 
sufficiently  large. When the sanction is imprisonment, moreover, it seems 
that  social sanction costs  alone exceed  private sanction costs.  The reason 
is  that the private sanction cost-loss  of liberty-is  a social cost, whereas 
the  substantial cost  of running prisons  is a social  cost  but not a private 
cost. Thus,  the  innocent  would  have  too  little  incentive  to  prove  their 
innocence, as surprising as this may seem.  (And this is true even ignoring 
the  fact that reducing mistaken convictions  of the innocent has the further 
social  benefit of improving behavior.) 
When  sanctions involve  high social costs,  as they often do in the crimi- 
nal  context,  economic  considerations  thus may favor subsidizing defense 
expenditures of the innocent.170  There is, however,  a problem. The very 
reason for  criminal trials is  that in advance  we  are not certain who  is 
innocent. If, instead,  one subsidizes  all criminal defendants,  the guilty- 
who  already have an excessive  incentive to prove their innocence171-are 
further  encouraged.  One would  also  be concerned  about whether accu- 
racy  overall would increase or decrease  as a result; if the latter occurred, 
the  final result may involve  more mistaken convictions  of the innocent.172 
One  can imagine other ways  to attempt to address the problem.173  For 
example, if criminal defendants  who were exonerated  received  rewards, 
there  would be more of an incentive  to undertake litigation expenditures, 
but the increase  in incentive  may be relatively  greater for the innocent. 
Alternatively, one  could  subsidize  criminal defense  but penalize  those 
170  See also Subsection  B1 (discussing  the example  of subsidizing  defense counsel for all 
defendants  if such a subsidy would increase  accuracy). 
171  See note  169 supra. 
172  As discussed  in Subsection  B1, subsidizing  defense counsel would shift  the burden  of 
proof  and affect accuracy.  The two components  can be separated.  Thus, if accuracy  falls, 
then  for any given level of mistaken  acquittals  of the guilty, there will be more mistaken 
convictions  of the innocent. See also note 137 supra (indicating  that, even if the formal 
burden  of proof is not adjusted,  sophisticated  decision-makers  may implicitly  adjust  it in 
any  event). If one valued  defense counsel, without  regard  to the effect on accuracy,  solely 
to  reduce  mistaken  convictions  of the innocent,  it would  be better  simply  to raise  the burden 
of proof. (This would not be true if defense counsel were of more value to the innocent, 
but  this is precisely  the case in which accuracy  would improve.) 
173  The mentioned  possibilities  are hardly  exhaustive.  Thus, one might  imagine  providing 
an  added  subsidy  to the defense of those with  no prior  record  or those who pass a polygraph 
test-factors  that may be probative  of guilt although  inadmissible  at trial. ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION  369 
ultimately  convicted, and presumably  the guilty have a greater  likelihood 
of conviction. The present criminal  justice system has this latter  feature, 
for the indigent  (a large  portion  of criminal  defendants)  receive subsidized 
services, but if one uses them to a great extent by going to trial,174  it is 
generally  believed that one's sentence is likely to be greater  than if one 
pleads guilty beforehand.175 
IV.  ACCURACY  IN ESTABLISHING  FUTURE  RIGHTS  AND  OBLIGATIONS 
The analysis in Parts II and III considers settings in which the primary 
purpose  of adjudication  is to provide incentives to guide prior  conduct.176 
In such contexts, sanctions themselves are of no independent  interest 
except to the extent they are socially costly. In that case, it is desirable 
to design a legal system in a manner  that reduces the use of sanctions, 
and an important  value of accuracy in adjudication  is that it has such an 
effect. 
In this part, the analysis will focus on situations  in which the outcome 
of adjudication  is not merely a sanction, or not a sanction at all, but 
rather  a pronouncement  of future  rights  and obligations  that have a direct 
effect on the future actions of the parties rather  than an indirect effect 
through  deterrence. Thus, it will be of independent  significance  whether 
adjudication  is accurate ex post, and the notion that sanctions should be 
kept to a minimum  will no longer make sense. 
Section A considers adjudication  of future entitlements, an important 
instance in which the primary concern of adjudication  is prospective. 
Section B addresses  adjudication  about past acts that governs  future  con- 
duct, in which the analysis in Section A as well as that in prior  parts of 
this article is relevant. 
A.  Adjudication  about Future Entitlements 
Many  disputes are primarily,  if not exclusively, concerned  with future 
entitlements.  For example, licensing procedures  may determine  whether 
one is fit to practice a profession or perform  a service.177  Another  exam- 
ple, which will be the focus of this section because of the attention  it has 
174  Guilty pleas obviously save prosecutorial  and court resources  in addition  to defense 
resources. 
175  See, for example, Kenneth Jost, A Six-Month  Burden  on Right to Trial?  A.B.A. J. 
34 (June 1993).  One also suspects that the increase in sentence for going to trial  tends to 
be greater  when it is apparent  at the time of sentencing  that the defendant  was obviously 
guilty and knew it, rather  than involving  a case with an arguable  defense (such as lack of 
intent  for tax evasion or possible self-defense). 
176  One exception is the discussion in Subsection  IIA3 that considers whether  damages 
provide  accurate  compensation  to risk-averse  plaintiffs. 
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received,178  involves  the entitlement to future public payments,179  as from 
welfare programs.180  Subsection  1 begins  the analysis by offering an as- 
sessment of the value of accuracy in this context.  Subsection 2 addresses 
whether  claimants'  incentives  to  make  expenditures  in adjudication to 
establish their entitlements  are socially excessive.  Subsection 3 discusses 
how  the  present  analysis  differs  from  that  most  commonly  offered  by 
courts and commentators. 
1.  The Value of Accuracy181 
Consider a scenario in which individuals apply for disability benefits.182 
Eligibility for benefits depends on whether one is disabled.183  The system 
obvious. In addition,  if licenses are denied to applicants  with, say, prior  criminal  convic- 
tions, the license denial can be seen as part  of the sanction  for prior  acts. 
178  What is surprising  is that most of the other contexts addressed  in this article have 
received  so little attention. 
179  Past behavior  may be involved here as well. For example,  if one quit one's job rather 
than  being fired, one may be ineligible  for unemployment  compensation.  Moreover,  many 
benefits  affect ex ante incentives-to  earn income in the case of welfare programs  or to 
avoid injury  in the case of social security disability  insurance.  These effects are ignored 
for convenience.  (The latter  effects have the most general  application.  The decision  to have 
the program  reflects a judgment that payment of benefits to individuals  who qualify is 
desirable  in spite of these incentive effects. To incorporate  the incentive  effects, one may 
simply  deem subsequent  references  to the benefits  of providing  payments  to qualified  indi- 
viduals  to be the net benefits:  the benefit  of compensation  minus  the incentive  cost.) 
180  Other contexts involving constitutional  claims concerning due process-such  as 
school discipline, being fired from government  employment,  or parole revocation-raise 
analytically  similar  issues. 
An important  related context is the determination  of tax liability.  (Tax obligations  and 
welfare  entitlements  are conceptually  analogous,  particularly  when both are determined  by 
income levels.) "Future" tax obligations  are usually self-assessed, with litigation  arising 
only when the government  disputes a taxpayer's  claimed  obligation.  As with welfare, the 
expectation  of tax obligations  has important  effects on ex ante behavior;  unlike  with most 
other  areas  of law, the law'  s effect on behavior  tends  to be undesirable  rather  than  desirable. 
For an analysis  of the income tax context, see Louis Kaplow,  Accuracy,  Complexity,  and 
the Income Tax (Discussion Paper No.  139, Harvard  Law School, Program  in Law and 
Economics 1994). 
181  This subsection  omits considerations  of some other  dimensions  of legal design. Nota- 
bly, the ideal level of benefits may depend on accuracy. For example, if accuracy  were 
perfect,  one might  want disability  benefits  to provide  full compensation  (although  this con- 
clusion would be affected by taking into account moral  hazard).  If accuracy  were highly 
imperfect,  so that many  benefits  were paid to individuals  not in need, lower benefits  would 
be appropriate.  (Since only a fraction  of each added dollar  of benefits  goes to those truly 
in need, each dollar  provides  less of a social gain.) 
182  The significance  of the issue is indicated  by the fact that  the Social Security  Disability 
Insurance  program  alone involves annually  over a million  claims, payments  of more than 
twenty billion dollars, and public administrative  expenses approaching  a billion dollars. 
Social Security Administration,  Annual Statistical  Supplement,  Social Security Bulletin, 
tables 4.A2, 4.A6, 6.C7 (1991). 
183  Many details will be omitted for simplicity.  The same logic would be applicable  to 371  ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION 
of  adjudication involves  two  types  of  mistakes,  paralleling the form of 
error in the discussion  of liability in Part III.  Some  disabled individuals 
will  be  mistakenly  denied  benefits,  and  some  individuals  who  are not 
disabled will be mistakenly  granted benefits.184  Expenditures  to increase 
accuracy are assumed  to reduce both types  of errors, so that with more 
accurate procedures  a higher portion of the truly disabled receive  bene- 
fits,  and fewer  individuals  who  are not  disabled  receive  benefits.  (This 
assumption is unconventional,  as it is usually assumed that more of both 
groups would receive  benefits;  Subsection  3 explains,  however,  that the 
conventional  view  confuses  accuracy  and the de facto burden of proof.) 
In order to  assess  the  value  of  accuracy,  consider  first the  effect  on 
the disabled.  Providing  more of  them benefits  has an element  of  social 
gain and a cost.  The gain corresponds  to the social  value  of a disabled 
person receiving  benefits,  rather than being left to other means  of  sup- 
port. The cost  is that of the funds,  which may be supplied by increasing 
taxes,  diverting  revenue  from other programs,  or reducing benefit lev- 
els.185  The net effect  should  be positive,  for otherwise  it would  be best 
to eliminate the program. 
Second,  consider  those  not disabled.  Denying  them benefits  involves 
a cost  (for,  after all,  providing  payments  to  those  not disabled  is not a 
complete waste  of resources)186  and a gain. The gain here corresponds to 
initial  determinations  or eligibility  for continuation  of benefits  (or to what procedures  are 
required  for determinations  that take immediate  effect but are subject  to subsequent  recon- 
sideration).  Similar  reasoning  also would govern disputes  concerning  the level of benefits. 
Finally,  the discussion  ignores  the important  fact that  disability  is usually  a matter  of degree, 
suggesting  that the cost of an erroneous  decision in some cases (clear ones) may differ 
greatly  from that in others (close ones). See Mashaw, supra note 87, at 82-85; Jerry L. 
Mashaw,  Administrative  Due Process as Social-Cost  Accounting,  9 Hofstra  L. Rev. 1423, 
1441, 1444-45  (1981). 
184  In both instances, individuals only come before a decision-maker  if they apply, 
whereas  in the discussion of accuracy in determining  liability  in Part  III, a victim or the 
government  initiates  proceedings.  The level of accuracy  will affect incentives  to apply. As 
accuracy  increases, there is less incentive for one not truly disabled  to apply (assuming 
that they know at the time of application  whether  they are indeed disabled,  which is true 
in cases of outright  fraud  but may not be for borderline  cases). Greater  accuracy  increases 
the likelihood  of success for the truly disabled, making  application  more attractive,  but 
there may be a countervailing  effect since more accurate  proceedings  may cost more in 
time and resources for applicants.  (Application  charges or subsidies could be offered to 
alter these incentives.) See also note 7 supra  (effect of accuracy  on frivolous  suits). 
185  One way to reduce benefits  is to make it more difficult  to qualify  for benefits,  which 
Justice Black suggested  may be the effect of the Court's  ruling  in Goldberg  v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254, 279 (1970)  (dissenting  opinion). 
186  An economic  approach  ordinarily  counts gains to all individuals,  even when the gains 
may not be "deserved." Moreover,  note that many  unqualified  individuals  may be disabled 
to some extent or otherwise  in need, so dismissing  all benefit  to their  receiving  funds  would 
be inappropriate.  In any event, the remainder  of the argument  does not depend on how 
one treats this issue. 372  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
the  cost  with  the  truly  disabled:  reducing  expenditures  allows  one  to 
reduce taxes,  increase funding of other programs, or raise benefit levels. 
The net effect  here should be positive  as well,  for otherwise  it would be 
best to expand the program to include those  not disabled. 
Finally, there is the cost  of providing more accurate procedures them- 
selves.  Because  this  cost  must  be  financed,  it  also  has  the  character 
described previously.187  To determine whether a posited increase in accu- 
racy is desirable,  one  would  determine  how  much it reduced each  type 
of error and sum the gains and losses  just  described. 
An alternative way to view this cost-benefit  calculus is to group all the 
financial costs  and benefits  together.  More  disabled  receiving  benefits 
increases  the revenue  requirement; fewer  individuals who  are not disa- 
bled receiving  benefits  reduces  required revenues;  and enhanced  accu- 
racy affects administrative costs.  Taken together, the net effect on direct 
costs  could  be  positive  or  negative.  To  determine  whether  increasing 
accuracy is desirable,  one would add to this the benefit of more disabled 
individuals receiving  payments  and the  cost  that fewer  individuals  not 
disabled receive  payments. 
2.  Claimants' Incentives  to Present Information188 
Subsection  1 indicates  that the appropriate level  of accuracy  is deter- 
mined by a number of factors.  But the claimant will only be concerned 
with the value of benefits to himself and the costs  he incurs in attempting 
to demonstrate eligibility. Thus, claimants' incentives  to provide informa- 
tion to enhance  their chance  of receiving  benefits  will be excessive  be- 
cause claimants do not take into account the cost of providing benefits.189 
Mashaw  suggests  that  no social value would  be assigned  to disability  payments  to individ- 
uals with no disability.  See Mashaw, supra note 87, at 82-83. Yet, his construct  suggests 
that it is desirable  to make awards  whenever  benefits  of the payment  are positive, which 
implicitly  ignores the costs of financing  benefits (that is, the financial  cost of funding  the 
benefits). See id. at 83. Taken together, however, these two omissions are largely off- 
setting-they  would  be precisely  offsetting  if the cost of financing  benefits  just equaled  the 
social value of benefits to those not at all disabled  (although  generally  the cost would be 
higher  since taxation  involves administrative  and incentive  costs). 
187  As suggested  in note 184, accuracy  may affect incentives  to apply  for benefits,  which 
will  affect  administrative  costs. If total  applications  fall, and  by a sufficient  amount,  adminis- 
trative  costs would  fall. The analysis  in the text does not depend  on whether  the administra- 
tive cost is positive or negative. In addition,  the text simplifies  in implicitly  assuming  that 
all administrative  costs are budgetary  costs, but they may also involve  private  expenditures 
of time and money. 
188  For a formal  analysis, making  the analogy  to private  insurance,  see Louis Kaplow, 
Optimal  Insurance  Contracts  When Establishing  the Amount  of Losses is Costly (Discus- 
sion Paper  No. 122, Harvard  Law School, Program  in Law and Economics 1993). 
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To illustrate,  suppose that a claimant  seeks to receive $10,000  in public 
benefits.  To receive these benefits, the claimant  would be willing  to spend 
up to $9,999. But the social benefit of the claimant  being found eligible 
is always less-and  often much less-than  this amount. The reason is 
that paying the $10,000 in benefits involves an expenditure of public 
funds, which may require  increasing  taxes, reducing  others' benefits, or 
cutting other programs. Hence, the social value of the transfer is less 
than  the private  value, regardless  of whether  the claimant  is truly  eligible 
or ineligible.190 
In practice, of course, claimants usually would choose to spend far 
less than $9,999. For example, if a claimant  can spend $500 to achieve a 
95 percent chance of receiving benefits, he surely would not spend an 
additional  $9,499 to increase the probability  to 100 percent, even if this 
were possible. The argument  in the previous  paragraph,  however, applies 
equally to incentives at the margin. When a claimant contemplates an 
additional  expenditure  to increase the likelihood  of receiving  benefits, he 
considers only the cost of the expenditure  and the gain from receiving 
the benefits, and not the social cost of funding  the program.  Therefore, 
whatever the amount individuals choose to spend, the amount will be 
socially excessive unless they are restrained  or discouraged  from under- 
taking as much effort in establishing eligibility as they would like. A 
system designed  to determine  benefit  eligibility  should  generally  constrain 
to some extent the ability of individuals  to expend resources  establishing 
their claims.191 
3.  Courts and Commentators'  Views 
Much of the attention to accuracy in the context of benefit eligibility 
has been with regard  to the Supreme  Court's  approach  to procedural  due 
eligibility,  aside from the costs they incur themselves. To simplify the exposition, it is 
useful  to think  of these costs as part  of the cost of providing  the benefits. 
190  If the claimant  is truly  eligible, the social value of providing  the benefits  may be high, 
but it is still the case that there is a nontrivial  social cost in providing  the funds. If the 
claimant  is ineligible,  the transfer-taking into account  the benefit  to the claimant  and the 
cost of providing  the funds-is  of negative social value (assuming  that the program  makes 
ineligible  those individuals  to whom it would be undesirable  to provide  a transfer),  and the 
resource  cost incurred  in claiming  the benefits  is an additional  social cost. 
191  How much  they should  be constrained  is an empirical  matter.  There  are other  compli- 
cations that could favor a different  outlook. For example, claimants  may have resource 
constraints  that make  it impossible  for them to finance  even the socially  appropriate  invest- 
ment  in establishing  their  claim, in which case subsidies  may be desirable.  The point  would 
remain  that the amount  of assistance that should  be provided  is less than what a claimant 
would be willing to pay if not under a resource constraint  (and, a fortiori, less than the 
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process that  was  first articulated  precisely  in  Mathews  v. Eldridge:'92 
"[I]dentification  of the specific dictates of due process  generally requires 
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will 
be  affected by the official action; second,  the risk of an erroneous depri- 
vation of  such  interest  through the  procedures  used,  and the  probable 
value, if any,  of  additional  or  substitute  procedural  safeguards; and fi- 
nally, the  Government's  interest,  including  the  function  involved  and 
the fiscal  and  administrative  burdens  that  the  additional  or  substitute 
procedural  requirement would entail."193  Much subsequent criticism has 
focused either on whether  the  Court in this case  or others  applied this 
analysis correctly194  or on  the  appropriateness  of  a cost-benefit  frame- 
work.195  The  present  discussion  will  instead  concern  whether  the cost- 
benefit framework is properly conceived. 
As an initial  matter,  the  Court's  formulation  is  confused.  The  third 
element-the  government's  interest-includes  everything and tells noth- 
ing. Presumably, even the first two elements are part of the government's 
interest.196  And,  if one  views  the government's  interest narrowly as in- 
volving only  its  selfish interest,  the  statement  is unilluminating because 
it says nothing about how this interest is affected by changing procedures. 
The second  element  is  somewhat  puzzling,  because  it does  not explain 
why the risk of  an erroneous  deprivation  is relevant  in addition  to the 
value of a procedural change. Implicitly, it is assumed that reducing error 
from 10 percent  to 8 percent  is more important than reducing it from 4 
percent to 2 percent,  but no reason  is given.197  Even the first element  is 
192  424 U.S.  319 (1976). For subsequent illustrative  applications,  see Connecticut  v. 
Doehr,  111 S. Ct. 2105 (1991);  Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
193  424 U.S.  at 335. 
194  Most  critics  suggest  that  in applying  this test courts  are  too stingy  to claimants  because 
they  fail to appreciate  the significance  of the private  deprivation  or the value of procedural 
safeguards  and they overstate the government's interest. See,  for example, Jerry L. 
Mashaw,  The Supreme  Court's Due Process Calculus  for Administrative  Adjudication  in 
Mathews  v. Eldridge:  Three Factors in Search  of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
28, 37-46 (1976).  Some, however, have suggested  that courts are all too willing  to impose 
additional  procedural  requirements.  See Henry J. Friendly,  "Some Kind  of Hearing,"  123 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267  (1975). 
195  In particular,  the suggestion is that a crass utilitarian  test overlooks other values, 
notably  dignitary  values. See, for example, Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor,  56 
Brooklyn  L. Rev. 789 (1990);  Mashaw,  supra note 87, at 88-97; Mashaw,  supra  note 194, 
at  46-59; Jerry  L. Mashaw,  Administrative  Due Process:  The Quest  for a Dignitary  Theory, 
61 B.U.L. Rev. 885 (1981).  Some of these other values will be addressed  in Section VC. 
196  See, for example, Mashaw,  supra note 87, at 81. 
197  One might imagine that the errors eliminated  when moving from 10 percent to 8 
percent  would, on average, be more severe errors  than when moving  from 4 percent  to 2 
percent  since when the error  rate is low only more modest errors  may remain.  See note 
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problematic,  as it refers to the private  interest  affected  without  specifying 
whether  it is meant to include the interest of ineligible  applicants  or only 
eligible  applicants. 
A generous  interpretation  of the Court's discussion198  suggests that the 
first  factor refers to the interest of the disabled  in receiving  benefits, the 
second to the reduction of false negatives, and the third to costs of the 
added  procedure  plus something else, presumably  involving the cost of 
paying  benefits to the ineligible. (To be complete, this latter component 
would have to include the effect on false positives, the value of benefits 
to the ineligible, and the costs of providing  benefits.) Even so, this inter- 
pretation  is not really a formulation.  Rather,  it is a heterogeneous  listing 
of relevant  factors. There is little care either in specifying  each relevant 
component  or in ruling out irrelevant  ones. And it does not attempt to 
indicate  how the components fit together.199 
These limitations  of the Court's test need not create significant  prob- 
lems as long as those who apply the test take it to represent a more 
coherent formulation.  It does not appear, however, that clear thinking 
always results. In particular, there seems to be systematic confusion 
about  the relationship  between accuracy and the burden  of proof, a topic 
explored  in Subsection IIIB1. 
This  confusion  is reflected  in the Court's  third  factor, which  is generally 
seen as suggesting  that government  functions will be adversely affected, 
even aside from  the added  costs incurred  in funding  additional  procedural 
safeguards.  This seems to assume that the added procedure  will involve 
an increase in the rate at which benefits are paid to individuals  who are 
not disabled.200  Procedures that increase accuracy in isolation do not 
produce  this sort of effect: more accuracy would reduce the rate of mis- 
taken  grants  of benefits. Instead, this pattern  of results-a  higher  rate of 
granting  benefits to both the disabled  and those who are not disabled-is 
what follows from a reduction in the implicit burden  of proof. In other 
words, the Court and subsequent  interpreters  and commentators  implic- 
198 See 424 U.S.  at 339-43. 
199  The Court simply announces the test, with little explanation  beyond a citation to 
Goldberg  v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970),  which articulates  no test but does discuss 
various  factors leading  to the Court's conclusion  in that case. The interpretation  must be 
made  from  the Court's  application  of each component  to the facts of Mathews  v. Eldridge, 
Goldberg  v. Kelly, and other cases. In many instances, this leaves little ambiguity  over 
what is included,  but the reader  often must speculate  as to the reasons for inclusion,  the 
relationship  among  the factors  (including  their  weight),  and  whether  elements  not mentioned 
are excluded  or simply not present  in the case before the Court. 
200  The only alternative  explanation  would  be that  the Court  had  in mind  the cost of paying 
for benefits  of deserving  individuals,  but it seems clear from the context and subsequent 
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itly have in mind procedures  that involve  a de facto  shift in the burden 
of proof, without regard to their effect  on accuracy.201 
This makes the Court's test  and discussion  of it easier to understand. 
The origin is apparent: those who challenge existing procedures are indi- 
viduals who lose  under them, and they will seek an additional procedure 
that will improve their circumstances.202 But there remains the problem 
of justification. Is there a constitutional requirement that burdens of proof 
not be too high in determining benefit eligibility? If not, what is the basis 
for demanding a reduction in the burden of proof? The remaining discus- 
sion will not answer these  questions  but, rather, suggest that, whatever 
the basis for inquiring into the burden of proof, the conventional approach 
seems  to differ greatly from one designed  to address this issue. 
First,  a necessary  element  of a challenge  to an existing  proof burden 
as inadequate would be an inquiry into the height of the current burden 
of proof. Perhaps the previously  criticized  second component-referring 
in part to the risk of erroneous  deprivation-embodies  this inquiry. But 
then it is unclear why the inquiry would not be at an end. If the burden 
is too high, the complaining party wins; if not, he loses. 
Instead,  one  may  understand  this  as  a  sort  of  cost-benefit  analysis 
about the burden of proof.203  The burden of proof should be lowered only 
201  For example,  Mashaw  argues  that "[a]ny  attempt  to eliminate  either  type of error  will 
induce errors of the opposite type. Hence, a move in the direction  of eliminating  false 
negatives-for  example, by relaxing  standards  of proof with respect to some criterion  of 
eligibility-will  induce some additional  number  of false positives." Mashaw, supra note 
87, at 84-85 (emphasis  added). This suggests, remarkably,  that improving  accuracy per 
se-as  by obtaining  additional  medical  tests, increasing  training  of decision-makers,  investi- 
gating  further  the applicant's  ability  to perform  particular  tasks-is  impossible.  (It is appar- 
ent from other parts  of Mashaw's  book that he does not believe this.) 
Further  evidence that the burden  of proof is the core concern  is that those who oppose 
more  procedures  often do so because of the increase  in mistaken  grants  of benefits,  whereas 
those who support  the procedures  may dispute  the magnitude  of the effect but usually  do 
not dispute the direction. Nor do they propose, say, adding  procedural  protections  for 
claimants  while simultaneously  increasing  the explicit burden  of proof so as to keep the 
likelihood  of mistaken  grants  of benefits  constant.  (Obviously,  such a rise in the burden  of 
proof  would  result in more mistaken  benefit  denials  than  under  the proposed  added  proce- 
dures,  although  less than  under  the status  quo if the proposed  procedures  were  indeed  more 
accurate.)  Perhaps  the assumption  that  procedures  inevitably  reduce  the claimant's  de facto 
burden  of proof has seemed natural  because the Supreme  Court  cases generating  much  of 
the literature  have involved terminations  of benefits,  where  the claimant  was demanding  a 
pretermination  hearing.  If such a hearing  were required,  it is generally  presumed  that  there 
would be added  delay before all terminations,  which would be pro-claimant  in the interim 
(assuming  that mistakenly  paid benefits often could not be recovered).  See, for example, 
Mashaw,  supra note 183, at 1435-36. 
202  Even this need not be true. A different  procedure  may be adverse to claimants  in 
general,  but for a claimant  who has already  lost under  existing  rules, it is desirable  to have 
a second chance, even if the new game is a more challenging  one. 
203  In fact, the Mathews  v. Eldridge  balancing  approach  is used in disputes  about stan- 
dards  of proof  in civil cases. See Laurence  H. Tribe,  American  Constitutional  Law 740-43 
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if  two conditions  simultaneously  hold: the burden  is "high," and  lowering 
it is justified on cost-benefit terms. Alternatively,  the idea might  be that 
some  combination  of excessive height  in the proof  burden  and sufficiently 
good marks  on a cost-benefit  test for its reduction  warrant  finding  for the 
claimant.  While  one can understand  such an approach,  it seems to diverge 
substantially  from much of the discussion and application  of the Court's 
test.204  Yet another formulation  would ignore the aspect of the second 
component  referring  to the rate of error  and simply  understand  the formu- 
lation  as stating  that there should be a cost-benefit  analysis of the burden 
of proof in such settings. If the burden is inefficiently  high, it must be 
reduced.205 
A more puzzling, second question is: if the problem is an excessive 
burden  of proof, why should it be reduced by adopting  some particular 
procedure, whether a hearing, providing a lawyer to the applicant, or 
whatever?  As emphasized in Subsection IIIB1, there are many ways to 
alter a proof burden. In the benefit determination  context, it may be 
feasible  to do this for free. One could instruct  those who determine  eligi- 
bility  (whether  case workers, administrative  law  judges, or those provid- 
ing internal  review of appeals) to require somewhat less confidence in 
eligibility  as a prerequisite  to granting  benefits. By reviewing  the rate at 
which applications are granted or by other means, such a shift could 
probably  be implemented.206  Even if a direct shift in the burden  of proof 
were infeasible, the question would not be whether a given procedure 
accomplishes a  cost-beneficial reduction in the burden of proof but, 
rather,  what procedure  accomplishes a given reduction  in the burden  of 
proof at the lowest cost. One could then ask whether implementing  that 
procedure  would achieve a cost-beneficial  reduction  in the proof burden. 
Thus, if the burden  of proof is the object of the inquiry,  a rather  differ- 
ent approach  would be appropriate.  Yet there  are reasons  for caring  about 
the effects of particular  procedures, even those that may not involve the 
cheapest way to reduce the proof burden. An obvious reason is that 
procedures  affect accuracy.207  Thus, providing  an opportunity  for claim- 
204  Most notably, one does not find extensive analyses of what "too high" a burden  of 
proof  may mean. 
205  If it is too low, the government  is always free to amend statutes, regulations,  or 
procedures. 
206  Presumably,  internal  administrative  guidelines  and procedures  already  pay much at- 
tention  to the implicit,  de facto burden  of proof. Those granting  or denying  eligibility  may 
get various  signals  and sanctions  that  induce  them  to behave  differently.  There  is no obvious 
reason that a denial rate that was a few percentage  points higher  or lower would involve 
much  difference  in administrative  costs. 
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ants to  explain  their  situation  and respond  to  arguments may  improve 
decision-makers'  knowledge  of  which  claimants  are  eligible.  But  the 
proper analysis  of whether  a gain in accuracy  is desirable (explained  in 
Subsection  1) is rather different from that for determining how  high the 
proof burden should be. 
The  analysis  in  Subsection  IIIB1 emphasized  that it is  conceptually 
useful and typically feasible  as a practical matter to separate evaluations 
of  accuracy  and of  changes  in the  implicit burden of proof.  It appears 
that courts  and commentators  that have  addressed  procedural require- 
ments for determining benefit  eligibility  care  about both and have  con- 
fused the two inquiries.208  The result is that the objectives  of the analysis 
are not  clear,  and the  analysis  of  both  accuracy  and burdens of  proof 
suffers.  Thus,  results  concerning  particular procedures  viewed  in isola- 
tion may be mistaken and, even  if they  are narrowly correct,  they  may 
not involve  the best  procedural design  compared with alternative ways 
to affect the burden of proof and accuracy.209 
When it is proposed,  say, that there be a more formal hearing, it should 
separately be  asked  whether  the hearing would  produce  a cost-justified 
increase in accuracy and whether it would result in a desirable reduction 
in the burden of proof.  If both answers  are affirmative or negative,  the 
outcome  is  clear.  If only  the former answer  is  affirmative, it would  be 
desirable to  adopt the  procedure  but also  to  raise the proof burden by 
other means.210  If only the latter answer is affirmative, it is probably best 
not  to  adopt the  procedure  but,  rather, to  reduce  the  proof  burden in 
some other manner. 
208  The best evidence for this is that, in concrete applications,  a procedure's  effects are 
almost  uniformly  described  in a manner  that implies  a shift in the burden  of proof, with no 
necessary  effect on accuracy  in either  direction,  while  general  discussions  of the desirability 
of additional  procedures  often emphasize  accuracy  and  make  no mention  of how procedures 
affect the burden  of proof. 
209  In part  the problem  reflects  the limits of designing  a legal system piecemeal,  through 
isolated disputes about the propriety  of particular  procedures.  Also, government  officials 
may  anticipate  that courts  will be inflexible.  For example,  if a court  requires  new procedure 
X today, an agency might imagine eliminating  X tomorrow  and substituting  Y, which it 
believes accomplishes  the objective in a more efficient manner.  The question  is whether 
the court's order is interpreted  literally to require  X, or only to require  certain sorts of 
results, so that it may require  X in the absence of Y but would not require  X if Y were 
present.  Since courts' statements  of objectives  are so obscure,  this is difficult  to determine. 
210  Such an outcome may occur presently.  When  an agency is forced to adopt  an added 
procedure,  particularly  if it has a limited  budget, it may be induced  to adjust  its internal 
operations  in a manner  that leads decision-makers  to be more stingy  with regard  to a given 
set of information. See Mashaw,  supra note  183, at 1447-48; notes  137 and 206 supra. See 
also note 185  supra  (agencies  may be more  reluctant  to grant  initial  eligibility  if termination 
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B.  Adjudication  about Past Acts That Governs  Future Conduct 
1.  The Effect of Remedies Specifying  Future Conduct 
on Prior Conduct 
Often,  adjudication  combines  elements of past behavior  and  future  con- 
duct. For example, prior conduct violating another's rights may be en- 
joined or one who commits  a crime  may  be imprisoned.  In such instances, 
the analysis of Parts  II and III continues  to be applicable,  as the anticipa- 
tion of an injunction  or imprisonment  affects individuals'  ex ante deci- 
sions about how to behave. But such ex ante analysis may be only part 
of the story. Injunctions and imprisonment  dictate future behavior as 
well. In contrast, when sanctions are monetary (damage awards and 
fines), individuals  are penalized for their prior behavior but left to their 
own decisions with regard  to the future.211 
This difference,  however, may be overstated  in the case of injunctions, 
for often the enjoined  party has the option of contracting  with victims to 
remove the restraint  imposed by the injunction.212  Similarly,  in the ab- 
sence of an injunction, a victim might contract with an injurer  to have 
the latter  refrain  from her harmful  conduct  in the future.  Thus, it is famil- 
iar that the difference between property  rules (entitlements  enforced by 
injunction)  and liability rules (entitlements  enforced by damages)  is less 
than  may appear.  In the limit, when bargaining  proceeds without  any cost 
or impediment,  they are the same.213  In such instances, any injunction 
can be seen as having a monetary  equivalent, so the analysis of Part II 
concerning  accuracy in assessing damages  would be applicable. 
Nonetheless, it is often the case that injunctions  remain in place be- 
cause bargaining  is imperfect  or is prohibited.  The problem  of numerous 
dispersed victims is the most familiar example of the former. For the 
latter, one might consider civil rights injunctions  or a declaration  that a 
211  The prior  adjudication  may still affect future  behavior.  First, individuals'  information 
may change.  (One may not have known  previously  that  an act was illegal,  but  for the future 
one knows  and  is likely  to remember.)  Second, if future  penalties  depend  on prior  violations, 
one's incentives  in the future  will differ.  (A proper  analysis  would  take account  of the effect 
on future opportunities  in determining  the effect of a first sanction  on an individual's  ex 
ante behavior.  See, for example, A. Mitchell  Polinsky  & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,  A Model of 
Optimal  Fines for Repeat Offenders,  46 J. Pub. Econ. 291 (1991).) 
212  Also, an enjoined  party  may have the option of violating  the injunction  and paying  a 
penalty. 
213  See, for example,  Guido  Calabresi  & A. Douglas  Melamed,  Property  Rights,  Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral,  85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089  (1972);  R. H. 
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statute  is  unconstitutional.214 Also,  one  cannot  be  released  early  from 
prison upon paying a fee.215 
2.  The Value of Accuracy  with Regard to Future Conduct 
An analysis  of the benefit of accuracy  with regard to future rights and 
obligations is more similar to conventional  cost-benefit  analysis,  as of a 
public works project or of eligibility for future entitlements,  than to that 
in Parts II and III.  Compare,  for example,  crafting the right injunction 
for operating a factory  that pollutes  with determining the best  location 
for a road.  In each  case,  one  can  always  undertake more  study in the 
hope of improving the decision,  but perfect  accuracy  is neither feasible 
nor desirable,  due to its cost.216 
When adjudication  both  creates  incentives  for  ex  ante behavior  and 
affects  future  conduct,  accuracy  tends  to  be  more  valuable.  Consider 
imprisonment, where the benefit with regard to future conduct is incapac- 
itation, which prevents  dangerous individuals from causing further harm 
to  the  community.217 Note  that  the  benefit  of  incapacitation  does  not 
depend  directly  on  whether  individuals  have  accurate  ex  ante  knowl- 
edge.218 The  benefit  of  accuracy  concerns  whether  those  incapacitated 
are indeed those who are dangerous.  If one increases accuracy, there are 
two effects.  More guilty,  presumed  dangerous,  individuals are incapaci- 
tated,  which  is  an advantage  from this  perspective.  In addition,  fewer 
innocent  individuals  are incapacitated.  Incapacitating the innocent  is of 
no independent  benefit (and is even  likely  to be harmful, in addition to 
214  There  is some room  for bargaining  even in this latter  area.  For a civil rights  injunction, 
the injunction  may  be avoidable  if, prior  to a court  order,  the case is settled  with  a monetary 
payment.  (This may have to be court approved,  however.) For problems  of constitutional- 
ity, if the benefits of a different  approach  are sufficiently  great, the constitution  may be 
amended.  Needless to say, in both contexts there often are sufficient  impediments  to bar- 
gaining  that  a court's  injunction  will remain  in effect even if it is not in the aggregate  interest 
of affected  parties. 
215  In some instances, there may be a de facto choice between monetary  payments  and 
imprisonment,  as when plea bargaining  involves an agreement  from  a prosecutor  to recom- 
mend  a particular  type of sentence. 
216  One way injunctions  sometimes account for error is to provide for modification  in 
light  of future  information. 
217  A more extreme situation arises with capital punishment,  for which the Supreme 
Court has emphasized "the Eighth Amendment's  heightened  'need for reliability  in the 
determination  that death is the appropriate  punishment.'" Caldwell  v. Mississippi,  472 
U.S. 320, 340  (1985)  (quoting  Woodson  v. North  Carolina,  428 U.S. 280, 305  (1976)  (plurality 
opinion)). 
218  Ex ante knowledge  may be relevant. For example, if an individual  would not have 
violated  the law if she knew that the act was illegal, incapacitation  for its own sake would 
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the  deprivation  of  liberty,  if prison  teaches  the  uninitiated  how  to  be 
criminals). It was previously  noted that the high social cost  of imprison- 
ment as a sanction justifies  greater accuracy than otherwise.219  Consider- 
ing incapacitation  in addition to deterrence  and sanction  costs  suggests 
that accuracy  in determining imprisonment  should be higher still.220 
3.  Parties' Incentives  to Present Information in Adjudication 
In this context,  as in the others  examined  in this article,  there is no 
particular reason to believe  that parties' incentives  to present information 
are socially  optimal.221  Parties gain from adjustments that are purely re- 
distributive or even those that decrease  value. (The discussion  in Subsec- 
tion A2 of claimants'  excessive  incentives  to demonstrate  eligibility for 
public benefits illustrates this problem.)222  Parties' private gains from pre- 
senting information may thus  systematically  exceed  social  benefits.  An 
exception223  may arise when there are third parties that are unrepresented 
or ineffectively  represented.224 The problem,  however,  is not that those 
parties  effectively  represented  will  present  too  little  information; their 
incentives  remain excessive.  Rather,  information that it is  not  in their 
interest to present may remain unavailable to the decision-maker. 
219  See  Subsection  IIIA2b supra. 
220  The argument is  applicable  to  determining  not only  who  is imprisoned but also  the 
duration of the term. The reason is that, from an incapacitation perspective,  it is desirable 
to imprison the more dangerous for a longer period of time. Thus, for example,  even if one 
is certain as to whether an individual committed murder, knowing whether it was premedi- 
tated or committed  in the heat of passion  may be relevant to assessing  dangerousness  for 
purposes of incapacitation.  (Individuals who kill in the heat of passion have lower recidivism 
rates.) 
221  It is useful  to contrast  the manner in which information is collected  to design public 
projects and to determine  the  content  of injunctions.  The adversary  system  is obviously 
much more central in the latter context,  although the use of public hearings or other opportu- 
nities to comment on proposed  action introduces elements  of the adversary system into the 
former. 
222  Expenditures  by truly eligible  claimants  may be socially  desirable even  though their 
objective  is redistributive because  this particular redistribution is socially  favored,  but the 
analysis  suggested  that,  as  in  other  distributive  settings,  individuals  ignore  the  cost  of 
making the payment they  will receive.  (Expenditures  by those  who  are ineligible involve, 
as described  in note  190, both undesirable redistribution and a waste  of resources.) 
223  In addition, the exception  discussed  in Subsection  IIID2b (that individuals do not take 
into account  the full social  cost  of costly  sanctions)  remains applicable. 
224  Class  actions  and intervention  are devices  designed  to address  these  problems,  but 
familiar agency  problems  render them  imperfect.  See,  for example,  John C.  Coffee,  Jr., 
The  Unfaithful  Champion:  The  Plaintiff  as  Monitor  in  Shareholder  Litigation,  48  L.  & 
Contemp. Probs. 5 (Summer 1985); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' 
Attorney's  Role in Class Action  and Derivative  Litigation: Economic  Analysis  and Recom- 
mendations for Reform,  58 U.  Chi. L. Rev.  1 (1991). 382  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
V.  OTHER VALUES  OF ACCURACY 
This article presents  an economic  analysis  of the value of accuracy  in 
adjudication. The primary focus  throughout is on how  accuracy  affects 
the central instrumental purposes  of the law. Therefore,  Parts II and III, 
which discuss  accuracy  in determining damages and liability, emphasize 
how  accuracy  is  relevant  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  law  in controlling 
behavior.  Part IV,  on accuracy  in establishing  future rights and obliga- 
tions, concerns  the extent to which the law's purposes in directing future 
events  are fulfilled. The analysis  also emphasizes  costs  of achieving the 
law's objectives-in  particular, administrative costs and social costs aris- 
ing from the imposition  of sanctions. 
Yet,  much concern  expressed  about the accuracy  of the legal system 
appears to be addressed  to different objectives.  Thus,  accuracy  may be 
valued because  it advances  fairness and justice,  one cares about mistak- 
enly sanctioning the innocent per se, it is important to the system's  legiti- 
macy that adjudication appears to be  as accurate  as possible,  or abuse 
of power  is made more difficult.  Also,  some  procedures  that affect  the 
accuracy of adjudication may be valued in themselves,  perhaps because 
they enhance  individuals' participation in processes  that will affect their 
lives. 
While there is much that has been and could be said about these issues, 
little attempt will be made to address them here. First, in most instances, 
the nature of the value at stake is not very well defined, and its grounding 
is uncertain.225  This makes  application in concrete  contexts  and evalua- 
tion of trade-offs quite difficult. Second,  the type of analysis that would 
be appropriate may be rather different from that offered here, so it seems 
useful to undertake further explorations  separately. 
Nonetheless,  the  analysis  in Parts II-IV  offers  some  illumination of 
many of these other values.  This part notes some respects in which these 
seemingly  different  values  may  be  implicitly  included  in the  economic 
analysis.  It also indicates  how the economic  analysis  may illuminate the 
extent  to  which  other  values  are  implicated  in the  contexts  that have 
been examined here. These  remarks will not be comprehensive.  Nor can 
they be definitive with respect  to the topics  addressed because  many of 
these values can be articulated in so many ways that an argument relevant 
to one version  may be inapplicable to another. 
225  For  example,  Mashaw  refers  to  his  own  statement  of  the  dignitary values  of  due 
process  as follows:  "The values  that fit our intuitions are vague at the margins and poten- 
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A.  Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages 
1.  Fairness and the Accuracy of Compensation 
With  regard  to accuracy  in assessing damages, one might  be concerned 
with  the fairness  of the outcome in addition  to how the accuracy  of adjudi- 
cation  affects behavior.  Thus, if a defendant  is required  to pay more than 
the harm she caused, this may be seen as an unjust burden. Or if she 
pays less than harm caused, this may be seen as less than she deserves 
to pay. Similarly,  if a plaintiff  collects too little, corrective  justice may 
not be served. If he collects to much, it may be viewed as an undeserved 
windfall. 
Examine  this claim first in the simplest setting examined  in Part II, in 
which individuals  are risk-neutral  and potential injurers  at the time they 
act do not know their  true  level of harm  (and  cannot  reasonably  determine 
it in advance). Then, arguably, the analysis suggests that the result is 
fair. Both an accurate system (damages equal to actual harm) and an 
inaccurate  one (damages  equal to average harm)  result in injurers  being 
obligated for the same expected payment. Moreover, if they are risk- 
neutral, they value these two outcomes identically. Thus, an ex ante 
notion of fairness may be appropriate,  and it would not require  greater 
accuracy. (An analogous argument  could be made for plaintiffs.)226 
When individuals are risk-averse, it is no longer true that they are 
indifferent  between damages equal to average harm and actual harm. 
For plaintiffs, Subsection IIA3 noted that the possibilities of under-  and 
overcompensation  are costly because of the risk that is imposed. As a 
result, greater  accuracy would be justified on this account. The question 
then becomes whether fairness demands even more accuracy than this. 
That is, does some fairness norm require that the system attach more 
weight to mistakes in compensating  plaintiffs  than would be attached  by 
226  Accuracy  may  be relevant  for ex ante  fairness  to plaintiffs  if some suffer  systematically 
more  harm  from  accidents  than  others, so that, ex ante, they can expect to be undercompen- 
sated. Individuals  whose damages,  measured  in dollars  (as the legal system  does even when 
the injuries  are nonpecuniary),  will usually  be above average  are typically  the wealthy,  who 
have more skills (and thus lose more wages when disabled),  attach  higher  economic value 
to nonpecuniary  losses, and  have more  expensive  property  to be damaged  (a Cadillac  rather 
than a compact car). First-party  insurance would eliminate  variance in awards, but the 
wealthy  would pay higher  premiums  to the extent damages  do not equal actual  harm.  (For 
example, auto insurance  premiums  for a Cadillac  are higher  than for a compact car.) Of 
course, adjustments  elsewhere, as in the tax system, could offset such an effect. See note 
238 infra. Whether  the disparate  effect is correctable  and whether  it is seen as unjust  will 
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the  plaintiffs themselves?  If not,  the  economic  analysis  subsumes  this 
fairness concern. 
For defendants,  risk aversion  indicates  that less  accuracy than other- 
wise is warranted because  accuracy  imposes  risk. Does  fairness demand 
that defendants bear such risk, when it is costly  to them and they could 
not reasonably foresee  the difference?  If not, fairness would not call for 
a prescription different from that in the economic  analysis.227 
Another  aspect  of  fairness  concerns  notice.  If,  indeed,  defendants 
could  reasonably  foresee  average  harm but  not  actual  harm,  do  they 
deserve  to pay for actual harm, even  when  it is unusually high or low? 
If not, an accurate system  may be more objectionable than an inaccurate 
one.228 
Now,  consider the case in which injurers do know the actual harm they 
would cause  in advance.  The economic  analysis  indicates  that accuracy 
is  desirable  in  this  case  if  it  is  not  too  costly.  Does  fairness  demand 
accuracy at any cost?  If not, how much accuracy does fairness demand? 
In particular, is there a reason to provide more accuracy than the parties 
would demand if they  could agree on the level  of accuracy  in advance? 
If not, then fairness would again be subsumed in the economic analysis.229 
2.  Ex Post  Incentives  to Present Information in Adjudication 
The analysis in Section  IIC indicates that in many settings parties may 
have an excessive  incentive  to present information in adjudication. Thus, 
the economic  analysis  suggests  that the system  should be designed  in a 
manner that either reduces  these  incentives  or prevents parties from act- 
ing as they wish  (as by limiting discovery  or the number of experts who 
may testify).  Are such limitations unfair? Would they frustrate the value 
of allowing parties the ability to participate fully in determining their fate? 
A prerequisite to answering  such questions  is specification  of the im- 
227  Observe  that, if fairness does require  that defendants  bear such risks, liability  insur- 
ance should  be prohibited. 
228  Many  concerned  with distributive  justice see eliminating  wealth  disparities  caused  by 
fortuity  to be a central  concern. Compare  Kaplow  & Shavell, Legal Advice, supra  note 5, 
at 603 (fairness  of limiting  advice about  information  to present  in litigation  when  individuals 
do not know at the time they decide how to act what the advice would be). 
229  While  the language  of the discussion  involved cost-benefit  analysis  rather  than  hypo- 
thetical  bargaining,  it is familiar  that informed  parties  would contract  to an efficient  result. 
The particular  application  is that dispute  resolution  is indeed  often specified  by contract.  If 
fairness  demands  an outcome  inconsistent  with  what  parties  would  choose, such  contractual 
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plicit notion of full participation.  If the system  offers both sides one trial 
day to present  evidence,  is participation full,  excessive,  or inadequate? 
Can one  specify  full participation independently  of the instrumental val- 
ues that participation serves?  One could ask individuals how much they 
value  a day  in  court  and then  ask  them  how  much  they  value  two  or 
three days.  A result differing from that in the economic  analysis  would 
arise only if individuals attached values unrelated to the outcome partici- 
pation would produce.  (For example,  if they preferred three days to one, 
at a cost  of,  say,  $1,000  per day  in lawyers'  fees,  even  if the outcome 
would be the same,  then limiting them to one day might be seen as unde- 
sirable.) 
Parties usually do prefer to present more evidence  because they believe 
it will advance  their case.  Similarly, they prefer that their opponent pre- 
sent less.  One might ask  what joint  arrangement they  would  find best. 
The answer,  in most  instances,  is zero  trial days;  most  cases  settle  for 
precisely  this reason.230  Moreover,  one  suspects  that, when  a case  fails 
to  settle,  this  may  be  because  of  an  inability  to  reach  agreement  on 
amounts  of  money  rather than because  one  party  attaches  substantial 
independent value to the days in court.231 
The value of presenting information in court should be viewed  ex ante. 
The economic  argument that incentives  may be excessive  concerns  the 
difference  between  the  effect  of  further information on  ex  post  results 
and on ex ante behavior.  In the simple case in which ex ante behavior is 
totally  unaffected  by  the  prospect  of  greater  accuracy,  achieved  by 
allowing additional presentation of information in adjudication, one could 
ask  whether  fairness  or  process  values  call  for  a  different  outcome. 
Again,  the  contractual  argument can  be  made:  the  efficiency  analysis 
suggests  what  informed  parties  would  have  agreed  to  ex  ante.232  This 
230  Relatedly,  there  are  reports  of satisfaction  with  alternative  dispute  resolution  programs 
that provide  an appearance  before a neutral  decision-maker  that falls significantly  short of 
a full trial. See, for example, Steering  Committee  Report, American  Law Institute  Study 
on Paths  to a "Better Way": Litigation,  Alternatives,  and Accommodation,  1989  Duke L. 
J. 811,817. 
231  In most contexts, parties attach negative value to time in court, both because of 
direct  litigation  costs and because of the time and anguish  involved. There are, no doubt, 
exceptions, such as in the libel context where the plaintiff  or defendant  may wish a public 
pronouncement.  (Even there, a settlement in which the other party agrees to a public 
apology  is often viewed as an adequate  substitute,  suggesting  that  it is the outcome-here, 
a nonpecuniary  one-rather  than the days in court themselves that are valued.) 
232  That is, if accuracy  ex post is inefficient,  but ex post incentives would be such that 
one or both parties would nonetheless have an incentive to undertake  expenditures  to 
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leaves two possibilities:  either there exist values that would call for nulli- 
fying an ex ante agreement to limit presentation of information in adjudi- 
cation233  or, if parties attach value on their day in court for its own sake, 
the economic  analysis  presented  here omits a component. 
B.  Accuracy  in the Determination  of Liability 
1.  The Extent  to Which the Analysis  Incorporates a Concern 
for Mistakenly  Sanctioning the Innocent 
The most  obvious  independent  concern  in the context  of accuracy  in 
the determination of liability is a concern for mistakenly sanctioning the 
innocent. Recall, however,  that the economic  analysis takes into account 
that sanctions  themselves  may be  costly.  Thus,  the cost  of  mistakenly 
imposing  sanctions  on  the  innocent  is  a central  part of  the  analysis  in 
Part III.  To be  independently  concerned  with  sanctioning  the  innocent 
suggests  that in some  sense  the  sanction  cost,  as  measured  in an eco- 
nomic analysis,  involves  an undervaluation. 
Consider first the indirect cost  of sanctioning the innocent-its  effects 
on their behavior.  The analysis  suggested  that individuals would,  on ac- 
count  of  the  possibility  of  mistakes,  be  more likely  to  commit  harmful 
acts234  and be more likely to be deterred from committing harmless acts 
that subjected  them to  the  risk of  sanctions.235 Thus,  the analysis  fully 
incorporates the adverse  effects  of mistakes on the behavior of individu- 
als who are truly innocent.  The value placed on this effect is individuals' 
private valuations of the acts deterred.236  As long as there are no external- 
ities,  there is no obvious  reason to depart from such an analysis.237 
Now  consider the direct costs  of sanctioning the innocent--that  is, the 
costs  of the innocent  bearing the sanctions  themselves,  rather than any 
effect  the prospect  of  sanctions  may have on behavior.  When sanctions 
are monetary  and individuals  are risk-neutral, the  analysis  treats  sanc- 
this option.  See Subsection  IVA2  supra;  Kaplow,  supra  note 188.  Parties  in actual  contracts 
who specify simple forms of alternative  dispute resolution  or who provide  for liquidated 
damages  in effect do just this. See Subsection  IIB4a  supra. 
233  See, for example, Owen M. Fiss, Against  Settlement,  93 Yale L. J. 1073  (1984). 
234  See Subsection  IILA1 supra. 
235 See  Subsection  IIIA3 supra. 
236  In the economic calculus, the cost of deterring  a harmless  act, for example, is the 
individual's  benefit  of the act minus  the harm  of zero. 
237  If there  are externalities,  such as benefits  to third  parties,  there  is a reason  to encour- 
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tions as socially costless because they involve mere transfers  of money. 
Thus, sanctioning  the innocent receives no independent  weight. Should 
this be otherwise? When individuals  are risk-neutral,  by definition  they 
do not attach any cost to the risky aspect of sanctions. All they care 
about is the expected value. That individuals  committing  a harmless  act 
have a positive expected sanction cost does deter desirable  behavior, a 
consequence  already  noted and taken into account. This leaves the possi- 
bility of an argument  that it is unfair  that individuals  who are not deterred 
must make payments, essentially an argument  that there is an unfair  tax. 
Such arguments are much akin to arguments  about ex post accuracy 
of compensation  when individuals  are risk-neutral,  already examined in 
Subsection  A  1.238 
When  sanctions  are monetary  and individuals  are risk-averse,  the riski- 
ness of sanctions  is itself a cost. This cost is incorporated  in the economic 
analysis, again  with a valuation  corresponding  to the value innocent  indi- 
viduals themselves would place on it.239  When sanctions are nonmone- 
tary, as in the case of imprisonment,  the social costs of sanctions are 
viewed as including  the loss of liberty.240 
In all these cases, therefore, the economic analysis includes the cost 
of sanctions  borne  by innocent  individuals.  Thus, an independent  concern 
for sanctioning  the innocent suggests that there is a harm  independent  of 
the harm to those who are sanctioned. In addition, as noted, such a 
concern  must be independent  of the effect of the anticipation  of mistakes 
in distorting  behavior. Finally, if it is a harm unique to sanctioning  the 
innocent, it suggests that it must not be a general cost of sanctions, but 
one unique to their misapplication.241 
If one believes that there is such a concern,242  the analysis would be 
affected in the manner  described in the following subsection. The point 
238  There  may also be a concern with the effect on the distribution  of wealth, if innocent 
behavior  is disproportionately  undertaken  by, say, low-income  individuals  (which, for the 
system as a whole, seems implausible).  Compare  note 226 supra. But it is difficult  to 
maintain  arguments  that such an effect should  justify inefficient  redesign  of the legal  system. 
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient  than the 
Income  Tax in Redistributing  Income, J. Legal Stud. (in press 1994). 
239  That  is, the cost of riskiness  in sanctions  is measured  by the amount  individuals  would 
be willing  to pay, above an actuarially  fair amount,  for insurance  against  the risk. 
240  Actually,  the loss of liberty  is used as a shorthand  to include  any costs to the individ- 
ual. The argument  is unaffected  by being more  complete, including  effects on one's reputa- 
tion or other long-term  effects arising  from a mistaken  conviction. 
241  The fear of government  abuse of power, see Subsection  C3 infra, is one possibility. 
242  For a discussion suggesting  that there is, see Ronald  Dworkin,  A Matter  of Principle 
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of this subsection  is merely that many, even  if not all, of the undesirable 
aspects  of  mistakenly  sanctioning  the  innocent  are incorporated  in the 
economic  analysis. 
2.  How  a Greater Concern for Sanctioning the Innocent 
Would Affect  the Analysis 
If sanctioning the innocent  should be given more weight,  the analysis 
would be qualitatively the same. One would consider the same trade-offs, 
and changes  in various  components  of the  system-sanctions,  enforce- 
ment effort,  accuracy,  and the burden of proof-would  have  the  same 
types of effects.  The only difference would be that effects  with regard to 
sanctioning the innocent would be weighted more heavily in designing the 
legal system.  Thus,  more accuracy  than suggested  in Subsection  IIIA2b 
and a higher burden of proof than suggested  in Subsection  IIIB2 may be 
appropriate. 
A common  intuition is that concern  for sanctioning the innocent  also 
warrants the use of lower  sanctions  than otherwise.  The analysis in Part 
III,243  however,  suggests  otherwise.  First,  for any given  level  of deter- 
rence one hopes to achieve,244  greater enforcement effort will be required 
if sanctions  are lower.  But raising enforcement  effort means that more 
individuals will be subject to sanctions,  so more mistakes will be made. 
It was  argued that,  as  a first approximation,  the  effects  would  be  off- 
setting,  so that the expected  costs  of sanctioning the innocent would be 
unaffected. 
Second,  the analysis suggested that relying more on enforcement effort 
than higher sanctions to achieve  deterrence would be counterproductive. 
When greater enforcement  effort is required, more cases  are processed 
(more  audits,  more  prosecutions).  This  means  that  each  increment  in 
accuracy  becomes  more  expensive.  The  result  is  that the  appropriate 
level of accuracy  is lower,  producing more mistakes.245 
243  See Subsections  IIIAlb and IIIA2a  supra. Details and qualifications  noted previously 
will not be repeated  here. 
244  The costs of mistakenly sanctioning  the innocent may be a reason to reduce the 
target  level of deterrence.  (But mistakes also directly reduce deterrence,  as explained  in 
Subsection  IIIA1,  so whether  an additional  reduction  is justified  is not obvious.)  But, what- 
ever is ultimately  deemed to be the appropriate  level of deterrence, there remains  the 
possibility of achieving it with high sanctions and low enforcement  effort or with low 
sanctions  and high enforcement  effort. 
245  One may not be required  to reduce accuracy. But, whatever  one spends to achieve 
accuracy  with  a high  enforcement  effort, low sanction  strategy,  the same  expenditure  under 
a low enforcement  effort, high sanction strategy  would achieve greater  accuracy  because 
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C.  Accuracy in Establishing  Future Rights and Obligations246 
1.  The Right to Appear 
In the context of determining  future entitlements, a commonly ex- 
pressed  objection  to employing  an economic analysis to determine  appro- 
priate  procedures  is that the process value of allowing  individuals  to be 
heard is ignored.247  There remains some question, however, about the 
246  The issues examined  in this section arise in other contexts as well but have received 
greater  emphasis  with respect to government  decisions about entitlements,  so for conve- 
nience they are considered  here. 
Also, no attempt  is made  to be exhaustive  with  regard  to possible  process  values. One  not 
considered  here that has received substantial  attention  is the importance  of an independent 
adjudicator.  See, for example, Martin  H. Redish & Lawrence  C. Marshall,  Adjudicatory 
Independence  and the Values of Procedural  Due Process, 95 Yale L. J. 455 (1986).  They 
offer  both instrumental  (see id. at 476-81) and noninstrumental  (see id. at 482-91) reasons 
for this, although  the latter do not emerge as having clearly independent  weight: "Our 
analysis  will demonstrate  that most of the proposed  values are inherently  tied to the instru- 
mental  justification,  and cannot be separated  from the individual's  interest in his entitle- 
ment.  Because each of them, with one possible  exception,  is a variation  on the instrumental 
theme, each of them, in the end, requires  the same basic procedures  for its achievement." 
Id. at 482-83. 
247  See, for example, Mashaw, supra note 194, at 49-52 (linking  the right  to participate 
personally  in the adjudication  with individuals'  dignity). Notes in the remainder  of this 
section often will discuss Mashaw's  views, as he has devoted greater  effort  to illuminating 
these issues than others. Yet all the discussion is implicitly  qualified  by the fact that his 
ultimate  policy conclusions in the area of social security disability  claims-a  context he 
has examined  in great  depth-give  less weight  to other  values  than  one might  have expected 
from his general discussions of them. See Mashaw, supra note 87, at 222-27; Mashaw, 
supra note 195, at 887 (while "a dignitary  approach  to administrative  due process has 
merit. . . [t]he  value ...  is not, however, that it would supplant  a positive, instrumentalist, 
and  utilitarian  conception  of process"; dignitary  theory "makes  modest  'absolute'  demands 
on processes of public  decisionmaking");  id. at 922, 930 (liberal  thought  gives only limited 
determinate  content to claims to participation).  See also Lance Liebman  & Richard  B. 
Stewart, Bureaucratic  Vision, review of Bureaucratic  Justice, by Jerry L. Mashaw, 96 
Harv. L. Rev. 1952  (1983). 
Another prominent  exposition of the values of procedural  protection  aside from their 
effect on accuracy  is Robert S. Summers,  Evaluating  and Improving  Legal Processes-a 
Plea  for "Process Values," 60 Cornell  L. Rev. I (1974).  Summers  is explicitly  modest  in his 
claims, but the pattern  of argument  is problematic  even for limited  conclusions.  Summers' 
proposed  process values are usually  defined  and  justified  in a couple  of paragraphs.  See id. 
at 20-27 (offering  ten values). Frequently,  his argument  involves presenting  an instance 
in which his posited procedure  seems attractive. For example, to illustrate  the virtue of 
"procedural  fairness," his example  considers  an adjudicator  who grants  advantages  to one 
side not made available  to the other. Id. at 24-25. Recognizing  that this would bias the 
results, he simply  poses the rhetorical  question  of whether  it would  be unfair  even if it did 
not. Id. at 25. But such a proposition  is best tested with an example  that does not involve 
such an effect on results. Thus, consider  whether  it would  be unfair  if a plaintiff  were given 
three  docket entries  for every item he files while the defendant  only gets one docket entry. 
It seems difficult  to argue  that there is a significant  injustice.  But if injustice  can only arise 
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justification for such a process  value-in  particular, one not already sub- 
sumed in the value of accuracy  or in setting the burden of proof.248 
One suspects  that claimants  who  object  to not being heard are those 
who  are, for example,  denied  benefits.249  If only losers  complain,  how- 
ever, one should be suspicious  that the complaint is motivated by a con- 
cern for the result, and thus an objection to a lack of process  may implic- 
itly be an instrumental argument.250  An entirely plausible reason to object 
to not being heard is that one may believe  (perhaps feel certain) that the 
decision was adverse precisely  because  the decision-maker was deprived 
of  information  one  had  to  offer.251  Thus,  the  decision  may  have  been 
dent concern  is established.  See id. at 14 (giving  as one of three  requirements  of a process 
value that "it is a value that can render  a feature  of the legal process prizable  regardless 
of its effect, if any, on results"). Even if the example here is unfair  to Summers,  it does 
seem proper  to ask why he and  most  other  commentators  advancing  the existence  of process 
values wholly independent  of results  rely primarily  or exclusively  on examples  with effects 
on results which are alone sufficient  to warrant  their preference  for the procedure.  See 
id. at 46 ("Identification  is an acute problem  because most process features capable of 
implementing  process values are at the same time capable  of serving  as means to certain 
outcomes."). Summers  also argues that his position is supported  by the fact that "some 
process  values are so taken  for granted  in our own society." Id. at 33. But some procedures 
may  be valued  precisely  because of their  effect on results. Moreover,  it is difficult  to justify 
the posited values on grounds  of public support  and then criticize  society for failing  to act 
on them (which suggests that the support  is minimal  or absent). See id. at 39, 42. 
248  Compare  William  Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property":  Adjudicative  Due 
Process in the Administrative  State, 62 Cornell  L. Rev. 445, 475-76 (1977): 
To the extent that one finds procedural  grossness offensive in food stamp  administration, 
public housing, public employment,  etc., it is almost certainly  because one believes that 
access to these things is itself of importance.  Mistaken  denial, or mistaken  termination  of 
such things to those who are in fact eligible is per se the wrong  that makes one angry.  It 
belittles the matter  to rest the case for minimal  procedural  fairness only on an extended 
anxiety  in behalf  of first  amendment  interests,  which we know in advance  will be involved 
in but a tiny fraction  of the cases in which mistakes  are made. 
249  One does not often hear stories of individuals  who win complaining  that they did not 
get their day in court. If there is an independent  process value, they would have a claim 
for reconsideration  under proper  procedures  despite their victory, and if they valued the 
process  significantly,  they would  choose such a reconsideration,  even at some risk  of losing. 
250  "We all feel that process matters  to us irrespective  of result. This intuition  may, of 
course,  be a delusion.  We may  be so accustomed  to rationalizing  demands  for improvement 
in our personal  prospects  on the purportedly  neutral  terms  of process fairness  that we can 
no longer  distinguish  between outcome-oriented  motives and process-oriented  arguments. 
Thibaut  and Walker's  experimental  work . . . may, after all, merely  demonstrate  that we 
generally  regard control or the opportunity  for personal strategic behavior as the best 
protection for our substantive concerns." Mashaw, supra note  195, at 887 (footnote 
omitted). 
251  Information  should  be construed  broadly.  For example, if the decision-maker  would 
have observed  the applicant's  demeanor,  and this would be relevant  to the decision, then 
not allowing  applicants  to appear  in person involves a reduction  in information. 
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inaccurate. Alternatively,  one may suspect that the decision-maker would 
be more favorable when the claimant appears personally,  independent of 
any additional information made available,  suggesting a favorable shift in 
the implicit burden of proof. 
To test this, one must consider a hypothetical  situation-one  probably 
too far removed  from the typical  disappointed  applicant's  mind for him 
to take  seriously-in  which  the  applicant is heard but it is certain that 
the decision would be unaffected by the hearing. Would individuals value 
appearing if they knew in advance that they would be ignored or that they 
would be "heard" but that hearing them could have no effect whatever on 
the decision?252 
From one perspective,  this is simply an empirical question  that could 
be  tested  directly.253 There  is  indirect  evidence  relevant  to  how  much 
less efforts than those of others. See Mashaw, supra note 87, at 90; see also id. at 90-91 
(claimants  would  be alienated  by Kafkaesque  procedures).  If they won, it would  be surpris- 
ing if they felt this way. If they lost, they would likely perceive it unfair  if they suspected 
that, as a result  of inadequate  effort, a decision-maker  did not obtain  information  that may 
have led to a different  decision. (Note that, since claimants  voluntarily  supply  self-serving 
information,  one might  think they would feel unfairly  treated  when more rather  than less 
effort  was devoted to investigating  their claims.) 
252  See, for example, Redish & Marshall,  supra note 246, at 487-88: 
This  participation  only makes  sense, though,  if the individual  harbors  some hope of bringing 
about substantive  change in the state agent's action or attitude.  Of course, the change  in 
attitude  might  affect only future  cases, not this participant's  situation,  but nonetheless  the 
focus remains  results-oriented ....  Even as Michelman  defines  it, participation  means "full 
and frank  interchange,"  and thus focuses on the litigant's  opportunity  to inform  the agent 
in the hopes of changing  her decision  ....  The connection  that many  have drawn  between 
"control"  and "participation"  demonstrates  the inseparable  connection  between  participa- 
tion and result efficacy. Imagine  a situation  in which the state agent announces  that his 
mind  is absolutely  made  up and that he will not reconsider  his decision. Does participation 
at that stage afford  any opportunity  for "control" over one's own destiny? 
For example, Mashaw argues  that "participation  increases self-respect  to the degree that 
participation  gives the participant  control over the process of decisionmaking."  Mashaw, 
supra  note 87, at 95. Of course, a claimant  would  presumably  exercise  his control  to increase 
the odds of success. Thus, self-respect is said to require  allowing  claimants  to increase 
their  chances of success (apparently  irrespective  of the merits)-a  rather  odd argument.  Is 
it that self-respect  demands a greater  likelihood  of success than the merits indicate?  Or 
that, whatever  level of success is given a claimant-however high-he  should  be entitled 
to increase  it personally?  (Even if affording  this opportunity  leads to a change  in the initial 
burden  of proof  leaving  the claimant's  chances of success unchanged  or reduced?)  Mashaw 
finds this and other participation  values persuasive  but does not attempt  to indicate  what 
they mean  or why they should  be given any weight. See id. at 95-96. Compare  Tribe,  supra 
note 203, at 666-67 (noting  "the special concern  about  being  personally  talked  to about  the 
decision rather  than simply  being dealt with"). 
253  For example,  one could have two systems, known  to produce  identical  outcomes,  but 
in only one is the applicant  heard. By charging  differential  fees, one could measure  the 
value individuals  associate with the procedure.  Of course, the experiment  may fail to pro- 
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people value such appearances for their own sake.  One type of evidence 
noted previously  is the high rate of settlement  in most civil litigation.254 
would  indeed  have no effect on the outcome. (They might  be told that outcomes  would be 
determined  by coin flips in either case.) See also note 249 supra. 
There  has been empirical  work-experiments involving  paid student  subjects--designed 
to determine  preferences  for and beliefs about the adversary  system, notably  by a group 
of social psychologists. See, for example, John Thibaut  & Laurens  Walker,  Procedural 
Justice: A  Psychological Analysis (1975); Pauline Houlden, Stephen LaTour, Laurens 
Walker,  & John Thibaut, Preference  for Modes of Dispute Resolution  as a Function  of 
Process and Decision Control, 14  J. Experimental  Soc. Psych. 13 (1978);  Stephen  LaTour, 
Pauline  Houlden,  Laurens  Walker,  & John  Thibaut,  Procedure:  Transnational  Perspectives 
and Preferences,  86 Yale L. J. 258 (1976);  John Thibaut  & Laurens  Walker,  A Theory of 
Procedure,  66 Calif. L. Rev. 541 (1978);  Laurens  Walker,  E. Allan Lind, & John  Thibaut, 
The Relationship  between Procedural  and Distributive  Justice, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1401  (1979). 
The major  finding  is a preference  for adversary  procedures  and, in particular,  for the use 
of representatives  for litigants  rather  than  relying  on investigators  working  for the court  or 
direct interaction  between the decision-maker  and the litigants.  The implications  for the 
present  context are uncertain.  First, the preference  for adversary  procedure  (which  might 
be viewed as more procedural  protection)  coincides with less direct involvement  of the 
parties (direct participation  often is the least preferred  mode in these studies). Second, 
beliefs about accuracy are no doubt confounded  with other values associated with the 
procedures.  (In most experiments,  preference  rankings  correspond  with rankings  of which 
procedures  are perceived to be more accurate or give relative advantages  to the party 
believed  to have the meritorious  position.) Mashaw  has commented  on much  of this work 
by noting  that it does distinguish  perceptions  of means and ends, but "I do not, however, 
believe that they have been able to isolate perceptions  of process that relate  necessarily  to 
some dimension  of process other than its potential to provide a favorable  outcome via 
either  personal  participation  or the participation  of an advocate  committed  to the claimant's 
cause. Indeed, their account of what is at work in a favorable  or unfavorable  perception 
of processes seems rather  muddled."  Mashaw,  supra  note 195, at 887-88 n.l5. Additional 
difficulties  in applying  this work  include  the authors'  failure  in some studies  to hold  informa- 
tion  levels (or subjects'  perceptions  of these levels) constant;  that  no valuations  are  obtained 
(that  is, there is no way to know the weight of the subjects'  preferences;  moreover,  given 
the lack of real stakes, subjects' responses may have been intended  to please the experi- 
menter,  as Houlden  et al. observe  (at 27) in the Journal  of Experimental  Social  Psychology); 
the inability  to know whether  the results reflect more than subjects' stereotypes  (as they 
are not given independent  information  about the procedures;  nor are they involved suffi- 
ciently to learn the effects the procedures  might have); and the difficulty  of determining 
the source of results (for example, in the study reported  in the Virginia  Law Review, 
Walker,  Lind, and Thibaut  argue  that participants'  perceived  control  is central,  but in the 
study  they were given virtually  no meaningful  control;  they conclude  (at 1417)  that  the "data 
suggest  that the attorney  should  facilitate  participation  by the client in the decisionmaking 
process," but this was not the case in their  experiment;  they do not remind  the reader  that 
in their other studies individuals  preferred  using advocates rather  than participating  di- 
rectly). Also, the authors  do not attempt  to reconcile  their  work  with individuals'  decisions 
in the world, as in settling lawsuits, choosing alternative  methods of dispute resolution, 
hiring  lawyers, and so on. 
254  Observe  that, in a settlement,  both sides forfeit  the opportunity  to appear  personally 
and participate,  implying  that settlement  destroys value for both parties  if participation  is 
indeed valuable to them. (Also, it is typical that settlements are negotiated  by lawyers 
rather  than  the parties,  indicating  that the parties  attach  no value or negative  value to their 
direct involvement  in proceedings  that affect them-or  that the positive value they place 
on participation  is exceeded by the personal  benefits  they receive from  having  more  expert 
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Another is the form of dispute resolution  typically  specified by contract, 
and these  often  are  of  a  simple  sort.255 Of  particular  relevance  for 
Mathews v.  Eldridge, individuals' private disability contracts presumably 
do not  provide for personal appearances in formal hearings.256  Moreover, 
in such  instances,  individuals  who  agree  to  summary procedures  forgo 
not  only the benefits of greater personal involvement  per se but also any 
positive effect  such involvement  may  have on the accuracy of outcomes. 
Finally, it is important to recall from  Subsection  IVA2 that individuals' 
incentives to promote  their interests  in claims proceedings,  by personal 
appearance or  otherwise,  tend  to  be  socially  excessive.  Thus,  even  if 
individuals, at the time disputes arose, did value further participation and 
were willing  to  pay  for  it,  satisfying  such  preferences  may  be socially 
undesirable.257 
255  See  Subsection  IIB4a supra. For example, in the extensive battle for credit card 
customers,  no company  has achieved a large market  share by  advertising  that it offers the 
opportunity  to present  disputes  in person. 
Further  evidence is that few individuals  take the opportunity  to appear  in traffic  court to 
dispute  violations. Those who do, one suspects, usually face serious consequences (the 
violation  is serious, the last in a series, or will involve a significant  increase in insurance 
rates)  or attach  a low value to  their  time (for  example,  they may be currently  unemployed). 
In  addition,  the option of disputing  in writing  may be unavailable.  Of course, when the 
dispute  is minor,  the process value, if it exists, may be  sufficiently  small  to have little effect 
in  any event. 
256  In fact, insurance  dispute resolution  may provide less by way of formal  procedural 
protection  than was present  in Mathews  v. Eldridge. 
257  As the analysis in Subsection  IVA2 demonstrated,  claimants'  incentives  ex post-at 
the time of adjudication-are socially excessive. This implies that ex ante-for  example, 
before  knowing  whether  they would  ever become disabled-they  would  benefit  from  enter- 
ing  into an arrangement  that reduced  their prospective  rights  in adjudication  in exchange 
for  lower tax payments  to fund the disability  program.  Evidence  from  insurance  contracts, 
in  which  such ex ante contracting  takes place, is thus particularly  probative  in this context. 
See Kaplow, supra note 188. Michelman  suggests that not all waivers of process rights 
should  be valid: "[I]n this case the contractual  commitment  is one whereby  the one who 
makes  it treats himself as a mere means-trading away not just a portion of his future 
freedom  of action but  his very claim  to be treated  as a fully valued  person. In that respect 
the waiver seems distantly  akin to voluntary,  contractual  enslavement."  Frank  I. Michel- 
man,  Formal  and  Associational  Aims in Procedural  Due Process, in 18  Nomos: Due Process 
126, 167 n.66 (J. Roland  Pennock & John  W. Chapman,  eds. 1977).  He does not explain, 
however,  how individuals  entering  ordinary  contracts,  such as one agreeing  to employment 
as a store clerk or a football  player, avoid treatment  as less than a fully valued  person. (If 
the distinction  does not arise because of waiver, it must be that the infringement  on auton- 
omy of, say, not appearing  personally  at a hearing,  is worse in kind than there being no 
formal  decision-making  process whatever,  as when one's boss orders  one to act, no ques- 
tions asked, at the risk of being  fired.) See also Stephen  N. Subrin  & A. Richard  Dykstra, 
Notice and the Right  to Be Heard:  The Significance  of Old Friends,  9 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
Rev. 449, 458-59, 479 (1974)  (authors  discuss state action  limit  to constitutional  procedural 
protection  but fail to explain why their rationale  applies to government  but not private 
action except by suggesting  greater governmental  power, implying  that abuse of power 
rather  than principles  such as human  dignity  underlie  the value of procedural  protection, 
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Alternatively, as with some of the fairness concerns that have been 
discussed, one might argue that there is a social interest in a procedure 
that should be considered even if individuals  do not value it.258  That is, 
individuals  should be made to pay, or society should be willing to pay, 
for individuals  to win or lose in person. While there are many contexts 
in which such a procedure  would affect accuracy or the implicit  burden 
of proof and others in which it may alter the effectiveness of a result,259 
an intrinsic  appeal  to process suggests that it should  be valued  even when 
there are no such effects.260 
258  The source and nature  of such values is difficult  to determine.  For example,  Mashaw 
refers  to individuals'  dignity, see supra note 194, at 49-52, but one ordinarily  presumes 
that individuals  care about their dignity. In fact, Mashaw suggests that lack of personal 
participation  causes alienation.  Id. at 50. Yet, without  more  careful  argument  and  evidence, 
it is difficult  to know whether the alienation comes primarily  from losing or from not 
appearing.  (Are those who win similarly  alienated?  See note 249 supra.) One does suspect 
that  individuals  will be more alienated  when they feel action  to be unjustified.  Thus, if they 
were  not allowed  to present  their  case effectively  or learn  of the evidence on the other  side 
that  formed  the basis for an adverse  decision, they may conclude  that  an outcome  is illegiti- 
mate. It is not clear, however, that such concerns call for live testimony.  An opportunity 
to present  evidence in some form and to be informed  of contrary  evidence is usually  desir- 
able to enhance accuracy in any event. Compare  Friendly, supra note 194, at 1279-95 
(discussing  and ranking  different  elements of a fair "hearing"). 
Mashaw  also suggests that benefit denials in the disability  context involve an adverse 
moral  judgment  (that  one is not socially excused from supporting  oneself, as one claimed). 
See Mashaw,  supra, at 51-52. This suggests that an adverse decision involves a sanction 
in addition  to not receiving benefits; if so, this would justify greater  accuracy, and then 
personal  appearance  would be appropriate  if it were a sufficiently  useful way of enhancing 
accuracy.  Mashaw  argues  that personal  appearance  is inherently  necessary  because of the 
moral  component  of the decision, but the benefits  he emphasizes  are allowing  more  empha- 
sis on "a particular  claimant's  vocational  characteristics,  his unique  response  to his medical 
condition,  and the ultimate  predictive  judgment  of whether  the claimant  should  be able to 
work."  Id. at 52. But whether  personal  appearance  enhances  this significantly  (beyond  the 
claimant's  written  submissions,  meeting  with doctors  and  others, and so on) seems more  an 
empirical  question.  (For  example,  it is not explained  why "a particular  claimant's  vocational 
characteristics"  is either moral-in  a way that his medical  condition,  which Mashaw  con- 
trasts, is not-or  something  best observed in person.) In subsequent  work, Mashaw  de- 
emphasizes  this moral  element, at least with regard  to whether  it is desirable  to emphasize 
it in the decision-making  process itself. See Mashaw,  supra  note 87, at 94-95. 
259  Being fined for a traffic  violation  in person, by a judge in robes, may have more of 
an effect on future  behavior  than when a violator  mails a check. Or denying  benefits  to an 
applicant  in person may allow for a live, and thereby more effective, explanation  of the 
reasons,  which  may lead to a better  informed  decision  about  whether  to appeal  or to reapply 
in the future. 
260  The discussion is explicitly addressed  to process values in appearance.  These seem 
closely related to values of participation.  One would similarly  ask why one wishes to 
participate  or why society should  value this. If it is to offer information,  it is subsumed  in 
the discussion  in the text. If it is to interact  with the decision-maker,  it must  be either  that 
one  believes that  this will improve  the reliability  of the outcome  (which  would  be subsumed 
entirely  in the preceding  discussion) or that it improves  the participant  in some manner, 
which  raises questions  analogous  to those discussed in the text. 395  ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION 
2.  Appearances  and Legitimacy261 
Perhaps  a system that allows additional procedures appears to  be  more 
"legitimate."262  Consider  first the  possibility  that the  system  would  be 
seen as more legitimate because  it would appear to  be more accurate.  If 
the  procedures indeed make the system  more accurate, this suggests that 
accuracy is more valuable than economic  analysis typically assumes.  The 
idea may  be that compliance  with legal commands  is enhanced not only 
by more precisely  tailored incentives  but  also  by a belief that the system 
functions well.263 
A second  possibility  is  that  additional  procedures  would  make  the 
system appear more  legitimate  even  though  it is  not  assumed  that the 
procedures make  it  more  accurate.  Again,  there  is  the  problem  from 
Subsection  1 that few  if  any  individuals  actually  focus  carefully  on  a 
hypothetical situation  in which  a new  procedure  is added and it has no 
effect on  the  outcome.  If such  a procedure  were,  nonetheless,  seen  as 
contributing to legitimacy,  one would wish to know why.  One possibility 
is that a procedure  enhances  legitimacy  because  it furthers the sorts of 
values addressed  in  Subsection  1.264 Another  is  that  such  a procedure 
261  A different  sort of process value is associated  with the range  of issues considered by 
decision-makers.  Thus, some have suggested  that irrebuttable  presumptions  or other rules 
that  limit debate in adjudication  have the undesirable  effect of closing off debate in the 
polity  as a whole. See, for example, Laurence  H. Tribe, Structural  Due Process, 10 Harv. 
C.R.-C.L.  L. Rev. 269  (1975). One  might  ground  such a benefit  in an instrumental  argument, 
that  in some circumstances  such a process will improve the quality of a later, ultimate 
decision.  Tribe argues, however, that such a process is not merely a means to enhancing 
outcomes  or legitimacy but  a constitutive  element  of legitimacy.  See id. at 306-7 &  n.114. 
262  This subsection  does not explore what legitimacy  means  or why it might be valuable. 
Of  course, given the resulting  ambiguity  of the subject,  one is unavoidably  more  uncertain 
about  the relevance  of any analysis of it. 
263  If the procedures  do not produce more accuracy, but citizens mistakenly  think that 
they do, there arises a familiar  problem  in governance  that there is no point in attempting 
to illuminate  here. (As an analogy, one might  ask whether  the government  should  adopt  a 
highway  plan that results in more loss of life because most citizens mistakenly  believe 
otherwise.)  One suspects  that, with regard  to designing  the legal system, the public  is indeed 
poorly  informed  about how accurate current  procedures  are or whether  various reforms 
would  improve  or worsen the situation. It could hardly be otherwise, for the problem  is 
complex  and there is virtually  no empirical  information  on the subject available  even to 
experts. 
264  Mashaw  suggests that legitimacy  is needed, which requires  "political  processes that 
respond  to a democratic  morality's  demand  for participation  in decisions  affecting  individual 
and group interests." Mashaw, supra note 194, at 49-50; see id. at 45. Interestingly,  he 
refers to "democratic  morality's" demand rather  than the "democratic  majority's"  de- 
mand,  rendering  the lack of popular  support  for the demand  immaterial.  (At one point, he 
notes the countermajoritarian  purposes of constitutional  protections,  see id. at 58, but he 
does not indicate  the countermajoritarian  problem  in the context of determining  eligibility 
for social security  benefits, for which most of the population  is potentially  eligible.)  What 396  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
may be seen as preventing abuse of power,  as discussed  in Subsection  3 
below.265 
Finally,  if one is concerned  with appearances and legitimacy,  it is use- 
ful to consider whether additional procedures tend to enhance rather than 
detract from the public's view of the legal system (in contrast to lawyers' 
or legal academics'  view).  In recent decades,  one has heard more com- 
plaints about the  litigation  explosion,  the  excessive  monetary  cost  and 
other burdens associated  with particular types of lawsuits,  and excessive 
procedures  delaying  or denying justice  than about a serious  shortage of 
procedures or an inadequacy of opportunities to be involved with lawyers 
or the legal system.266  Although such views  in substantial part involve  an 
unsophisticated  understanding  of  the  legal  system,267 an approach that 
privileged  them  may  warrant less  accuracy  and concern  for procedure 
than indicated by the economic  analysis presented  here. 
the "morality"  is that demands  participation  is unclear. He proceeds to discuss human 
dignity, addressed  previously  in note 258. Later in the section, he repeatedly  notes how 
participation  would  provide  decision-makers  relevant  information,  encourage  them  to focus 
on different  issues, and  affect  their  decisions, see id. at 50-52, suggesting  a close connection 
between his argument  and an instrumental  one concerned  with accuracy.  (The difference 
may  be that  he has in mind  different  criteria  than  the Supreme  Court  that  the decision-maker 
is supposed  to be applying  accurately.  Compare  id. at 44 (arguing  that  consistency-treating 
like cases alike-may  be the only possible index of accuracy, which suggests  that he has 
in mind whether adjudicators  are applying  the same criteria, rather than whether they 
correctly  find the facts-which  defines which cases are alike).) See also id. at 52-54 (dis- 
cussing "equality"  as a separate  value but arguing  for additional  procedural  rights  largely 
on grounds  of accuracy  or to promote  dignitary  values, as in his discussion  of other  values). 
265  Yet another  possibility  is that a procedure  may enhance  legitimacy  in part  because it 
may  hide inevitable  inaccuracies  in adjudication.  See, for example,  In re Winship,  397 U.S. 
358, 364 (1970)  (beyond  reasonable  doubt standard  valuable  so as not to leave community 
"in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned");  Charles Nesson, Reasonable 
Doubt  and Permissive  Inferences:  The Value of Complexity,  92 Harv. L. Rev. 1187  (1979); 
Charles  Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial  Proof and the Acceptability  of 
Verdicts,  98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357  (1985);  Tribe,  supra  note 140.  See also Jonathan  J. Heohler 
& Daniel  N. Shaviro,  Veridical  Verdicts:  Increasing  Verdict  Accuracy  through  the Use of 
Overtly  Probabilistic  Evidence  and  Methods,  75 Cornell  L. Rev. 247  (1990)  (surveying  much 
of the debate on use of probabilistic  evidence and sharply  distinguishing  between whether 
using such evidence increases accuracy, which the authors  claim it does, and whether  it 
furthers  other policies, which it may not); Note, supra note 108, at 1807-14 (exploring 
appearances  argument  as a positive explanation  of hearsay rules but critiquing  such an 
approach  on normative  grounds). 
266  See, for example, Summers, supra note 247, at 39 ("Then, too, lay ignorance  of 
process  values  is widespread.  Consider  how often laymen  seem ready  to dismiss  procedural 
rules  as 'mere technicalities'  even though  these are the very rules which  must secure most 
process values."); id. at 42. 
267  See, for example,  Robert  C. Clark,  Why So Many  Lawyers?  Are They Good or Bad? 
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3.  Abuse of Power 
Additional procedural safeguards are advocated-sometimes  implic- 
itly-on  the ground that they make abuse of power more difficult.268 
Thus, for example, if decision-makers  are required  to state reasons for 
their  decisions, it may be easier to detect inadequate  effort  or impermissi- 
ble grounds  for decisions.269  The benefits of enhanced  detection are two- 
fold: decision-makers  have a greater  incentive to behave properly  in the 
first  place if their misbehavior  is more likely to be observed; and misbe- 
havior  that nonetheless occurs may be easier to correct, through  appeals 
of individual  cases, removal of decision-makers,  or reforms of the pro- 
cess.270  Concerns such as these directly involve problems of accuracy. 
When decisions are made haphazardly  or on criteria other than those 
deemed relevant, more errors  will occur. 
There is  a further connection between accuracy and the abuse of 
power. If a system must be structured  so that it provides accurate out- 
comes, it will tend to be more difficult  to manipulate,  as by prosecuting 
individuals  based on fabricated charges. An abusive government may 
have the alternative  of enacting substantive  rules making  illegal the be- 
havior it finds threatening.  Some such enactments  are directly regulated 
by constitutional  provisions, such as the First Amendment,  the prohibi- 
tions on ex post facto laws and  bills of attainder,  and  limits  on the govern- 
ment's power to take property. In addition,  enactment  of offensive sub- 
stantive law may be self-limiting  because it will be more difficult  for a 
government  to hide the purposes of its actions. Thus, it may be no acci- 
dent that so many constitutional  protections concerned with controlling 
government power  involve  adjudication and  often  concern its  ac- 
curacy.271 
268  Although  the relationship  between procedural  protections  and abuse of power is not 
usually  addressed  in depth, it is common  for advocates  of intrinsic  process values to offer 
references  to fears of abuse of power in support. See, for example, Subrin  & Dykstra, 
supra  note 257, at 456-57, 458-59; Tribe, supra  note 203, at 666-67, 718. 
269  The problem  of effort is a general  problem  of incentives  that  arises when agents  must 
be relied  on to implement  mandates  specified  by others-in  this context, by the legislature 
or executive  officials.  A more  particular  worry  is that  decisions  will not merely  be occasion- 
ally erroneous  due to insufficient  effort but rather  will be infected  by prejudice. 
270  Redish  and Marshall  distinguish  intrinsic  arguments  concerning  the benefits  of reveal- 
ing reasons for official  decisions: "An official's revelation  that he has acted arbitrarily  in 
dealing  with an individual,  though  perhaps  helpful  in certain  senses to the individual,  does 
not, in and of itself, treat that individual  with dignity. As long as the individual  can do 
nothing  to alter  the outcome, the revelation  does not alter  the morally  unacceptable  fact of 
arbitrary  governmental  treatment."  Redish & Marshall,  supra  note 246, at 490. 
271  Of course, some constitutional  procedural  protections  may interfere  with accuracy, 
as when credible  evidence is excluded  on account  of Fourth  Amendment  violations  or when 398  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Concerns  about abuse  of power  may,  however,  raise independent  is- 
sues. First, one may be more concerned with errors that arise, say, due to 
racial prejudice than as a result of inevitable imperfection in fact-finding. 
Second,  problems involving abuse of power may involve a more complex 
dynamic. A procedure-say,  delegating a decision entirely to an expert- 
may normally be both cheap and accurate but, in the wrong hands or in 
tense  times,  may go awry.272  These  factors  may affect an assessment  of 
how valuable accuracy  is in a given context  or the determination of how 
accurate various procedures would be in practice,273  and also complicate 
the economic  analysis.274 
Finally,  it is useful  to observe  that concerns  for abuse of power  may 
fit more comfortably than others with the legal context  in which disputes 
over accuracy  have  arisen-constitutional  challenges  concerning  proce- 
dural due  process.275 Some  commentators  have  remarked that  a cost- 
benefit calculus276  such as that employed  in Mathews  v. Eldridge is not 
the Confrontation  Clause leads to excluding  the only available  evidence of a crime. See, 
for example, Smith  v. Murray,  477 U.S. 527, 544-46 (1986)  (Stevens, J., dissenting).  This 
suggests that maximizing  accuracy is not in all instances the best way to control abuse. 
See note 138  supra. The point here is merely  that it is often useful toward  that end. More- 
over, when a procedure  that reduces  accuracy  in a given case is adopted  to deter  abuse, it 
may be that overall accuracy  is enhanced  in the process. (Nonetheless, some procedures 
are advocated  on grounds  of fairness or dignity  that are not claimed  to be instrumentally 
motivated.) 
272  As another  example, if a fact-finder  is allowed  to deviate  from scheduled  damages  to 
fine-tune  its award,  this added  discretion  may provide  more room  for abuse. 
273  Analyzing  the latter requires a positive analysis of government  institutions,  which 
differs  entirely  from the sort of analysis  presented  here. 
274  If inaccuracy  is due to prejudice  rather  than  adjudicators'  inability  to produce  accurate 
assessments  even while making  the best possible inferences  from incomplete  information, 
inaccurate  awards  would be biased, rather  than being correct  on average  (as was assumed 
in much of the analysis in Part II). It is desirable  to eliminate  systematic  bias-whether 
produced  intentionally  or through  misunderstanding-regardless  of whether  actors  ex ante 
have precise information  about the actual harm  they will cause. (Those favored  by antici- 
pated  error  will be underdeterred,  and  those disfavored  will be overdeterred.)  This situation 
is like the case analyzed  in Subsection  IIA4, if one assumes  that actors  anticipate  the error 
ex ante. See also Subsections  IIAlc and IIB3 and note 9 supra. 
275  One  also might  defend  constitutional  review  of procedural  protections  on separation  of 
powers  grounds.  Thus, if process is insufficient,  an agency  may  be seen as not implementing 
Congress'  commands.  Such an approach  would have much in common  with the positivist 
one suggested  in many  of the Court's  opinions,  see, for example,  Board  of Regents  v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564 (1972), and taken to its most extreme form in Justice Rehnquist's  plurality 
opinion  in Arnett  v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.  134 (1974)  (defining  property  rights  as limited  by 
the procedure  provided),  a position  rejected  by the Court  in Cleveland  Board  of Education 
v. Loudermill,  470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
276  It also is not clear that an analysis emphasizing  participation,  dignity, or other fre- ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION  399 
obviously suited to implementation  by appellate courts rather than by 
legislative bodies or specialized agencies.277  Moreover, the Due Process 
Clause is a component of the Bill of Rights, much of which is designed 
to protect individuals  against potential government  abuse.278  Thus, it is 
not necessarily  appropriate  for the courts' tests of the constitutionality  of 
procedures  to mirror  an economic analysis designed to determine  which 
procedures  are socially best.279 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The economic analysis of accuracy in adjudication  suggests that the 
effects and value of accuracy depend greatly on the legal setting. Accu- 
racy in the assessment of damages  is relevant  primarily  because of how it 
affects the precision with which legal rules control behavior. But greater 
accuracy  ex post, in adjudication,  only improves  ex ante behavior  to the 
extent that individuals  are knowledgeable,  at the time they act, about  the 
detail an adjudicator  later will learn. An important  complication  is that 
the anticipation  of greater accuracy in adjudication  induces individuals 
to become more informed  before they act. Greater  accuracy is valuable 
if it results in a sufficient  improvement  in behavior to justify its cost in 
adjudication  as well as the additional  costs individuals  incur to become 
informed  about the legal consequences of contemplated  acts. It is noted, 
however, that individuals'  incentives to present information  in adjudica- 
tion are not closely related to the social value of accuracy; in some in- 
stances, there are tendencies for these private  incentives to be excessive. 
quently  expressed  concerns  is more appropriate.  One might  believe that courts  are experts 
in such matters  as participation  in adjudication,  but presumably  they are similarly  expert 
in the accuracy of adjudication.  A distinction could, of course, be maintained  if "due 
process" is interpreted,  as a matter  of definition,  to include  concerns  for participation  but 
not concerns  for accuracy. 
277  See,  for example,  Mashaw,  supra note  183, at 1439, 1450-52;  Tribe, supra note 203, 
at 718. There  are also problems  with designing  procedures  through  piecemeal  adjudication. 
See, for example, note 209 supra. 
278  See, for example, Wolff v. McDonnell,  418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)  ("[t]he touchstone 
of due process is protection  of the individual  against  arbitrary  action of government");  see 
Mashaw,  supra note 195, at 898. 
279  It does not follow that courts should have no concern for an economic analysis or 
even that  the inquiry  into abuse of power  is wholly  distinct.  Rather,  it may be, for example, 
that  courts  should  limit  their  attention  to concerns  for abuse  of power  and  attempt  to assure 
that procedures  adopted  are sufficient  to avoid significant  threats,  to the extent that this is 
feasible. In some instances, this may involve requiring  more or less procedural  protection 
than would otherwise be prudent;  in others it may involve imposing different sorts of 
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Accuracy  in determining liability  affects  deterrence  and the  costs  of 
imposing sanctions.  With regard to the former, greater accuracy,  along 
with increased  enforcement  effort and higher sanctions,  is a way  to en- 
hance deterrence.  Increasing  accuracy  differs  in that it allows  a given 
level of deterrence  to be  achieved  while  imposing  sanctions  less  often, 
which is an additional benefit when sanctions are socially costly.  Increas- 
ing accuracy-which  reduces  false  convictions  of the innocent and mis- 
taken acquittals  of the  guilty-is  distinguished  from raising the burden 
of proof-which  reduces false convictions  but increases mistaken acquit- 
tals. The discussion  emphasizes  that accuracy is one of many instruments 
of the legal system,  and the optimal degree of accuracy  cannot be sepa- 
rated  from how other aspects  of the system  are designed. 
When adjudication  determines  future  rights  and obligations,  greater 
accuracy is valuable directly,  as it determines the extent to which future 
actions conform to legal norms.  (Accuracy  may continue to have values 
similar  to those  in other contexts  because  the anticipation of pronounce- 
ments  governing future circumstances  will influence prior behavior.) The 
value of accuracy  in this context-which  receives  the most attention in 
discussions of procedural due process  with regard to government entitle- 
ments-is  often  misunderstood  because  of  a failure to  distinguish  the 
purposes and effects  of  accuracy  and of changes  in the implicit burden 
of  proof. 
While  this investigation  of accuracy  is confined to economic  consider- 
ations, it is  observed  that the  economic  analysis  incorporates  to  some 
extent  many other values  thought to be implicated by accuracy,  such as 
the  fairness  of over-  or undercompensating  accident  victims  or the cost 
of  mistakenly  sanctioning  the  innocent.  Moreover,  the  discussion  sug- 
gests that admitting other  values  may  affect  the  analysis  in  surprising 
ways. For example,  placing  added weight  on a concern  for mistakenly 
sanctioning  the innocent  may favor a legal strategy that employs  higher 
sanctions. 
This  preliminary study of such a broad subject is inevitably incomplete. 
First,  because  the  effects  and value  of accuracy  depend greatly on the 
context,  further investigation  is necessary  both to explore  contexts  not 
considered  here and to  study more carefully those  that are examined  in 
order  to determine how generally the analysis applies. Second,  the analy- 
sis  can be applied in a concrete  situation only after examining how partic- 
ular  legal rules affect accuracy and how accuracy will affect individuals' 
behavior.  Third,  this  article  is  confined  to  economic  considerations- 
notably,  the  extent  to  which  behavior  and the granting of  entitlements 
conforms  to the law and the various public and private costs  of adminis- ACCURACY  IN ADJUDICATION  401 
tering the law.  Some  regard this perspective  as including most  or all of 
what is relevant,280  while others believe  that significant weight should be 
accorded to additional concerns.  It is to be hoped that the present inquiry 
will serve two purposes: to suggest that the effects  and value of accuracy 
should  not  be  taken  almost  entirely  for  granted,  and  to  outline  some 
important lines of analysis  in a wide range of legal settings. 
280  One might  think  that Jeremy  Bentham  would  be the prototype,  although  his views on 
procedure  are more complicated  than  they first  appear.  See Gerald  J. Postema,  The Princi- 
ple of Utility and the Law of Procedure:  Bentham's  Theory of Adjudication,  11 Ga. L. 
Rev. 1393  (1977). 